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

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ABSTRACTS

Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration

By A. H. BIRCH

The recent growth of minority nationalist movements poses the conceptual question of the validity of social science theories dealing with national integration, and the practical question of assessing the options open to governments faced with nationalistic agitations and demands for secession. Older theories predicting the decline of ethnic and cultural conflicts have been challenged by the theory of internal colonialism and by a group of theories stressing the durability of ethnic loyalties. The theory of internal colonialism is analyzed and found to be unhelpful. The durability of ethnic loyalties is accepted; four propositions are advanced to explain the growth of minority nationalist movements. It is suggested that this is a rational development in view of recent changes in the international order. Canadian and British experience indicates that it is difficult for governments to prevent demands for secession from arising. However, the growth of interdependence has reduced the significance of secession; this view is supported by a brief analysis of relations between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic.

Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence

By J. L. SNYDER

Decision makers in international crises seek to reconcile two values: on the one hand, avoiding the loss of prestige and credibility that capitulation would entail and, on the other, avoiding war. These values conflict with each other, in the sense that any policy designed to further one of them will jeopardize the other. Cognitive theory suggests that in ambiguous circumstances a decision maker will suppress uncomfortable value conflicts, conceptualizing his dilemma in such a way that the values appear to be consonant. President Kennedy's process of decision and rationalization in the Cuban missile crisis fits this pattern. He contended that compromise would allay the risk of war in the short run only at the cost of increasing it in the long run. Thus, he saw his policy of no compromise as furthering both the goal of maintaining U.S. prestige and credibility and the goal of avoiding war.

A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations

By R. J. MITCHELL

Contemporary Soviet doctrine on international relations emphasizes changes in the relationships of both domestic and world political structures; all the processes of restructuring are said to be "organically" interconnected. An extensive reconceptualization of domestic processes of social change has provided ideological legitimation for elites in the highly bureaucratized Soviet system. Meanwhile, according to Soviet spokesmen, the world correlation of forces has shifted decisively in favor of the U.S.S.R. Because of this change in the world balance, the Soviets claim the power to set the rules in international relations. The new Brezhnev Doctrine projects the U.S.S.R. as the center of the world, largely determining the direction and pace of political change. The Soviet leaders view détente in terms of rational acceptance by the "imperialist camp" of unavoidable processes of restructuring favorable to the "socialist camp."

Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management

By S. CHAN

Qualitative analysis of China's behavior in five situations of international conflict suggests several important similarities in the structure and sequence of Peking's actions. These similarities imply the existence of a relatively stable and coherent strategy of conflict management, and provide a basis for inferring the nature of this strategy. As a

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result of China's strategic vulnerability, this strategy places a major emphasis on engaging in confrontations with stronger adversaries only under carefully controlled conditions, and on manipulating the "incidental" aspects of these confrontations (e.g., time, place, target, and scale of confrontation) to Peking's advantage. Peking's relative success in applying this strategy is assessed in terms of the "coercive diplomacy" model discussed by Alexander George *et al.* This assessment identifies areas of strength and weakness in the Chinese approach to conflict management.

Political Convergence: An Empirical Assessment

By D. N. NELSON

When détente emerged as the focal point of American foreign policy in the early 1970's, the issue of whether or not communist political systems were becoming more like Western democracies over time (i.e., "converging") was raised. This paper assesses political scientists' efforts to analyze such a hypotheses, particularly the implication that socioeconomic changes called "development" and "modernization" co-vary with fundamental political change. After identifying three components of the convergence hypothesis—pluralism, nationalism, and legitimacy—the author examines published research for empirical evidence regarding these phenomena. He stresses the similarities and differences of political change among communist states. Convergence theory is found to be inadequate in most respects for understanding the relationships between socioeconomic and political changes, although various political trends (such as pluralization) are evident.

Professor Renzo De Felice and the Fascist Phenomenon

By A. J. GREGOR

Renzo De Felice's most recent publications, *Mussolini il duce* and *Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice*, have caused considerable consternation among both the lay and academic public. De Felice has suggested that generic fascism, and particularly Italian Fascism, may have displayed some progressive and revolutionary features. He goes on to suggest that Italian Fascism shared some affinities with the traditional "left." Most of these contentions are well supported in the specialized literature; while they may cause some *political* discomfort, they should generate little *intellectual* resistance. The discussion concerning sensitive political issues has caused scholars to neglect some important methodological theses which De Felice is prepared to defend. The most critical issue turns on the role and legitimacy of generalizing over an ill-defined generic fascism. De Felice has attempted to restrict the characterization "fascist" to one or two strictly European regimes. The article concludes that there are no methodological grounds for such a restriction.

The Global Logic of the Neoconservatives

By F. AJAMI

Robert W. Tucker's *The Inequality of Nations* is a critical work on Third-World egalitarianism and those in the First and Third World who urge greater equality among states. Inequality, maintains Tucker, is built into the system of states; new sensibilities that question inequality are thus unwarranted and historically groundless. This essay subjects Tucker's views and the broader neoconservative consensus on global egalitarianism to a critical assessment.

The Emerging Morphology of the World's Legislatures

By S. C. PATTERSON

In recent years there has been quite a growth in the corpus of research on legislatures, so that today studies of the legislature are extant for about two dozen countries. Studies of Third-World representative assemblies have demonstrated a remarkable degree of "linkage" between legislators and constituents. Alongside research on European and Asian legislatures, these inquiries make possible a better understanding of the contributions of legislative institutions to political integration. More generally, the accumulating literature on legislatures permits the construction of functional typologies which are more empirically adequate than earlier ones.

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MINORITY NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AND THEORIES OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

By ANTHONY H. BIRCH

THE rise or resurgence of minority nationalist movements has become so widespread in the last decade that it is no longer necessary to begin a paper on the subject with a list of examples. The fact that France, the "one and indivisible republic," experienced nationalist agitations in five separate parts of the country during 1976 may be taken as symbolic confirmation of the ubiquity of this development. The purpose of this paper is to discuss two consequential questions that have arisen, one conceptual and the other practical. The conceptual question is that of the relevance and validity of social science theories dealing with political or national integration; the practical question is that of assessing the options open to governments faced with nationalistic agitations and possible demands for secession.

From the middle of the last century until the last decade, most social theorists have believed that the development of industrial society would be accompanied by the withering away of conflicts based on ethnic or cultural divisions. Marxists have always taken the view that such conflicts were a passing phase of capitalist society, essentially irrelevant to the class struggle and certain to be engulfed by class warfare when the latter developed. Many American writers, possibly influenced by the "melting-pot" ideal of American society, have also assumed that ethnic, cultural, and nationalistic conflicts are less fundamental and less enduring than economic conflicts. The persistence of conflicts of the former kind has either been described as a manifestation of residual loyalties from an earlier phase of social development, due to fade away as people become more rational, or has been characterized as "essentially" a form of economic conflict, even though the participants may not recognize it as such.

Other types of theory have pointed in the same direction. On the one hand, there is what sociologists call the "diffusionist" theory of social integration, associated with such eminent scholars as Talcott Parsons, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Neil J. Smelser, according to which the culture and values of the core community in a society are gradually diffused throughout the peripheral communities. In line with this, but

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more specific, is the theory developed by Karl Deutsch in the fifties, according to which the development of both social and political integration depends on the extent of mass communications and social interaction, which can be measured by a number of indicators showing the volume of transactions between people in different regions, or belonging to different groups.[1]

The mounting evidence that these theories are incomplete, and may even be misleading, has produced two theoretical reactions, of which one may be called hard and the other soft. The hard reaction, given this adjective because (like the theories of Marx and Deutsch) it involves the construction of a predictive model, has come from a group of writers who may be called "the internal colonialists." The soft reaction, which does not involve a predictive model, has come from a group who may be described as "the new ethnicists." Each of these theories will be examined briefly.

The Internal Colonialists

The chief proponent of this theory of social development is Michael Hechter.[2] He does not claim to have invented it and suggests that it was first adumbrated in Lenin's analysis of the development of Russian capitalism and, some years later, in Gramsci's discussion of the Italian South.[3] More recently, the concept has been used by Latin American sociologists.[4] But Hechter is the first scholar to have conducted a full-length historical study to test the validity of the theory.

The essence of the theory is that the relationships between members of the core community and members of the peripheral communities in a state are characterized by exploitation. The core community, having acquired an advantage over the outlying communities in the period of state building or in the early period of modernization, uses its political and economic power to maintain its superior position. The cultural and (in some states) ethnic differences between the communities do not disappear, however, and in certain circumstances they may form the basis of demonstrations and separatist agitations by members of the peripheral communities.

[1] See Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communications* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1953). It should be noted that Deutsch has modified his theory in later writings.

[2] Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975).

[3] *Ibid.*, 8-9.

[4] See Pablo Gonzales-Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," and Rodolpho Stavenhagen, "Classes, Colonialism, and Acculturation," both in *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 1 (1965).

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The country chosen for a case study is the United Kingdom, and Hechter claims that British history between 1536 and 1966 validates the theory. The study is thorough, well written, and contains many illuminating passages. In addition to a re-interpretation of the history of relations between England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, Hechter has made an elaborate analysis of voting statistics. Using the technique of multiple regression, he demonstrates the persistence of regional variations in voting behavior which cannot be explained in terms of the normal social and economic variables and have to be ascribed to cultural factors. However, variations of this kind do not necessarily imply exploitation; it is possible to question whether the evidence presented in the book actually validates the internal colonial model.

The two basic propositions of the model can be summarized as follows.

(1) The dominant community (in this case the English) define and regulate influential roles and positions in the state in such a way as to exclude members of the peripheral communities.
(2) The economic development of the peripheral regions is controlled so as to make them highly specialized in their products, and thus more vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets than the core region is.[5]

Little hard evidence is given to support the second proposition, and even less to support the first. The following facts are relevant to the latter.

(a) At the time of the 1971 census, 17 percent of the population of the United Kingdom lived in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
(b) Twenty-two percent of Members of Parliament represent constituencies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
(c) The M.P.'s of Scottish and Welsh origin and upbringing representing English constituencies considerably outnumber the M.P.'s of English origin and upbringing representing non-English constituencies, so that a breakdown in terms of origins and upbringing would give a figure in excess of 22 percent for the peripheral communities.
(d) In the 20th century, 35 percent of British Prime Ministers (6 out of 17) have been Scottish, Welsh, or Irish.
(e) At the time of writing (March 1977), 18 percent of Cabinet

[5] See Hechter (fn. 2), 9-10 and 38-40.

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Ministers (4 out of 22) are Scottish or Welsh; the Speakers of both Houses of Parliament are Welshmen; and the Leader of the Liberal Party is a Scotsman.

(f) The peripheral communities are adequately represented in the top ranks of the civil service. In 1975, 21 percent of the Permanent Secretaries of government departments (6 out of 28) were Scottish or Welsh.

(g) When appointing advisory committees, British governments lean over backwards to ensure that the peripheral regions are adequately represented. For example, the Royal Commission on the Constitution comprised 15 Commissioners, of whom 6 (i.e., 40 percent) were Scottish, Welsh, or Irish, together with 12 Assistant Commissioners, *all* of whom were Scottish, Welsh, or Irish.

(h) The peripheral communities are also well represented in the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary. The three outstanding generals in the Second World War (Lords Alanbrooke, Alexander, and Montgomery) were all Ulstermen. In January 1977 the Home Secretary (of Welsh origin) appointed a Scotsman from Glasgow to take charge of the London police. All judges in Scotland are Scottish; all judges in Northern Ireland are Irish; and although England and Wales are treated as one area for the administration of justice, the Welsh are adequately represented in relation to their numbers.

In a small country with a great deal of geographical mobility among the middle classes, it would require painstaking research to make a complete analysis of the ethnic composition of political and administrative elites. However, if allegations are made of persistent discrimination by one ethnic group against others, the onus of proof rests with the writer making the allegations. In the absence of such proof, I believe that the evidence cited above, even though it is not as systematic or complete as one would wish, is sufficient to cast serious doubt on the validity of Hechter's first proposition.

Of course, proponents of the model of internal colonialism may argue that individuals from the peripheral communities who achieve positions of high status and influence are like blacks who pass for white, achieving personal advantage at the cost of deserting their own communities. Indeed, Hechter mentions this at one point and suggests that selective co-optation of such careerists "serves to remove potentially divisive

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leadership from the peripheral group and thereby ensures stabilisation of the cultural division of labour."[6]

However, the weakness of this argument is its tendency to circularity. If there were clear evidence of a cultural division of labor, as there is between blacks and whites in the United States, it might be reasonable to argue in this fashion about the position of exceptional black citizens who reach positions of prominence. But not all societies follow the American pattern and, until clear evidence that a society does so has been marshalled, it is dangerous to make generalizations based on American experience. If this line of argument is used in a generalized way to discount all successful careers by members of minority communities, the original proposition is thereby rendered incapable of disproof and its scientific status is undermined.

The second basic proposition of the internal colonial model is also open to doubt. First, it is not clear that a high degree of industrial specialization is necessarily a bad thing. The two most prosperous European countries, Switzerland and Sweden, both depend for their prosperity on the production of specialized products for the export market. Second, the contemporary situation in the United Kingdom does not fit the model. The figures in Table 1 show the coefficients of specialization of employment of the standard economic regions of the United Kingdom, the coefficient indicating the minimum percentage of each region's employed population that would have to change from one type of industry to another to make the regional distribution coincide with that of the whole United Kingdom.

There seems to be no way in which these figures can be interpreted so as to support the internal colonial model. Of the three non-English regions, Northern Ireland is highly specialized, Wales has a coefficient that is a little higher than the regional mean of 13.9, and Scotland is the least specialized of all. If a distinction is drawn between the two most prosperous regions and the rest of the country, it becomes clear that there is no relationship between specialization and prosperity, as the South East is one of the least specialized regions and the West Midlands is one of the most specialized. These figures support the view that the degree of specialization in a region depends on the accidents of economic geography and economic history, as does the level of prosperity in such region.

In Chapter 5 of his book, Hechter points out that per capita incomes in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have always been a little

[6] *Ibid.*, 41.

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TABLE 1

SPECIALIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT IN REGIONS OF THE U.K. IN 1966

Degree of Specialization	*Region*	*Coefficient of Specialization*
High	West Midlands	20.4
	Northern Ireland	20.4
Medium	Wales	14.7
	East Anglia	14.4
	South West	14.0
	East Midlands	13.9
Low	Yorkshire	12.5
	North	12.0
	South East	11.7
Very Low	North West	10.2
	Scotland	8.9

Source: A. J. Brown, *The Framework of Regional Economics in the United Kingdom* (Cambridge University Press 1972).

lower, on average, than in England. That fact is undeniable, but it is not necessarily evidence of English exploitation as there are obvious differences in geography and natural resources which can account for the differences in prosperity. Thus, Northern Ireland has no mineral resources whatever and is separated by sea from the populous mainland. All three non-English regions have more hilly country, less fertile land, and lower densities of population than England, the figures for population per square mile in 1971 being as follows: England, 915; Scotland, 175; Wales, 341; Northern Ireland, 292. The non-English regions are appreciably further from the profitable export markets of continental Europe and, although poorer than England as a whole, are not (apart from Northern Ireland) poorer than some of the English regions. The regional figures for Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1964, given as percentages of the U.K. figure, are as follows: South East England, 113; West Midlands, 109; Yorkshire and Humberside, 99; North West England, 98; East Midlands, 98; Wales, 88; South West England, 88; East Anglia, 87; Scotland, 86; Northern England, 85; Northern Ireland, 66.[7]

In any case, it would be surprising if relative poverty were given as a general explanation of minority nationalism. In Spain, the Basque country and Catalonia are the most prosperous regions of the country

[7] Commission on the Constitution, *Research Paper 10* (London: H.M.S.O. 1973), 72.

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outside Madrid, not the poorest. Scottish nationalism has been stimulated, not weakened, by the discovery of North Sea oil and the consequent emergence of parts of eastern Scotland as the most booming areas of the United Kingdom. The independence movements in Biafra and Katanga derived some of their strength from the relative prosperity of these regions. The reasons for the growth of minority nationalist movements cannot be reduced simply to economic variables.

I would suggest, therefore, that contemporary data on the United Kingdom provide little evidence for the two basic propositions of the theory of internal colonialism. I would not suggest that this invalidates the whole theory, which may have considerable explanatory power in other parts of the world, such as Latin America. It may also be a useful model for the interpretation of Anglo-Irish relations from the 17th century until the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. But the theory does not help to explain the growth of Scottish and Welsh nationalism in the past decade, and it clearly lacks the universal validity that some of its proponents claim for it.

The New Ethnicists

Under this heading I should like to group all those scholars who have corrected the balance of social theory in recent years by drawing attention to the strength and endurance of ethnic and cultural loyalties, without committing themselves to a firm predictive model. The best-known members of this group are probably Daniel Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, Walker Connor, and Wendell Bell, but many other scholars have developed a similar line of argument.[8]

One of the problems which these writers have posed is that of terminology. As William Petersen has noted, Americans habitually tie the concept of "nation" so closely to that of "state" that they find difficulty in using it in relation to ethnic groups within a state.[9] It is also relevant that the increased willingness to recognize the legitimacy of ethnic

[8] See Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, eds., *Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Comparative International and Historical Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications 1974); Ernest Q. Campbell, ed., *Racial Tensions and National Identity* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press 1972); Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), and "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, xxiv (April 1972); Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, xxvii, No. 1 (1973); Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973); Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1975); and Martin L. Kovacs and A. J. Cropley, *Immigrants and Society: Alienation and Assimilation* (Sydney: McGraw-Hill 1975).

[9] See William Petersen, "On the Subnations of Western Europe" in Glazer and Moynihan (fn. 8), 177-208.

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loyalties and cultural differences within American society has not (with the partial exception of blacks) led to movements that could reasonably be described as "nationalistic." Petersen has therefore suggested "subnation" (and presumably "subnationalism") as an all-purpose term, while Walker Connor favors "ethnonationalism."[10]

However, I am not convinced that it is necessary (or helpful) to coin these slightly cumbersome words. Any movement that aspires to political autonomy for a community within a definable area deserves to be described as a nationalist movement. It would hardly be appropriate to refer to "the Basque subnation" or to "Scottish ethnonationalism." If adjectives or prefixes are needed, it would seem more appropriate to use terms like "aspiring nations" and "minority nationalist movements." To be sure, such terms cannot be applied to Italian-Americans or Polish-Canadians, but there is no advantage in devising all-purpose terms that blur important distinctions. What is apparent in North America outside of Quebec is a revival of ethnic consciousness and pride, and although some of the reasons for this may be similar to the reasons for the growth of minority nationalist movements, the resulting phenomena are obviously different.

A further disadvantage of the term "ethnonationalism" is that it may lead writers to exaggerate the ethnic component in nationalist movements. Even so careful a scholar as Walker Connor has succumbed to this temptation on one occasion: when he refers to the conflict in Northern Ireland as being one between Irish and non-Irish groups.[11] Although the Ulster Protestants are mainly descended from settlers who migrated from Britain to Ireland in the 17th century, they have regarded themselves as Irish for many generations and are also regarded as Irish by both the Irish Catholics and the English. The survey data cited by Connor, showing that many Irish Protestants identified themselves as Ulstermen or British, should not be taken to indicate that they do not also see themselves as Irish, for Ulster is a geographic part of Ireland and the term "British" refers to their citizenship, not to their ethnic identity.[12]

Michael Hechter falls into the same trap when he says that "it is difficult to make the case that Scotland is a single 'nation' " because its population includes three separate cultural groups, who are, respec-

[10] See Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," (fn. 8).

[11] See Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" (fn. 8), 339-41.

[12] For a discussion of the political viewpoint of the Ulster Protestants, regarded as a form of nationalism, see Birch, *Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles* (London: Allen and Unwin 1977), chap. 4.

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tively, Celtic, Norwegian, and Anglo-Saxon in origin.[13] He has a point about the one percent of the population who are of Norwegian origin and live in the Shetland Isles. But the remainder of the Scottish people have a rather clear sense of nationhood which is based not on their ethnic origins but on Scotland's long history as an independent state, governed by its own Parliament from the 14th century to the 18th century.

Another question posed by some of these writers is that of the desirability (or otherwise) of recent developments. Some scholars, such as Connor, Kovacs, and Cropley, clearly view them sympathetically. On the other hand, they are regretted by John Porter on the grounds that, first, ethnic awareness entails the danger of ethnic stratification, and second, it marks a retreat from liberal ideas. In his words, "the saliency of ethnic differences is a retreat from the liberal notions of the unity of mankind."[14] However, it is not necessary for scholars, as distinct from policy makers, to commit themselves to a normative position about ethnic loyalties and the resurgence of minority nationalist movements. For the purpose of analysis, what is needed at this stage is to summarize the position in the form of a few simple propositions.

Some Propositions about Minority Nationalism

1. Ethnic loyalties and cultural attachments should be regarded as independent rather than dependent variables.

Of course, this proposition involves a degree of oversimplification. In social and political affairs very few variables are truly independent. Ethnic loyalties become more or less salient in the course of social development as a consequence of all kinds of factors, and so do cultural attachments. Political movements based on these attachments wax and wane. But the point is that the loyalties and attachments themselves persist over very long periods of time, largely irrespective of other factors. The self-consciousness and loyalties of the Scots, the Welsh, the Bretons, the Basques, and other minority groups have survived for centuries despite the political integration of their countries in larger states and the substantial elimination of their languages, which in the Scottish case is almost complete. In comparison with the rapid changes in economic development and political organization of the past hundred years, ethnic and cultural loyalties are durable and relatively permanent.

[13] Hechter (fn. 2), 310.

[14] John Porter, "Ethnic Pluralism in Canada," in Glazer and Moynihan (fn. 8), at p. 291.

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There is nothing surprising about this, for ethnic identity is one of the most unalterable of man's social characteristics, and cultural loyalties are loyalties which only emigrants—indeed, only some emigrants—have an incentive to lose. It clearly makes more sense to treat ethnic and cultural loyalties as given than it does to make the common assumption that they are dependent variables, to be explained in terms of political discrimination, economic exploitation, relative deprivation, and so forth.

2. THE EXTENT TO WHICH ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES ARE CONTENT WITH THEIR SITUATION OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN A LARGER STATE DEPENDS ON THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGES IN ANY PARTICULAR PERIOD.

The object of this proposition is to steer a course between two opposing viewpoints that are to be found in the literature. Traditionally, academic writings on this subject have been dominated by the assumption that nation building is an evolutionary process in which local loyalties are superseded by a wider loyalty to the state as a consequence of bureaucratic penetration, social mobilization, industrialization, and improved communications. Writers of this school have tended to describe local loyalties by such implicitly derogatory terms as tribalism, communalism, and primordial loyalties. At the other extreme, some writers sympathetic to minorities have given the impression that nation building entails nothing but loss to the minority communities, involving the destruction of their distinctive cultures as well as their political and economic domination by the elites of the majority community.

Both of these extremes assume a universality of social trends which can form the basis of universal value judgments. But the real world is not so tidy as this. The incorporation of local communities into a sizeable multipurpose state involves cultural and other sacrifices together with economic and other advantages. The balance of sacrifices and benefits varies from place to place and from period to period, and at any one time it may also be the subject of differing evaluations by the individuals affected.

Thus, during the first half of the 20th century most (but not all) of the citizens of Quebec, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany believed that the benefits they derived from their membership of the Canadian, British, and French states outweighed the cultural and other sacrifices involved. The recent movements of opinion on this subject are best interpreted neither as a retreat from progress nor as an overdue revolt against oppressive systems, but rather as a rational reaction to a change in the

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balance of advantages. The individual circumstances naturally differ from case to case, but certain general factors can clearly be discerned.

3. SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE BETWEEN THE SIZEABLE MULTIPURPOSE STATE AND THE SMALL COMMUNITY HAS CHANGED TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE SIZEABLE STATE.

The three main factors that underlie this proposition are quite independent of one another, but have a cumulative impact on the situation.

(a) The first factor is the changed character of the international system. For the first time since the emergence of the state system, the size of a country's population has ceased to bear a close relationship to its military security. The people of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Canada are protected just as effectively by the NATO alliance and the American nuclear capacity as are the people of France and the United Kingdom. The people of Scotland, Wales, and Quebec would not lose security by seceding from the states to which they now belong, and they might save money on defense expenditures. For all countries but the superpowers, size is also much less important in diplomatic disputes than used to be the case. The medium-sized states are so constrained by the web of international relationships that in some respects they have less freedom of maneuver than small states which for one reason or another find themselves in a favorable position, among which Iceland, Tanzania, and Saudi Arabia are obvious examples. These changes in the international order have removed one of the main benefits to be derived from membership of a sizeable state.

(b) The second factor is the development of supranational organizations like the E.E.C., the Nordic Council, the O.E.C.D., the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Such organizations go some way toward giving citizens of small states the economic advantages that have hitherto been enjoyed only by citizens of large states. These advantages include access to a larger market, capital loans, protection against financial instability caused by local economic difficulties, and the opportunity for geographical mobility for members of the professional classes. The consequence of this development is that members of small societies like Scotland could now gain many

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of the advantages of belonging to a large market for the exchange of goods and services without the sacrifice of local autonomy that has previously been a necessary concomitant. The rules of the E.E.C. actually provide an incentive to secession, as an independent Scotland or Corsica would be entitled to its own representatives in Community institutions and would gain the important power of vetoing decisions in the Council of Ministers.

(c) The third factor is the impact of television on cultural minorities. Television's impact is different in kind from that of other media because it brings the majority culture (often in its least attractive form) right into the living room. It is different because it captures the imagination and sympathies of children to a much greater extent than do printed material or radio. A Welsh child who uses English at school but Welsh at home may retain a lifelong affection for the Welsh language, even though he has to use English at work. But if he watches English television programs each evening and adopts English and American stars as his heroes, he is also apt to develop a preference for the English language. Such a transfer of allegiance may not be reversed by the introduction of compulsory Welsh lessons at school; in this situation it may be Welsh, instead of English, that is perceived as the language the child is *forced* to learn.

Television also differs from the printed word in its enormous costs of production. Minorities cannot support their own channels in the way they support their own publishing firms. In view of these differences it is not surprising that the impact of television often provokes an angry reaction from members of linguistic minorities. People who would do nothing to prevent the gradual erosion of their language over several generations are stirred to protest if they see it threatened with extinction within their lifetime.

4. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE FACILITATED THE TASK OF SMALL BUT DETERMINED MINORITY GROUPS ANXIOUS TO EXERT POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

Though differing in character, four developments facilitate political agitation by passionate minorities.

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(a) The first of these developments is the growth of political impatience, combined with a marked increase in the willingness of democratic regimes to tolerate this impatience. In an era when talk about the future is dominated by predictions of nuclear warfare, world famine, and the exhaustion of energy resources, people are no longer willing to accept a situation that displeases them in the hope that things will be better for their children or grandchildren.[15] Groups campaign vociferously for what they conceive to be their rights—women's rights, gay rights, students' rights, and prisoners' rights are perhaps the most obvious examples—and the readiness of governments to make concessions on these issues has helped to create a climate in which it would be thought unreasonable to refuse concessions to ethnic or cultural minorities.

(b) A second development is the evolution of television news programs, which has proved to be of immense benefit to the propagandist activities of nationalist movements. Whereas such movements in the past had to hold meetings and distribute pamphlets to reach a few thousand people, they can now command an audience of millions by any activity that attracts television coverage.

(c) Technological developments of the past three or four decades have made advanced industrial societies much more vulnerable to direct action by minorities than they have been in the past. Modern societies can be crippled by such measures as a strike by power station engineers, the withholding of fuel supplies to power stations, the destruction of electricity pylons on a national grid, or the sabotage of pipelines carrying oil or natural gas.

(d) A nationalist organization that moves from peaceful forms of direct action to violence can utilize other developments to carry on urban guerrilla warfare or terrorism. These include plastic bombs, incendiary bombs small enough to be concealed in a pocket or woman's handbag, letter bombs, lightweight automatic rifles, and portable rockets. The importance of air travel in particular makes modern societies vulnerable to hijacking; and the combination of these de-

[15] This point has been made by Karl Deutsch in "Between Sovereignty and Integration: Conclusions," *Government and Opposition*, IX (1974).

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velopments with television news coverage means that Mao's slogan, "Kill one, frighten ten thousand" could well be revised to read "Kill one, frighten ten million." Although counterinsurgency techniques have also improved, the balance of advantage seems to have moved toward the guerrillas.

Some Practical Implications

If the above propositions are valid, it follows that we have entered a period in which the authority of sizeable states containing ethnic or cultural minorities within their borders may increasingly be challenged by nationalist movements representing these minorities.[16] At present, there are no indications that the recent change in the balance of advantage between large and small governmental units is a passing phenomenon, likely to be reversed in the near future. The problems for governmental policy makers who (rightly or wrongly) invariably think it their duty to preserve the integrity and unity of the state are aggravated by the fact that it is not at all clear what national governments can do to placate the nationalists.

The recent experiences of the Canadian and British governments illustrate the difficulty rather well, because they have followed radically different strategies. The Canadian strategy has been to allow Quebec to opt out of various federal-provincial arrangements without suffering financial loss, so that in some fields Quebec has achieved a large measure of *de facto* autonomy. It has, for instance, "contracted out of twenty-nine programs dealing with hospital insurance, old age assistance, blind and disabled allowances, the welfare portion of unemployment assistance, technical education, health and other areas."[17] Edwin Black has constructed a "Policy Limitation Index" which measures the constraints on provincial independence in policy making imposed by the Canadian system of conditional grants from the federal to the provincial governments; for 1968 (the latest year quoted) the index for Quebec was 11 compared with a mean index of 52 for the other nine provinces.[18] At the same time, the Official Languages Act of 1969 has given

[16] As several writers have pointed out, there are few, if any, sizeable states which do not contain ethnic or cultural minorities. If a total population of 10 million qualifies a state as sizeable, Japan and the two Koreas are the only ones that come close to complete ethnic homogeneity; and even Japan contains a scattered minority of Korean immigrants.

[17] Edwin R. Black, *Divided Loyalties: Canadian Concepts of Federalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1975), 142.

[18] *Ibid.*, 83.

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French equal status with English in federal government business, and the government has gone quite a long way in implementing policies designed to give substance to the official declaration that Canada is a bilingual country. For instance, prospective immigrants get points for a knowledge of French as well as for a knowledge of English when they apply for visas; Francophone radio and television channels have been established in all major centers of population throughout Canada; and goods cannot be imported or sold unless they have bilingual labels. (This last provision means that specialized goods made in Seattle cannot be sold in the neighboring city of Vancouver unless they have bilingual labels and instructions, even though the nearest Francophone community of any size is about 2,000 miles to the east.) But these measures have not prevented the Quebec nationalists from capturing a majority of seats in the provincial legislature, announcing their intention to make Quebec a monolingual French-speaking province, and declaring their desire to separate Quebec from the rest of Canada.

Recent British governments have pursued the very different policy of giving direct financial advantages to the people of Scotland and Wales through centralized control of the economic and fiscal systems. A pattern of public expenditures designed to benefit Scotland and Wales has been supplemented by special tax allowances and incentives for business firms in these areas, and also by using the national government's control of industrial building permits to force English firms wishing to extend their plants to do so in Scotland, Wales, or those parts of northern England suffering from industrial decline. In 1969–1970, public expenditure per head on locally beneficial services was 16 percent higher in Wales than in England, and 31 percent higher in Scotland than in England.[19] But these policies have not prevented significant electoral gains by the Welsh nationalists and dramatic electoral gains by the Scottish nationalists.

The failure of both Canadian and British government policies to prevent the growth of minority nationalism is not surprising if one views the problem in the way suggested in this paper. If the nationalist movements had arisen as a consequence of specific grievances, one could have expected that their growth would be halted or reversed by remedying the grievances. The whole question takes on a different aspect if minority nationalism is seen as a natural phenomenon now that the benefits of belonging to a sizeable state have diminished. People who are converted to the belief that their community should govern it-

[19] See Commission on the Constitution (fn. 7), 23. For fuller details, see Birch (fn. 12), chaps. 3 and 6.

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self come to view politics through different spectacles, and it is not to be expected that their minds will be changed by piecemeal concessions.

If this analysis is correct, the next two decades may see the emergence of active demands for secession in various parts of the world. This is not absolutely certain, because political inertia and traditional loyalties are hard to overcome, but it is sufficiently likely to make some speculation about the question worthwhile. The evidence of history shows that such demands are normally resisted, by force if necessary. The Swedish authorities permitted Norway to secede peacefully from their union, but it is not easy to find other examples of agreed secession (as distinct from decolonization). The attempted secession by the Southern states of the U.S.A. was crushed in a long civil war that entailed more casualties than any other war in history before 1914. The Irish independence movement was resisted by the British in a bitter campaign of guerrilla activities and reprisals which involved atrocities by both sides. The secession of East Bengal was violently resisted, even though it was separated from the rest of Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Katanga's attempt to secede from the fledgling Congo state provoked a long conflict. Biafra's secession from Nigeria was crushed in a civil war which lasted thirty months and resulted in approximately two million deaths. There have been several secessionist movements in other new states of Africa, which have invariable been resisted in spite of the unnatural location (in ethnic terms) of most African frontiers.

Of the cases cited, only Katanga and Biafra possessed natural resources that gave the state governments a strong economic motive for crushing the secession attempts. The lesson of history is therefore that attempts at secession are generally seen by governmental leaders as a threat to the authority of their regimes which is so intolerable that it is worth spilling blood to prevent it. It is possible that in the coming decades governmental leaders will be more relaxed about this issue, since they have mostly been more tolerant toward demonstrations and sectional claims than in previous periods. But there can be no doubt that the threat to secede from an established state touches a vital nerve in the body politic.

In Canada—as liberal and decentralized a state as can be found in the modern world—the possibility that Quebec might attempt to secede has produced some rather excited reactions. In a Senate debate on February 2, 1977, a Liberal senator from Newfoundland declared that independence for Quebec would be "an unmitigated disaster" and "a catastrophe for the country." He also said that if Quebec seceded, New-

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foundland would abruptly terminate the agreement to supply cheap electric power from Churchill Falls, Labrador, to Hydro Quebec.[20] At the same time, a New Democratic Party M.P. for an Ontario constituency declared that he had conducted a poll which showed that over four-fifths of his constituents were willing to grant more concessions to Quebec to keep the province as part of Canada. He proposed that all of his party's M.P.'s should conduct surveys in their constituencies asking such questions as: "How much are you prepared to pay to keep Quebec in Canada?" and "Would you be prepared to assist Quebec in paying off its Olympic debt?"[21] A leading Canadian political scientist has said that separation "would present quite fearful perils to both French and English Canadians."[22]

While these reactions are entirely understandable, it is also possible that they may be exaggerated. Insofar as recent developments have reduced the military, diplomatic, and economic benefits of belonging to a sizeable state, the change affects members of the majority community as well as members of minorities. There is a tendency for issues like nationalism and secession to be discussed in terms of a model that is rapidly becoming obsolete. It might be called the "Woodrow Wilson model" of a world divided into nation-states, each one sovereign within its area and independent of the rest. The issues appear much less critical and more manageable if we abandon this model and think in terms of an overlapping set of decision-making authorities, autonomous in some respects but interdependent in others.[23] The most realistic way of assessing the consequences of secession for the citizens involved is to view them in functional terms rather than in terms of national sovereignty. As an example, it is illuminating to examine the position of the Republic of Ireland and to ask how much practical difference it makes to the citizens of Britain and Ireland that the countries have been legally independent of each other since 1922.

In terms of political authority, the countries are completely independent of one another, to the great advantage of both. The Irish do not have to put up with British politicians telling them what to do; the British do not have to cope with a large contingent of Irish M.P.'s affect-

[20] Senator Eric Cook, quoted in the *Vancouver Sun*, February 4, 1977.

[21] Max Saltsman, quoted *ibid.*

[22] John Meisel, *Working Papers on Canadian Politics* (2d ed.; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1975), 211.

[23] It is not suggested that the state is becoming obsolete, as some writers have proposed—only that the degree of interdependence between states is now so great that for many purposes it is more meaningful to analyze the situation in terms of areas of relative autonomy and partial dependence than to do so in "absolute" terms like sovereignty and independence.

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ing the balance of power and the conduct of business in the House of Commons. The Irish had the satisfaction of remaining neutral during the Second World War, which was not a serious loss to the British in view of the fact that they had not been able to implement conscription in the face of Irish opposition during the First World War. The only real problem about Irish neutrality was that the Irish ports could not be used by the Royal Navy as bases from which to protect Atlantic convoys, and at one stage during the war Churchill contemplated invading Ireland to seize the ports. However, an occupied Ireland would have posed security problems to the British, and it should be noted that the Irish authorities made no objection to the Royal Air Force using Irish air space.

In terms of citizens' political rights, very little has changed since 1922. There is free movement between the countries, with no checks on immigration and no passports needed. Irish citizens living in Britain have virtually all the rights of British citizens, including voting rights. British citizens living in Northern Ireland have dual citizenship with the Republic, and Britons who move from the mainland to the Republic can easily acquire Irish citizenship if they want it.

The fiscal systems of the two countries are not very different. The level of personal taxation in Ireland is not quite so high as it has recently become in Britain, and levels of public expenditure in Ireland are also somewhat lower. In terms of public services, the Irish are worse off than they would be were they still part of the United Kingdom (in which case they would be subsidized by the wealthier regions of the country); but they think this a price worth paying, and the British are relieved of the burden of subsidizing them.

In economic matters, Ireland is still strongly linked to Britain. In 1922, 96 percent of Irish exports went to the United Kingdom; the proportion did not fall below 90 percent until after the Second World War. Since 1958, Irish governments have pursued a rather successful policy of industrialization coupled with an attempt to reduce their dependence on the British market, but Britain still takes slightly more than half of Irish exports. Britain also provides more capital for Irish industry than any other foreign country. When Britain applied to join the E.E.C., Ireland followed suit. The Irish pound is kept at parity with sterling, so that the Irish economy suffered from the rapid devaluation of sterling between 1974 and 1976. And the very high rate of inflation in Britain since 1973 has been paralleled almost exactly in Ireland.[24]

[24] In the twelve months ending in February 1977, the rate of inflation in the United Kingdom was 16.2% and that in Ireland was 16.7%. The O.E.C.D. figures for neigh-

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In cultural terms, legal independence has not made all that much difference. Irish governments have made determined efforts to revive the Irish language, but they have not been successful outside the *Gaeltacht*; it has been estimated that less than 2 percent of the population actually use Irish as a normal means of communication.[25] The British influence remains considerable, not only because English is the predominant language but also because two-thirds of the Irish people can receive British television and radio programs, full details of which are printed in Dublin newspapers.

If relations between Britain and Ireland are considered in terms of personal transactions, the relevant comparison is with transactions between Britain and Northern Ireland. As the geographic factors are very similar, differences in the level of transactions provide one way of measuring the effects of the legal independence of the Republic. Some relevant figures are given in Table 2.

TABLE 2

TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN

Type of Transaction	*Between Irish Republic and Gt. Britain (in millions)*	*Between N. Ireland and Gt. Britain (in millions)*	*Transactions with the Republic, as a percentage of transactions with N. Ireland (% per capita)*
Passenger movements in 1975	3.3	1.6	103
Freight traffic in 1971	10 (tons)	7 (tons)	71
Letters mailed in 1975–76	126	79	80
Telephone calls in 1974–75	5.4	7.8	35
Telex messages in 1974–75	1.8	1.1	82

Sources: The figures for passenger movements were estimated by the author from data regarding air and sea traffic. The figures for freight traffic were derived from the *Digest of Port Statistics* and the *Irish Statistical Bulletin*. The figures for letters, telephone calls, and telex messages were supplied by the British Post Office.

Three of these five sets of figures show a volume of transactions between the Republic and Britain which, after allowance has been made

boring states were France, 9.1%; Belgium, 8.1%; Holland, 7.3%; Denmark, 11.7%; and Norway, 8.9%.

[25] See Brian O'Cuiv, *Irish Dialects and Irish-speaking Districts* (Dublin: Institute for Advanced Studies 1951).

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for the fact that the Republic has twice the population of Northern Ireland, is between 71 and 82 percent of the volume of transactions between Northern Ireland and Britain. The higher figure for passenger movements probably reflects the fact that the Republic attracts a greater number of tourists than the North. The lower figure for telephone calls reflects the pricing policy of the British Post Office; whereas letters to the Republic cost no more than letters to Northern Ireland, telephone calls are much more expensive. The general conclusion must be that the separation of the Republic from the United Kingdom has made some difference to the volume of transactions between people in the two countries, but not a great deal.

This very brief summary indicates the high degree of interdependence between Britain and the Irish Republic more than fifty years after they separated. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that if Scotland were to secede from the United Kingdom, or Quebec were to secede from Canada, subsequent relationships between these countries would be marked by a similar degree of interdependence.

Of course, secession also involves special problems that vary from case to case. In the Irish case, the special problem was the conflict between Catholics and Protestants, the consequent partition of Ireland, and the subsequent difficulties of the Catholic minority in the North and the Protestant minority in the Republic.[26] In the Scottish case, the special problem would be that of dividing the revenues from North Sea oil in a manner acceptable to both Scotland and England. In the case of Quebec, the special difficulties would be the position of the English-speaking minority in Quebec, and the problem of communications between the Maritime Provinces and the rest of Canada. In any example of possible secession, there are distinctive problems which are peculiar to the area.

These problems tend to be considerable, and it is perhaps natural that politicians and journalists should focus most of their attention on them. But one of the advantages of an academic approach is that problems of this kind can be put into a wider perspective and viewed with a fair degree of detachment. If this is done, the possibility that minority nationalist movements may in some cases lead to secession can perhaps be viewed with more equanimity than is common among political commentators discussing such questions.

[26] The difficulties of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland have been amply documented in recent years, most carefully in Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem* (rev. ed., London: Oxford University Press 1972). For the difficulties of Protestants in the Republic, see Harold Jackson, *The Two Irelands* (London: Minority Rights Group 1971).

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RATIONALITY AT THE BRINK: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence

By JACK L. SNYDER*

I. Introduction: Rationality in a Two-Value Game

ACCORDING to the scenarios imagined by most strategists, nuclear confrontation is a game involving a trade-off between two values. First, there is the value associated with the immediate issue of contention: for instance, in the Cuban missile crisis, maintaining U.S. prestige in the world arena; in the Berlin crisis, maintaining the credibility of U.S. commitments. Second, there is the value of minimizing the possibility that an unwanted general war could result from this superpower confrontation. Assuming a strong commitment on the part of both adversaries, any policy that tries to attain the value associated with the immediate point of contention will tend to increase the likelihood of general war. Conversely, any policy that seeks to maximize the avoidance of war will jeopardize the protection of the first value.[1]

Trying to understand the dynamics of this two-value game has been a chief preoccupation of strategists since the advent of nuclear weaponry. It is important, first of all, to understand how this game *should* be played, so that the decision maker will be able to recognize the strategies that give him the best chance of optimizing his interests and preparing an appropriate force posture, military doctrine, and diplomatic strategy. At the same time, it is also important to understand how the game *will* be played by flesh-and-blood decision makers. This understanding is crucial for two reasons: (1) Since each player's optimal strategy depends on the strategy adopted by his opponent, such an understanding may help the player to estimate his opponent's probable responses and to adjust his own strategy accordingly; (2) If the nonoptimizing strategies adopted by human decision makers tend to occur in regular patterns, then a knowledge of these patterns may help each player to monitor his own strategies.

* An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for Professor Warner Schilling's Colloquium on Military Technology and International Relations at Columbia University, and appeared in the Rand Corporation paper series (P-5740, October 1976). The earlier version includes a more extensive discussion of the 1914 case.

[1] This trade-off relationship is discussed in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 232-38.

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Most discussions of the dynamics of nuclear confrontations have tended to telescope these two questions—"which strategy *should* logically be adopted?" and "which strategy *will* in fact be adopted?"—into a single issue. Either implicitly or explicitly, it is assumed that players will tend to employ strategies which, in a rough way, optimize their values. Take, for example, Thomas Schelling's method for overcoming the shortage of empirical evidence regarding the behavior of decision makers in a nuclear confrontation: "You can sit in your armchair and try to predict how people will behave by asking how you would behave if you had your wits about you. You get, free of charge, a lot of vicarious, empirical behavior."[2]

According to Schelling, the very foundation of strategic theory is "the assumption of rational behavior—not just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages."[3] The theory of deterrence, which receives its most difficult test in the type of superpower confrontation that is under discussion here, rests on such premises. One of its key assumptions is that the deterree will make an estimate of probable costs and probable gains and, on that basis, will be deterred from pursuing a policy that is likely to lead to nuclear war, since no possible gains could outweigh the costs of a nuclear exchange. The theory of deterrence explicitly assumes that the decision maker will recognize the trade-off between the two values and that he will employ a strategy which effects the optimal trade-off between those values, as determined by the decision maker's indifference curve.

Similarly, the strategy of "compellence," as outlined by Schelling in *Arms and Influence*,[4] assumes that the compellee will recognize trade-offs and make the appropriate cost-benefit calculations. That is, once the compeller has "rigged the incentives so that the other party *must* choose in [the compeller's] favor," it is assumed that the compellee will weigh those incentives correctly and recognize his obligation to capitulate.[5]

Strategic research has concerned itself primarily with the internal logic of deterrence theory. To be sure, many strategists include caveats regarding the fragility of rationality in crisis situations. For example, Bernard Brodie cautions his readers not to let the seemingly powerful

[2] From Schelling's article in Kathleen Archibald, ed., *Strategic Interaction and Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1966), 150, as quoted in Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 19.

[3] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960; citation from New York: Oxford University Press 1963), 4.

[4] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (1971 ed., New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 69ff.

[5] Schelling (fn. 3), 37; emphasis added.

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logic of deterrence make them sanguine about the improbability of nuclear attack. Brodie points out that it may not be realistic to assume a dispassionate calculation of costs and benefits under conditions of great uncertainty, especially when an attack is perceived as imminent.[6] Still, the implications of such insights have remained largely unpursued.

There does exist, however, a considerable body of research into nonrational influences on the decision process which might profitably be applied to the problem of deterrence in time of crisis. Most of this research approaches the problem in terms of constraints on an essentially rational decision process—constraints which, nevertheless, may be so great as to completely undermine the rationality of that process. Such constraints may include:

(1) Organizational dynamics, e.g., the organizational processes and bureaucratic politics outlined in Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision.*[7]

(2) Idiosyncratic psychopathologies that may prevent value optimization, as illustrated in Alexander and Juliette George's *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House.*[8]

(3) Non-idiosyncratic cognitive processes that evaluate information and options according to nonrational principles. Phenomena included in this area would be, for example, (a) the tendency to establish, on the basis of inadequate information, a stereotyped image of the adversary and then to maintain that image tenaciously by means of unconscious, selective processing of information,[9] and (b) the alleged tendency of decision makers to advocate riskier policies when responsibility for the decision is shared with a group than when the individual is solely responsible.[10]

A more ambitious approach to nonrationality in decision making can be found in John Steinbruner's *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision.*[11] Steinbruner does not so much describe mere constraints on rational

[6] Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965), 280.

[7] Allison (fn. 2).

[8] George and George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (New York: Dover Publications 1956).

[9] John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 101.

[10] See Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972), esp. 236-37. This shift-to-risk hypothesis has come under criticism in recent years, however. See W. L. Tullar and D. F. Johnson, *Group decision-making and the risky shift: a transnational perspective* (Technical Report 48, Rochester, N.Y.: Management Research Center, University of Rochester 1972).

[11] Steinbruner (fn. 9).

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decision making as an entirely independent, nonrational process by which decisions are made. The operation of this process is based on the model of a computer's feedback loops, supplemented by the general principles that govern the operation of non-idiosyncratic cognitive processes—principles which have been established by experimental psychology.

Steinbruner's model posits rules of decision that reject the rational-analytic method. In his model, values that are in a trade-off relationship are not integrated, but pursued separately. Indifference curves are not constructed, even implicitly; probable outcomes are not estimated; no attempt is made to optimize values. Under conditions of uncertainty, decisions are structured not by rational-analytic procedures, but by nonrational rules of cognitive operations. For example, the decision maker will tend to conceptualize his decision environment so as to avoid recognizing trade-off relationships between his values. Trade-offs violate the principle of cognitive consistency. Hence, when the environment is sufficiently unstructured to permit some interpretive latitude, the decision maker will suppress the trade-offs by conceptualizing his world in such a way that the values do not appear to conflict.

Furthermore, Leon Festinger points out that decision makers can solve their cognitive dilemma by conceiving their decision as being wholly determined by the course of external events. "It is possible . . . to reduce or even eliminate the dissonance by revoking the decision psychologically. This would consist of . . . insisting that really no choice had been made for which the person had any responsibility."[12]

In sum, Steinbruner's model holds that there are strong cognitive forces in operation under conditions of uncertainty which predispose decision makers to deny the existence of trade-offs, to deny choice, and to impute unwarranted certainty to this view of their situation.

If Steinbruner's model is an accurate description of decision making under uncertainty, it places the stability of deterrence in a new and disconcerting light. Whereas deterrence theory requires at least an implicit recognition of trade-offs, Steinbruner's model suggests that human decision makers are under cognitive pressure to conceptualize their decision environment in such a way as to deny the existence of trade-offs.[13]

[12] Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson 1957), 43-44.

[13] Steinbruner has discussed the implications of his theory for deterrence strategies in "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions," *World Politics*, XXVIII (January 1976). The discussion presented here takes a different direction and should not be construed as reflecting Professor Steinbruner's views on the implications of his model for deterrence theory.

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Compellence strategies—generally viewed as rather reckless even by conventional analysts—appear even more troublesome in this light. Adopting a compellence strategy permits the compeller to forswear choice and avoid his trade-off, so decision makers under uncertainty—as in a nuclear confrontation—should be predisposed to adopt this type of tactic. Furthermore, a "cybernetic decision maker" who is in the position of the compellee may not accurately perceive his incentive to capitulate—especially if he too is locked into a no-choice compellence strategy.

Despite this gloomy picture, there exists a possible mitigating factor even within Steinbruner's scheme: the so-called "reality principle." Only when uncertainty is great—in unstructured situations—do nonrational cognitive principles have full rein. When a decision environment is highly structured—that is, when uncertainty is low and the trade-off is unavoidably self-evident—the reality principle may not permit the decision maker to avoid the realistic calculations and tough choices required by the rational-analytic process of decision. Hence, the relevant question becomes: is the specter of nuclear destruction a sufficiently palpable constraint so that (1) it imposes an undeniable structure on the decision environment, and (2) it forces the decision maker to recognize the trade-offs inherent in his situation, despite the cognitive costs this entails?

In order to answer this question and, more generally, in order to test the plausibility of Steinbruner's cybernetic model of decision, it will be helpful to examine a historical case, the stakes and structure of which resemble those of the hypothetical nuclear confrontations imagined by strategic analysts. American decision making during the Cuban missile crisis has these characteristics. The "objective" structure of this case (as opposed to its perceived structure) involved a trade-off between two values—the avoidance of an unwanted war of monumental proportions and the securing of a web of interests related to the maintenance of political prestige and military power.

With regard to the Cuban case, one may ask three questions: How did U.S. decision makers deal with their value trade-off problem? How did they perceive their options? And, what are the implications of their behavior for our ideas about deterrence?

Before proceeding with a fuller explanation of the relevant aspects of Steinbruner's theory and with the analysis of the case study, some of the assumptions and limitations of this analysis should be made explicit.

(1) The psychological principles on which Steinbruner's theory rests will be accepted as representing a rough consensus based on the disci-

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pline's experimental work. In any event, the test for these principles will be in the plausibility of the explanation they suggest for the case study.[14]

(2) This analysis offers no rigorous technique for *conclusively* demonstrating that a particular set of policy options was structured by nonrational cognitive pressures rather than by an analytic approach. If a player decides that circumstances leave him only one option, how can the objectivity of that view be disproved? Certainly, there may be situations in which even a *rational* decision maker is left with the single option of initiating an unwanted war—or at least risking its immediate provocation. Psychologist Jack Brehm points out that, even in experimental conditions, it may be impossible to determine whether an effect is caused by cognitive dissonance or whether it is simply a case in which rational rules of decision produce the same results as nonrational cognitive rules.[15] This analysis does not mean to refute the view that a model based on constrained rationality can explain the Kennedys' conceptualization of their problem. However, circumstantial evidence will cast doubt on such an explanation. In any case, it is not the goal of this analysis to design a classical experiment, pitting the cybernetic model against the rational-analytic one, but rather to test the rough plausibility of Steinbruner's approach and to determine whether it might suggest insights that have interesting ramifications for strategic theory.

(3) It is dangerous to generalize on the basis of one case study—or, more accurately, on the basis of only one side of one case. It is doubly dangerous when one of the unexplored aspects—the Soviet process of decision—offers a possible disconfirmation of the main hypothesis. That is, despite uncertainty, the Soviets did not lock themselves into a no-choice policy. Still, in the absence of hard information regarding the Soviet process of decision, one can only speculate about the respective roles of analytical and cognitive factors in shaping the Politburo's conception of the crisis and its choice of options. That speculation will be reserved for the conclusion.

II. The Analytic versus the Cybernetic/Cognitive Model of Decision

In a two-value game such as a nuclear confrontation is likely to represent, the rational-analytic approach to decision making is charac-

[14] These principles and some of their experimental underpinnings are presented in Steinbruner (fn. 9); Festinger (fn. 12); Janis (fn. 10); Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Wiley 1962); and Joseph H. deRivera with James N. Rosenau, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill 1968).

[15] Brehm and Cohen (fn. 14), 71.

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terized by (1) the "integration" of the conflicting values by means of an explicit or implicit indifference curve; (2) cost-benefit calculations; and (3) the estimation of the expected outcomes of alternative policies in order to determine the best means of achieving an optimal trade-off of values. Uncertainty is treated as a statistical problem. The decision maker is sensitive to all relevant information.[16]

In his cybernetic theory of decision, John Steinbruner has attempted to formulate a decision paradigm that is equal in scope to the analytic paradigm, but entirely different in its operating principles. It is organized around two concepts: "short-cycle information feedback" and the elimination of uncertainty.[17]

THE CYBERNETIC MODEL

Steinbruner takes as his model simple, cybernetic decision mechanisms—such as the thermostat—which effectively solve problems without the complex calculations required by the analytical model. Since the cybernetic mechanism makes no calculations, it is unaffected by uncertainties which may stem from a lack of relevant information, and which would stymie an analytic decision maker.

Despite its simplicity, such a mechanism can produce highly adaptive behavior:

> Roughly speaking, the mechanism of decision advanced by the cybernetic paradigm is one which works on the principle of the recipe. The decisionmaker has a repertory of operations which he performs in sequence while monitoring a few feedback variables. . . . The cook, in this model, does not construct the relative preference for sweetness or tartness for an average range of customers in baking pies. Rather, he follows established recipes and watches attendance at the restaurant and the rate at which his pies disappear.[18]

This is essentially a satisfying method rather than an optimizing one. Sequential attention is given to alternatives until an adequate one is found.[19]

"VALUE DISAGGREGATION"

A cybernetic mechanism cannot deal with the problems of conflicting values. It must disaggregate them and attend to them sequentially. Or it must assign them to separate parts of the decision mechanism, such as different agencies within the government. Of course, this disaggregation of conflicting values is likely to result in a decrease in the efficiency

[16] For fuller explanation and illustration of the rational-analytic paradigm, see Steinbruner (fn. 9), and Paul Samuelson, *Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1973).
[17] Steinbruner (fn. 9), 51. [18] *Ibid.*, 55. [19] *Ibid.*, 62.

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of the mechanism, as some of its policies work at cross-purposes with other policies. Steinbruner cites the following example:

> . . . separate entities of the government construct river projects to control floods, on one hand, and to provide disaster relief to pay for flood damage on the other. Though the separate problems jointly affect private investment in flood plain areas, they are operated separately and decisions about them are made separately. Jointly over the years, they have produced uneconomic investment in flood-plain areas so that the more flood control projects that have been constructed, the *greater* the national flood losses have become. Since the decision process treated the programs as separate issues, no one noticed the inherent problems until the investment had been made and the paradoxical flood losses began to occur.[20]

Sometimes, conflicting values cannot be disaggregated by sequential attention or by assignment to different bureaucratic pigeonholes.[21] The value conflicts inherent in crisis diplomacy are of this kind. Any decision maker knows he must consider the closely related problems of war avoidance and diplomatic success simultaneously, not sequentially. He cannot tell one bureaucracy to worry about avoiding war and another to concern itself only with winning the confrontation. If the value conflict is to be eliminated, it must be done by psychological means, not bureaucratic ones.

The human mind, of course, can and will deal with such trade-offs analytically if compelled to do so by a highly structured decision environment. However, trade-offs violate the experimentally established principle of cognitive consistency. Therefore, if the decision environment is sufficiently unstructured and entails sufficient uncertainty so that there is leeway for interpretation, the decision maker will tend to conceptualize the problem in such a way that the trade-off can be denied. In other words, if the point of view that there is no trade-off relationship *can* be taken (that is, if it is not precluded by the "reality principle"), then it *will* be taken. Thus, the problem is cast in a form with which the cybernetic decision maker can deal.[22]

Once such a conceptualization of a problem is established, cognitive principles work to impute certainty to the correctness of that view by selective processing of incoming information which depreciates the value of disconfirming evidence and by "categorical inferences" of certainty or impossibility.[23] With regard to the latter point, Steinbruner

[20] *Ibid.*, 73. [21] *Ibid.*, 88. [22] *Ibid.*, esp. 103-09.

[23] Experimental evidence suggests that when the objective probability of a desirable occurrence is relatively high, people tend to view that probability as approaching certainty; conversely, impossibility is often imputed to events which are only moderately unlikely. DeRivera (fn. 14), 109.

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discusses John Kennedy's inference that he would be impeached if the missiles were not removed from Cuba:

> That Kennedy might have taken his impeachment quite seriously as *the* outcome of his following a conciliatory course in the crisis is [harder] to imagine within the analytic paradigm. It would appear as a rare limiting case (all other outcomes each assigned a probability of zero).
>
> By contrast, cognitive theory readily accounts for the existence of firm, categorical, nonprobabilistic beliefs in the presence of intense uncertainty. The cognitive processing mechanisms of the mind provide a number of ways in which beliefs become established, independent of the weight of objective evidence. . . . To the cognitive theorist it becomes quite readily conceivable that Kennedy meant exactly what he said about his impeachment—as he said it. As a general matter, cognitive theory makes the assumption that structure will be imposed on certain situations, and uncertainty thereby resolved, not by probabilistic judgments but by categorical inferences.[24]

COGNITIVE DYNAMICS AND DECISION MAKING DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The following case study of U.S. decision making during the Cuban missile crisis will stress the role of the cognitive principle of management of inconsistency in structuring the decision makers' conception of their environment under conditions of uncertainty. Specifically, it will point out:

(1) the tendency toward unwarranted assumptions of certainty regarding opponents' intentions and the correctness of one's chosen policy;

(2) the tendency to see the two principal values at stake in the crisis not as conflicting but as consonant;

(3) the tendency to adopt a strategy of compellence (which entails no trade-offs for the compeller), rather than a strategy of negotiation (which necessitates "value integration"—i.e., the recognition of a trade-off between conflicting values).

III. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Fourth Cut

Graham Allison has pointed out that the nature of the decision environment in the Cuban missile crisis makes it particularly well suited for "Model I" (rational actor) analysis: "In the context of ultimate

[24] Steinbruner (*fn. 9*), 110. The principal study which Steinbruner uses to illustrate his theory is the debate on the M.L.F. (multilateral force). His discussions of the Cuban crisis are limited to this examination of Kennedy's certainty regarding his impeachment and to one of Kennedy's certainty in his inferences about Soviet intentions and the consequences of a no-response policy, 89.

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danger to the nation, a small group of men, unhitched from the bureaucracy, weighed the options and decided."[25] The decision makers were highly conscious of the need to approach their dilemma in a rational-analytic manner. Furthermore, their chosen course of action was highly successful in achieving their goals. Hence, in such a case, Allison argues, alternative models "are forced to compete on Model I's home ground. The dimensions and factors uncovered by Model II [bureaucratic processes] and Model III [bureaucratic politics] in this case will therefore be particularly suggestive."[26] This is also true for an explanation based on nonrational cognitive processes of decision.

The present analysis will focus on the overall shaping of the decision makers' attitudes toward their options and the process by which those options were weighed, rather than on nonrational constraints on the decision.

AVOIDING THE TRADE-OFF

Kennedy and most of his advisors conceptualized the decision in a way that avoided placing their two relevant values (war avoidance and the maintenance of prestige in the international arena) in conflict. They achieved this by conceiving the problem in terms of "risking war now" versus "running an even greater risk of war later." If Kennedy did not act to save U.S. international prestige *now*, the loss of that prestige would contribute to an increased chance of war *later*. Kennedy attributed virtual *certainty* to the view that the Russians would be encouraged to push for greater and greater concessions in Berlin and elsewhere unless the missiles were *unconditionally* removed. Viewed in this light, Kennedy's choice of avoiding a diplomatic solution (such as trading Cuban missiles for Jupiters in Turkey) in favor of an essentially unconditional ultimatum must have seemed reasonable to him despite his estimate that his course of action entailed a probability "between one out of three and even" of nuclear war.[27] It would be worth taking such horrendous risks if the diplomatic or do-nothing options entailed even greater long-run risks of war. In sum, Kennedy's "war now versus war later" formulation of the problem permitted him to deny the trade-off relationship which seemingly existed between the values of avoiding war and maintaining prestige. In fact, it permitted him to view the values as mutually reinforcing: standing firm in Cuba would demonstrate America's resolve and, hence, reduce the long-run likelihood of war.

[25] Allison (fn. 2), 8-9. [26] *Ibid.*, 9.
[27] Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row 1965), 705.

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Clearly, Kennedy's formulation of the problem is not prohibited by the rational model simply because it corresponds closely to the formulation predicted by the cognitive model. It is Kennedy's imputation of certainty to a highly uncertain situation which most strongly suggests the operation of the cognitive model, rather than the "no trade-off" character of his formulation *per se*. Kennedy's decision environment was highly "underdetermined." Many and diverse interpretations could be and have been given to the Soviets' motivations—and to their future intentions, had the missile gambit been successful. Some of these interpretations would hardly have justified a one-in-three risk of nuclear war as the price of removing the missiles, especially when their removal could have been secured with less risk (albeit at a somewhat higher price) diplomatically. The rational paradigm offers no guidance as to how such vast uncertainties can be resolved. The cognitive paradigm, however, explains unambiguously, in terms of cognitive principles and pressures, why Kennedy and the ExCom decided as they did.

THE SUBJECTIVE STRUCTURING OF THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT

In order to support the cognitive view of Kennedy's decision process, it will be necessary to look more closely at the seeming trade-off which Kennedy faced, and at his manner of dealing with it.

To repeat, there were two values involved in the missile crisis. The first consisted of a web of interests including the preservation of the military *status quo ante*, the maintenance of America's international prestige, and the need to demonstrate to the Soviets that destabilizing *faits accomplis* and "salami tactics" would not be tolerated—with all of these interests requiring an unconditional withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba. The second was to avoid a nuclear war which might be precipitated by measures designed to achieve an unconditional withdrawal.

Aside from the question of whether, objectively, a trade-off relationship exists, it is undeniable that the two issues are, in Steinbruner's jargon, "highly interactive." That is, policies that affect one value must intimately affect the other. Thus, reality constraints are too strong to achieve a stable disaggregation of the values by the simplest and most routine cybernetic means— for instance, letting one bureaucracy handle value A and another handle value B, as in the example of flood control.

In such situations, the decision maker may be forced to deal with the values analytically; but, since uncertainty is great in this case, one might expect subconscious, nonrational, cognitive processes to structure the decision in such a way that the values do not conflict.

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Intuitively, it is not hard to imagine the cognitive stress which the sacrifice of either value would have entailed for President Kennedy, especially when his own prestige as well as that of the United States was on the line. The Bay of Pigs, his disastrous confrontation with Khrushchev in Vienna, and the domestic allegation that he was long on profile but short on courage, all combined to make the unconditional withdrawal of the missiles an important value indeed, perhaps tantamount to the avoidance of nuclear war itself.

With two such vital values at stake, it is not hard to imagine that Kennedy was under strong cognitive pressure to view his situation in a way that would permit him to adopt a strategy which held out the possibility of winning big with respect to both values—even if it meant running the risk of losing big as well. An analytic, trade-off-oriented formulation of the problem could not achieve this for Kennedy; a cognitive, "no trade-off" formulation could.

"A MISSILE IS A MISSILE"

Conceptually, there were two possible ways to avoid the trade-off. The first, and simplest, would have been to disclaim the significance of the introduction of the missiles into Cuba. By telling themselves that the missiles did not, in any appreciable way, affect the military balance or undermine the prestige of the United States, the members of the ExCom could have acquiesced in the installation of the missiles and incurred no cognitive costs. Both values—prestige maintenance and war avoidance—could have been viewed as essentially irrelevant to the missile issue.

In fact, at the beginning of the ExCom's deliberations, Secretary of Defense McNamara argued for exactly this view: "A missile is a missile. It makes no great difference whether you are killed by a missile fired from the Soviet Union or from Cuba."[28] Ted Sorensen reports: "As some (but not all) Pentagon advisers pointed out to the President, we had long lived within range of Soviet missiles, we expected Khruschev to live with our missiles nearby, and by taking this addition calmly we would prevent him from inflating its importance."[29]

Objective arguments on this point were mixed. McNamara's view was bolstered by the fact that the vulnerable, soft-site missiles could be useful only in a first strike, and that the Soviets were far from a credible first-strike capability even with the additional deliverable warheads

[28] Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: Lippincott 1966), 43.
[29] Sorensen (fn. 27), 682-83.

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provided by the Cuban emplacements.[30] Meanwhile, the armed services pointed to the reduced warning time for getting American bombers off the ground,[31] and the diplomats and politicians stressed the importance of "appearances," independent of strictly military considerations.[32] In any case, uncertainty regarding the significance of the Russians' gambit was great enough to permit McNamara to rationalize his dissonance-avoiding formulation.

President Kennedy, however, rejected the "do nothing" course of action from the outset. "We'll have to do something quickly," he told the ExCom. "I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to render the weapons inoperable."[33] Kennedy was operating under cognitive pressures different from those that influenced McNamara. In the wake of Vienna, Berlin, and the Bay of Pigs, members of both parties in Congress were urging Kennedy to stand firm against Khrushchev's encroachments. Even before the revelation about the emplacement of medium- and intermediate-range missiles, Republican candidates were making Kennedy's do-nothing policy in Cuba a central issue of the election campaign. After the revelation, Kennedy saw his impeachment as the likely consequence unless they were removed. To quote Roger Hilsman, "The United States might not be in danger, but the Administration most certainly was."[34] Whereas the formulation "a missile is a missile" may have diminished the cognitive pressures on McNamara (who was chronically insensitive to political concerns), it could only heighten Kennedy's troubles and exacerbate the trade-offs he faced.

WAR NOW VERSUS WAR LATER

The other possible means for avoiding the trade-off between the avoidance of war and the maintenance of prestige was the formulation, "risk war now to avoid certain war later." This, in fact, was the conceptualization adopted by Kennedy. In his speech of October 22 announcing the blockade, Kennedy said: "Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving

[30] See I. F. Stone, "The Continuing Debate," in Robert A. Divine, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Quadrangle 1971), 163; and Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964).

[31] Abel (fn. 28), 52.

[32] Sorensen (fn. 27), esp. 678.

[33] Abel (fn. 28), 49.

[34] Hilsman, *To Move A Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1967), 197.

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objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere."[35]

Robert Kennedy recalled that "we all agreed in the end that if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear war and that was that. So we might as well have the showdown then as six months later."[36]

In the ExCom, Secretary of State Rusk had concluded his case for an air strike with a similar sentiment: "If we don't do this, we go down with a whimper. Maybe it's better to go down with a bang."[37]

Presidential biographers Schlesinger and Sorensen summed up Kennedy's and, generally speaking, the ExCom's attitude, as follows:

> In a general sense, the decision [to introduce missiles] obviously represented the supreme Soviet probe of American intentions. No doubt a "total victory" faction in Moscow had long been denouncing the government's "no win" policy and arguing that the Soviet Union could safely use the utmost nuclear pressure against the United States because the Americans were too rich or too soft or too liberal to fight. Now Khrushchev was prepared to give the argument its crucial test.[38]

> The Soviets would move [in Berlin], [Kennedy] expected, but they probably would whatever we did; and perhaps this show of strength would make them think twice about it.[39]

This view *per se* was neither necessarily wrong nor necessarily incompatible with the analytic model. However, the unswerving nature of the President's commitment to this view under conditions of great uncertainty is more reminiscent of the cognitive than of the analytic paradigm.

COMPELLENCE AND CERTAINTY

Kennedy's steadfast commitment to the "war now versus war later" view is directly reflected in the strategy he adopted to force the Russians to remove their missiles. That strategy was essentially one of compellence: a strategy based on the renunciation of choice.

The President and his brother assured each other that they had no choice but to compel the Russians to dismantle the missiles unconditionally. "It looks really mean, doesn't it? But then, really there was no

[35] Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: Norton 1969), 166-67.
[36] Robert Kennedy, quoted in Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of Crisis," *Saturday Evening Post* (December 8, 1962), 16.
[37] Abel (fn. 28), 70.
[38] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1965), 796.
[39] Sorensen (fn. 27), 694.

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other choice. If they get this mean on this one in our part of the world, what will they do on the next?"[40]

The President then tried to convince the Russians that *he* was locked into a no-choice situation. If a blockade did not get the missiles out, an air strike *would*, Kennedy told Ambassador Dobrynin via his brother.[41] In effect, he told the Russians that he was not interested in compromise solutions; he had no choice but to insist on the unconditional removal of the missiles. Therefore, the Soviets would have only two options: submit to his demands or provoke an escalation of the conflict. However, since Kennedy had read *The Guns of August* and was attuned to the Soviets' need to avoid humiliation,[42] he would permit them the option of capitulating gracefully before he unilaterally imposed a military solution. But if the Soviets were really intent on pushing him, Kennedy told them in effect, there was nothing he could do to avert escalation.

Despite Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter's protestations about controlling the risks in Cuba, the fact remains that "all [the Kennedys'] skill would have been to no avail if in the end [Khrushchev] had preferred his prestige, as they preferred theirs, to the danger of a world war."[43] And despite Sorensen's and Schlesinger's description of the ExCom's decision process as painstakingly open and rational, the fact remains that the President and most of his advisors perceived only one real option: an uncompromising policy based on compellence, rejecting any trade-off of values. Such policies are the hallmark of the cognitive decision maker.

THE FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE

An analytical decision maker, on the other hand, would have characteristically adopted a strategy based on negotiation, compromise, and explicit value trade-offs. Kennedy did have an opportunity to strike a bargain in which both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would have given up some prestige in order to eliminate the immediate danger of war. The Soviets offered to remove their missiles from Cuba if the Americans would remove theirs from Turkey.[44] Such a trade had already been

[40] President Kennedy, quoted in Kennedy (fn. 35), 67.

[41] Abel (fn. 28), 199.

[42] Kennedy (fn. 35), 127.

[43] Wohlstetter and Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 234. The quotation is from Stone (fn. 30), 164.

[44] In addition, each side was to agree not to violate the sovereignty of the other's client. It should be noted that the final agreement did entail one element of "compromise." The United States agreed to forswear an invasion of Cuba as a condition for the removal of

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proposed in the American press as a face-saving, war-averting compromise. Walter Lippmann had argued that "the two bases could be dismantled without altering the world balance of power."[45] Inside the ExCom, Adlai Stevenson also argued for the compromise. As Ambassador to the United Nations, he realized that the emplacement of missiles in Turkey was in fact quite comparable to the emplacement in Cuba, and that he would find it hard to construct a tenable argument against the equity of the proposed trade.

In addition, Stevenson had hoped to link this exchange to a broader settlement of some contentious issues between the two superpowers. Schlesinger reports, however: "The President . . . rightly regarded any political program as premature. *He wanted to concentrate on a single issue*—the enormity of the introduction of the missiles and the absolute necessity for their removal. Stevenson's negotiating program was accordingly rejected."[46]

Although Kennedy had previously ordered the dismantling of the missiles in Turkey (an order which had never been carried out), he perceived any compromise affecting Turkey as undermining a U.S. commitment. Still, he *did* ask Roswell Gilpatric to prepare a scenario for the removal of the missiles in Turkey and Italy.[47] On the one hand, Kennedy remained firm in his cognitively reinforced view that the long-term likelihood of nuclear war would increase greatly if he appeared to be giving in to Soviet pressure. On the other hand, he seems to have balked at the thought that a very marginal diminution of the American commitment to Turkey could have ramifications significant enough to warrant a one-in-three risk of nuclear war.

Kennedy found a way to avoid the trade. As the cybernetic model would predict, he seized upon his brother's idea of rejecting the most recent and most official offer to trade Cuban for Turkish missiles and accepting instead Khrushchev's informal offer to remove the missiles simply in exchange for a pledge not to invade Cuba. Although the informal offer (1) was only inferred from an ambiguous and emotional letter from Khrushchev and transferred more explicitly through a highly unorthodox, unofficial contact[48] and (2) had apparently been superseded in the Kremlin by a more recent and more stringent one,

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the missiles. That was not much of a concession, and Kennedy certainly lost no prestige by agreeing to it. In fact, he had to warn his subordinates not to be excessively gleeful in public print about the settlement.

[45] Stone (fn. 30), 221.

[46] Schlesinger (fn. 37), 741; emphasis added.

[47] Stone (fn. 30), 222.

[48] Abel (fn. 28), 175-77.

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Kennedy chose to "accept" the Khrushchev "offer." He then locked himself into that policy by informing Dobrynin that an air strike would soon follow if his "acceptance" were not agreed to by the Politburo.

Although Robert Kennedy *privately* assured Dobrynin that in the long run "there would be no problem about the missiles" in Turkey,[49] that was hardly the point. It was prestige and appearances that mattered, not the outmoded Jupiter missiles. Thus, President Kennedy had violated his own cardinal rule of crisis management: "Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war."[50]

In sum, Kennedy's failure to negotiate, his adoption of the so-called Trollope ploy of accepting a non-offer, his desire to "concentrate on a single issue," and, in general, his insistence on a compellence strategy in which only the adversary must deal with trade-offs, are all indicators of a non-analytic, cognitive decision process.

By the time Kennedy announced the blockade, his perception of the situation and his analysis of the options were firmly established. In his mind, he had structured his environment in a way which subjectively disposed of dissonance-causing trade-offs. As predicted by the cognitive paradigm, he had seen certainty in an inherently uncertain situation; he was confident that his chosen policy was not merely the *right* one, but the *only* one he could possibly adopt under the circumstances.

On the day he announced the blockade, according to Schlesinger's report, "Kennedy himself was never more composed."[51]

It is fortunate that the Soviet process of decision was not ruled by the same cognitive pressures as Kennedy's. Khrushchev's apparent willingness to opt for peace rather than prestige led to the settlement whereby an unwanted war was avoided.[52] However, decision makers who use compellence strategies cannot always count on their adversaries to weigh the costs and benefits "correctly" and to opt for peace. The origins of World War I, for example, illustrate the tragic outcome that can result when both sides view their dispute as a "no trade-offs" game, and adopt strategies based on compellence.

[49] Stone (fn. 30), 222.
[50] Kennedy, speech at American University, June 10, 1963, quoted in Abel (fn. 28), 91.
[51] Schlesinger (fn. 37), 742.
[52] This does not necessarily indicate that Khrushchev's decision was analytical in the sense of weighing trade-offs, making indifference calculations, etc. It is possible that the cognitive pressures on Khrushchev and his colleagues were structured differently from those on Kennedy. Only detailed information on the Soviets' decision process, which is currently unavailable, could resolve this question.

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IV. Cognitive Processes and the Failure of Deterrence

Most scenarios suggest that World War III is likely to ensue from a two-value game between the superpowers. The case study discussed in this analysis illustrates the tendency of human decision makers to deal with such situations by avoiding the recognition of the trade-off relationship that exists between a player's own values. According to experimentally supported cognitive theories, this avoidance reduces "cognitive dissonance" and re-establishes cognitive consistency.

In the case study, the simplest method of ignoring the trade-off relationship consists of the view that there is no contradiction between values because one of them is not really threatened. Secretary of Defense McNamara employed this method of trade-off avoidance when he argued that a missile is a missile, whether launched from Cuba or the Soviet Union.

However, sometimes reality constraints (for instance, obvious diplomatic costs of a do-nothing solution) or political constraints (for instance, Republican and Congressional attitudes during the Cuban crisis) can preclude this direct means of avoiding a trade-off. In that case, the decision maker will tend to sidestep the trade-off between war avoidance and, say, prestige maintenance by conceptualizing his dilemma according to a "risk war now or incur destruction later" formula. The decision maker thereby allows himself to argue that only by running some risk of war over the immediate issue of contention can he demonstrate resolve to his adversaries and, thus, avoid an inevitable war in the future. This formulation makes the two values consonant and extricates the decision maker from the dissonance-producing trade-off. However, it is likely to produce war if the adversary also adopts it.

Strategists have recognized that the "better war now than war later" concept presents real problems for the theory of deterrence, even aside from the lessons of cognitive theory. To quote Warner Schilling:

> The level of destruction that would attend a nuclear war becomes less relevant if the critical choices should be made through reference to relative, rather than absolute, costs (better World War III now than later).
>
> . . . there will be many opportunities for statesmen to conclude—accurately or inaccurately—that . . . the intentions of their opponent make the costs of war unavoidable.[53]

If those with conventional views of nuclear strategy and crisis management, based largely on the rational-analytic paradigm, interpret such

[53] Schilling, "Technology and International Relations," *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968), 593.

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remarks as a challenge to the logic of deterrence, the lessons of cognitive theory must underscore and redouble this concern. Whereas conventional strategists see the "better war now than war later" formulation as a possible result of *objective* calculations of interest, the cognitive model suggests that statesmen are even more likely to fall back on such a formulation than objective calculations would warrant, since that formula solves one of the prevalent, subconscious problems of decision makers under uncertainty.

Not only will the cognitive decision maker tend to seek out this formula, but he will tend to lock himself into this conception of his environment and the adversaries' intentions. Cognitive theory argues that the mind craves certainty and will work to establish it even when it is unwarranted by objective conditions. Selective processing and recall of information, in accordance with the principles of reinforcement and cognitive consistency, can create such certainty.

As a result, the decision maker is likely to become locked into a strategy based on compellence. As the case study has shown, it is a short step from the formulation "better risk war now than face the certainty of incurring it later" to a strategy based on closed options and no choice. Ole Holsti has pointed out that "when [cognitive?] stress increases, problem solving tends to become more rigid," because the ability to "resist the pull of closure" is reduced.[54] In addition, the case study suggests that the cognitive decision maker is highly unlikely to adopt a policy based on negotiation. Negotiation entails compromise and represents the quintessence of explicit recognition of value trade-offs. The cognitive costs involved will be avoided by the decision maker under uncertainty if at all possible.

Compellence is a most dangerous game if both players are locked into that strategy by their trade-off-avoiding conceptualizations. Steinbruner remarks:

> Consider, for example, the game of Chicken, long a favorite of theorists of bargaining as a simple model of political conflict. In one of its more dramatic forms, the game consists of two players each of whom drives directly at the other at 60 mph down the center of a deserted highway with an audience of peers looking on. The first player to swerve to avoid collision loses, is labeled a chicken, and suffers the contempt of his peers. The game poses a classic value trade-off problem—survival on the one hand, preservation of honor on the other. Thomas Schelling has provided an analysis of the game under the assumption that both players

[54] Holsti, "Crisis, Stress, and Decision-making," *International Social Science Journal*, XXIII, No. 1 (1971), 61-62, citing Sheldon J. Korchin and Seymour Levine, "Anxiety and Verbal Learning," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 54 (March 1957), 238.

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are analytic decisionmakers. The first player to establish clearly an irreversible commitment to the center of the road (such as by tying the wheel and climbing in the back seat) will win the game. The other player, still retaining control, faces a certainty of death as against a finite loss of honor, and everyone knows how an analytic actor will resolve that choice. The scenario, which Schelling labels "compellence," is played out daily, usually for lesser stakes, on street intersections throughout the nation.

One's sense of this game changes drastically if a cognitive decisionmaker is inserted into the scenario. There are at least two good reasons why such a decisionmaker might not yield to a cleverly established commitment by the opposing player: first, while focusing on other things, he may not notice the commitment; second, he may simply fail to engage in a value trade-off while carrying out his prior intention. Rather than compellence, with such a player involved, one readily imagines disaster. Viewed from the assumptions of the cognitive paradigm, moreover, it is not a disaster which emerges from an error in calculation, but rather it is the consequence of the normally functioning decision process.[55]

In sum, the analysis of the Cuban case study in light of cognitive theory has re-emphasized the dangers of a compellence strategy. It should also make us more circumspect about the tendency to regard deterrence as a *deus ex machina* for avoiding nuclear war.

The present analysis suggests that, in situations structured along the lines of a probable nuclear confrontation, there are "regularities of human thought" that tend to lead decision makers away from seeing the trade-offs which must be seen if deterrence is to work. At the same time, it is clear that confrontations for high stakes between superpowers do not inevitably result in nuclear destruction. On the contrary, there appear to be several mitigating factors:

(1) A world of mutual assured destruction may impose reality constraints on one or both players, which may lead to a stronger tendency to recognize trade-offs than in a first-strike world. Whereas the Cuban crisis occurred in a world where "mutual assured destruction" tended to limit the advantages of "mobilizing" first, Kaiser Wilhelm and Tsar Nicholas confronted each other in a situation that encouraged a preemptive first strike. According to the doctrine of the day, the realities of warfare in the railroad era put a premium on rapid mobilization and gave strong incentives against being slow to respond to an opponent's preparation for war. This situation, in which both players employed compellence strategies in a first-strike world, proved to be a deadly combination.

(2) In a sense, the argument that the risks in Cuba were controlled

[55] Steinbruner (fn. 9), 147.

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may be right: Perhaps a moderate, well-thought-out compellence strategy (like the blockade) does involve fewer risks than a hysterical approach (like the Wilhelm-Nicholas "I can't stop" correspondence). Because the reality factor *does* seem to matter, a decision maker faced with a calm (and even semi-accommodating) ultimatum may be less able to rationalize a "war now versus war later" formulation, and more likely to evaluate his trade-offs analytically than if confronted with hysterical threats.

(3) Khrushchev's capitulation gives rise to the suspicion that, even at the brink, not all decision makers are subject to the pressures of dissonance which prohibit value integration. What explains this fact? It might be speculated that Kennedy's dissonance was high because both values—war avoidance and prestige maintenance—were extremely precious and were subjected to an extreme challenge by the Cuban confrontation. For Khrushchev, the dissonance may not have been as great if he did not view Soviet (and his personal) prestige as vitally challenged by the Cuban issue. The prospects of sacrificing a lesser value for a greater one may not cause sufficient dissonance to force the subconscious to avoid the recognition of that trade-off.

From the standpoint of policy, it would be idle to warn decision makers about dangerous cognitive tendencies toward "value disaggregation" in a crisis. However, insights from cognitive theory may be instructive for peacetime discussions of weapons procurement policy. In a world of perfectly invulnerable strategic forces, even a cybernetic-cognitive decision maker might find it difficult to rationalize a "war now versus war later" formulation of his dilemma. As the case of World War I shows, in a situation of perceived vulnerability to a first strike, decision makers may be strongly inclined toward this dangerous formulation. Thus, while strategic stability has been recognized as important by strategists working in the rational-analytic framework, it becomes doubly important when viewed in the light of cognitive theory.

Strategic stability based on the *mutual* survivability of retaliatory forces has been a proclaimed goal of American policies of strategic procurement and arms limitation. However, it has had to compete with other goals which often conflict with the requirements of stability. The deployment of large numbers of high-accuracy MIRV's demonstrates that considerations of stability are not always at the top of the list when these competing goals are considered. Cognitive theory would seem to support the case that strategic stability should be given a higher priority in such deliberations.

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A NEW BREZHNEV DOCTRINE: The Restructuring of International Relations

By R. JUDSON MITCHELL

SOVIET spokesmen have in recent years elaborated a new and comprehensive doctrinal approach to world politics under the general rubric "restructuring of international relations." The Soviet doctrine on restructuring, which from a Western viewpoint may be termed "the new Brezhnev Doctrine," emphasizes growing Soviet power in the world, changes in relationships between competing systems, and internal structural transformations within those systems. However, the doctrine reflects in many respects a basic continuity in the Soviet approach to world politics.

Official Soviet pronouncements emphasize and exaggerate such continuity. The restructuring of international relations is said to have begun with the Bolshevik Revolution;[1] the nature of processes of change and Soviet conceptualization of these processes is represented as essentially unchanged since the era of Lenin.

Western analysts generally discount this official Soviet position on doctrinal formulation. However, Western scholarship has produced no consensually accepted model of Soviet behavior that would identify key variables or causative factors in the formation of Soviet foreign policy doctrine.[2] In the absence of such a general model, there is need for identification or clarification of the relationship between specific doctrines and Soviet ideology as a whole; of the extent to which the ideology, or a portion of it, serves as a "cognitive map" for policy makers; and of the connection between processes of doctrinal reformulation and system-maintenance functions. A brief examination of these matters follows, beginning with a survey of the component parts of the ideology.

Marxism-Leninism is composed of the following elements: a basic view of reality contained in the philosophy of dialectical materialism, the *diamat* of Soviet parlance; a theory of social development and an action program; and a description of the Utopia that is the end product

[1] N. Lebedev, "The USSR's Effort to Restructure International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1976), 3-4.

[2] See Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan 1968), 108-15, for a discussion of the problems in the construction of such a general model. Triska and Finley also offer an imaginative framework for inquiry in this area of research.

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of purposive action and processes of social development. Developmental theory and the action program are obviously the most flexible parts of the ideology; virtually by definition they are subject to constant re-examination and reformulation. What is not generally recognized is that the other elements of the ideology are by no means impervious to revision. Soviet spokesmen have in recent years frankly acknowledged the incomplete development of the philosophy of dialectical materialism. Soviet philosophers have been assigned the task of rounding out a comprehensive philosophy, of integrating "objective" and "subjective" dialectics, and of "fulfilling the legacy of Lenin."[3] As Jerome Gilison has pointed out, Karl Marx did not—and could not, given his method—present a specific description of a communist Utopia.[4] Marx simply pointed toward a society which would have an undifferentiated social structure. Soviet theoreticians have taken Marx's uncomplicated vision and have attempted to fill in the details.

Since all of the components of Marxism-Leninism are acknowledged to be incomplete, the ideology is obviously highly subject to manipulation. It thus becomes important to inquire by whom it is manipulated and for what purposes, what continuities can be observed in the processes of revision, and how new formulations fit into the total framework.

Ideological reformulation is a function of a subsystem of the Soviet political system. This subsystem, like all elements of the Soviet system, is bureaucratically organized and is centered within the Communist Party, which holds a monopoly of authority over ideological reformulation.

The structure of the ideological subsystem is inseparably connected with the continuities in doctrine. These continuities transcend any differences of opinion among ideological spokesmen and presumably provide the basic elements of the policy makers' cognitive map. First, since its inception with Lenin, Soviet ideology has above all justified control of society by the Party; the distinguishing characteristic of Marxism-Leninism in its Soviet version has been the emphasis upon the Party's organizational power. Second, the ideology has consistently postulated a linkage between external and internal variables, maintaining a total

[3] Constantine Olgin, "Recent Doctrinal Adjustments in Soviet Philosophy," Radio Liberty Dispatch, July 12, 1973; F. V. Konstantinov, "Sovremenni problemi marksistoleninskoi filosofii i zadachi filosofskoi obshestvennosti" [Contemporary Problems of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and the Tasks of the Philosophical Association], *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 1 (January 1972), 25-39. Cf. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1971), 15-19, 66-67. All translations are by the present author unless otherwise noted.

[4] Gilison, *The Soviet Image of Utopia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1975), 29.

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world view of the theoretical interconnection of all sociopolitical structures. Finally, there is the perennial view of a global polarization of social forces, of the competitiveness of differing social systems.

Soviet ideology thus can be viewed as primarily a rationale for a specific system of power relationships. Particular doctrinal additions tend to be associated with perceptions of events signalling critical changes in power relationships pertaining to system maintenance. If the Party's power is the primary ideological concern—a perspective apparently shared by Soviet spokesmen and Western observers—then the most important aspect of doctrinal change should be the response to domestic events, particularly to social realignments that affect the context of the exercise of the control function by the Party. Whatever its aims in the world, the Party, like the old American urban "machines," must first of all act to secure its political base. This, of course, has an important bearing upon foreign policy.

The legitimation of foreign policy is dependent upon the legitimation of domestic social systems; in the Soviet case this linkage has been made quite explicit and constitutes one of the few unchanged imperatives of the ideology. The extensive domestic doctrinal reformulation of recent years therefore provides an essential foundation for the doctrine on the restructuring of international relations.

I. Domestic Doctrinal Reformulation

The principal domestic variable in processes of doctrinal change over the course of Soviet history appears to have been the implementation of bureaucratic controls over the society, together with the growth in scope and complexity of control structures. The Bolshevik Revolution, like most subsequent communist revolutions, was favored by the primitiveness of the society's prerevolutionary political infrastructure. The low level of political development enabled the hierarchically structured revolutionary organization to quickly establish its dominant position in society following the Civil War interlude. As Henry Jacoby has pointed out, once control of the economy was assured, there was no barrier to the Party's institutionalizing its internal bureaucratic forms of organization as the norm for the society.[5] According to Jacoby, the fact that the Bolsheviks' organizational patterns were similar to those of the tsarist control structures was crucial to their success; their victory strengthened and magnified prerevolutionary tendencies toward bureaucratization.

[5] Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1973), 123-36.

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Processes of modernization and social mobilization yielded an overwhelming expansion in this bureaucratic organization of Soviet society. Moreover, as many Western scholars have noted, this expansion produced a number of massive, hierarchically organized, overlapping bureaucratic structures engaged in competition for allocation of resources. The proliferation of organizations was partially responsible for the widespread rejection of the traditional model of totalitarianism by Western Sovietologists. The resulting sociopolitical configuration has been described by Allen Kassof as the "administered society,"[6] by T. H. Rigby as an "organizational system,"[7] and by Alfred G. Meyer as "participatory bureaucracy."[8] By the late 1960's, the effects of processes of bureaucratization had become so obvious to Western scholars that Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the contributors to the model of totalitarianism, substituted a group approach to Soviet politics in place of the general model. According to Brzezinski, the Soviet system had become an institutionalized oligarchy featuring "bureaucratic arbitration" by the Party of the claims advanced by competing interest groups.[9]

The Party serves as the defender of the whole system of multiple bureaucracies. This role and the arbitration function noted by Brzezinski are both related to the Party's monopoly on interpretation of the ideology. Economic development and social mobilization have provided powerful tendencies based upon functional specialization for the diffusion of authority and power. In these circumstances, the Party's exclusive control over ideology, from which legitimacy is derived, appears as an important weapon in bureaucratic politics: emphasis upon ideology is a means for controlling the complex system. The massive ideological campaigns of recent years are no doubt inspired in large measure by the Party's need to counter the functional diffusion of authority. Since the ideology is primarily a justification for rule by the Party, emphasis upon the "reideologizing" of society necessarily tends to strengthen the Party's dominant position.

Within the past decade, Soviet spokesmen have identified three specific domestic challenges to this complex system of control: the development of a civil liberties movement of dissent among a segment of the

[6] Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 558-75.

[7] Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 539-57.

[8] Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970), 327.

[9] Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," in Brzezinski, ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press 1969), 1-34.

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intelligentsia; persistent and apparently growing nationalism among non-Russian population groups;[10] and the growth of a "consumerist psychology."[11] None of these challenges poses an immediate threat to the system of control, but Soviet authorities have reacted as if this were the case. Moreover, all of them are related in some measure to a general problem of legitimation of political power under conditions of advanced socialist development. This problem surfaced during the Khrushchev era, inspiring the quasi-Utopian response of the program adopted at the 22nd Party Congress.

Classical Marxism postulated a structural reordering of society by which the "superstructure" of ideas and institutions would be submerged in the "substructure" of economically grounded social relationships. In the Soviet case, superstructural elements—ideology, the state, the Party—have not only been maintained as phenomena independent of the economic base, but have increased that independence as the claimed economic requirements for communist society have been progressively, if only partially, realized. One can argue persuasively that the practice of Leninism, and indeed of all Marxism, has always involved the independence and supremacy of politics vis-à-vis economics, a tendency for substructural submergence in the superstructure. But the contradiction between practice and Utopian claims has become a practical political problem only with the achievement of a mature socialist economy.

Soviet theoreticians have recently maintained and extended the ideology's emphasis upon organizational power. The thesis on the "party and state of the entire people," first advanced by Khrushchev, has been revived and stressed during the present decade.[12] The continued existence of social classes within the Soviet Union is acknowledged, but these classes are asserted to be engaged in voluntary alliance and nonantagonistic relationships.[13] Of course, from the standpoint of original Marxism, the concept "party and state of the entire people" is patently contradictory, for the state was conceived as an agency for the repression of other classes by the dominant social class; the Communist Party's

[10] See speech by Mikhail A. Suslov, *Pravda*, October 23, 1974, pp. 1-2.

[11] *Izvestia*, September 5, 1974, p. 1; Maj. Gen. D. Volkonogov, "The Ideological Struggle in Conditions of Detente," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 3 (February 1977), 9-23; trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIX (March 2, 1977), 5.

[12] *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Documents* (Moscow: Novosti 1971), 87, 126, 226; Brezhnev's speech to the 11th Hungarian Party Congress, *Pravda*, March 19, 1975, pp. 1-2; Brezhnev's speech to the 25th CPSU Congress, *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 10; editorial, "Leninskoe edinstvo partii i naroda" [Leninist Unity of Party and People], *Kommunist*, No. 6 (April 1975), 10.

[13] A. Viktorov, "XXV S'ezd KPSS—tvorcheskii razvitie teoriia" [25th CPSU Congress: Creative Development of Theory], *Pravda*, March 27, 1976, p. 2.

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raison d'être was the representation of the interest of a particular class. Elaboration of the new concept does serve to obscure real conflicts of interest; it identifies the Party as a structure capable of aggregating all social interests, rather than as simply the articulator of the interests of the proletariat. But what is most significant about current Soviet usage of the concept is that it is no longer confined to a transitional period, but is effectively applied to the stage of communism.

Soviet theoreticians continue to present descriptions of the communist Utopia and to offer some variety in those descriptions.[14] But the major thrust of authoritative pronouncements on social development in the 1970's has been toward anti-Utopianism, or at least toward a revision of Utopia to accommodate currently prevailing power relationships. The problem of continuing differentials in status, income, and political power has been met by a rejection of the Marxian principle of abolition of the division of labor. In Marxist thought, abolition of functional specialization has been considered the absolute precondition for the classless, apolitical future society since all social and political power is derived from the functional division of labor. Authoritative Soviet spokesmen now maintain that the division of labor or functional specialization not only continues but deepens and accelerates during the stage of communism.[15] This formulation introduces a radical redefinition of communism and the assertion of long-run independence of the superstructure.

The theoretical dissolution of the structural unity of communist society opens the way, in turn, for the long-run affirmation of superstructural dominance. It involves a redefinition of the roles of ideology, Party, and state. In Marxism, ideology is a reflection of partial, differentiated interests; accordingly, if partial, differentiated interests remain, ideology must continue. Soviet theoreticians have granted the consequences: authoritative spokesmen now leave little doubt about their acceptance of the "permanence of ideology."[16] Since the specific ideology in question is a representation of the interests of the Communist Party, its indefinite continuation makes no sense apart from the continued existence of the Party. And the continued existence of the Party

[14] Gilison (fn. 4), chap. 3.

[15] A. G. Yegerov, "Partiia nauchnogo kommunizma" [The Party of Scientific Communism], *Kommunist*, No. 2 (February 1973), 48-49; V. G. Afanasyev, "V. I. Lenin o nauchnom upravlenni obshestvom" [V. I. Lenin on the Scientific Direction of Society], *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 1 (January 1974), 17-29; Brezhnev's Warsaw speech, *Pravda*, July 22, 1974, p. 1.

[16] Yegerov (fn. 15), 36-55; B. Grigoryan, "Problema cheloveka v marksisto-leninskoi filosofii" [The Problem of the Individual in Marxist-Leninist Philosophy], *Kommunist*, No. 3 (February 1975), 48-58.

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is tied to causes that dictate survival of the state. There is no evidence of disagreement among Soviet leaders about the major thrust of this ideological reorientation. Perhaps the clearest authoritative statement on the official position against the withering of the state and Party was provided by A.G. Yegerov, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism:

> With the victory of socialism, the state ceases to be an instrument of class domination, but it by no means disappears. . . . Even Communist self-government, which we are moving toward, does not arise apart from the bodies of state authority but springs directly from them. . . . the Communist Party—the vanguard of the people, their generally recognized leader—is the guiding nucleus of all state and public organizations, their cementing principle.[17]

The expansion of state power is currently justified partially on the basis of the alleged threat of bourgeois ideology, a position that accords poorly with the accepted theses on the present non-antagonistic relationship of classes and the end of "capitalist encirclement." In the long run, the growth of state power can be justified only on the basis of the inevitable increase in the functional complexity of society; Soviet theoreticians have adopted this position.[18] Since functional specialization is said to deepen and intensify even in the stage of communism, it logically follows that the expansion of state power will continue indefinitely. The Party, as the directing nucleus of the state structure, is given a guarantee against extinction. Although this interpretation is supposedly based primarily upon analysis of the "objective" factors in social development, Soviet theoreticians usually allow wide latitude for the "superstructural" determination of the "objective" patterns of development. For example, A. Viktorov, in his widely discussed article of March 1976, ascribed enhancement of the "Party's leading role to the growing significance of the subjective factor in the modern historical process."[19]

Soviet theoreticians have thus carried their reformulation of developmental theory to the point where revision has necessarily extended into the area of Utopian goals. The single identifiable concept in Marx's vision of Utopia has been discarded. This reformulation is an extension of earlier tendencies in Soviet thought, providing a more explicit ac-

[17] Yegerov (fn. 15), 53-54.

[18] P. Fedoseev, "Vozrastanie roli partii-zakonomernost stroitelstva sotzialisma i kommunizma" [Growth in the Role of the Party-Revolutionary Law of Socialist and Communist Construction], *Kommunist*, No. 15 (October 1971), 72-91; G. Pavlov, "Vozrastanie roli partii i otvetstvennosti kommunistov" [Growth in the Role of the Party and the Responsibility of Communists], *Kommunist*, No. 4 (March 1972), 14-25, esp. 15.

[19] Viktorov (fn. 13), 3.

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knowledgement of the persistence of politics and, given the Party's hierarchical form of organization, of oligarchy as well. The Soviet system is largely maintained through the supports generated by the prevailing patterns of sociopolitical stratification. Beneficiaries of that stratification are confirmed in their elite status by the doctrinal reformulation. In the interest of its own stability, an essentially conservative social system has been compelled to redefine the ideological rationale for its existence through formulas that contain certain radical theoretical implications.

II. Organic Relationships

The Soviet Union's rise to the status of a superpower comparable to the United States in terms of weight in international politics has coincided with the doctrinal revision discussed above. The phenomena are closely interconnected. The rise to superpower status has been perhaps the most impressive achievement of the Soviet system, and there is a reciprocal relationship between external goals and internal organization. The tightly structured organization of Soviet society has permitted the leadership to concentrate an extraordinarily large proportion of national resources upon the expansion of Soviet power in the world; world tensions, partially fostered by that expansion, have furthered and solidified the functional roles of key elites in the superbureaucratized Soviet system—party ideologues and specialists in organization; managers of heavy industry, scientists, and technicians; the police; and military leaders.

As noted above, a major concern in Soviet ideology is the explanation of structural relationships. The general theory of Marxism-Leninism is one of structural disequilibrium; there is inherent conflict among social structures because of the unevenness of development or imbalances of weight among the constituent elements of the structures (i.e., division of labor gives rise to the class struggle, which produces constant flux in structural development); the direction and pace of movement in the interrelationships of social structures is seen as determined by the degree of internal cohesion of structures. This internal cohesion or incohesion is a product of both objective and subjective factors; lately, the subjective factors have been accorded a near-paramount position by Soviet theoreticians. Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions and the analytical framework of Marxism-Leninism remain grounded in the idea of structural disequilibrium, meaning that the projection of the eventual dissolution of all social structures, save one, is intact. Thus, for purposes

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of this discussion it is largely irrelevant whether or not the Soviet Union remains a "revolutionary" society or whether it has lost its "revolutionary dynamism." The exclusive conceptual framework for all Soviet thought on politics and society dictates the ultimate domination of the world by a single social structure.

That ultimately victorious social structure is now depicted by Soviet theoreticians as having a number of unevenly developed substructures (if development is not uneven, structural boundaries vanish and structures lose their distinct existences; thus no classes, no Party, no state). This radical redesign of the future society obviously raises the most serious theoretical questions about the process itself. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue adamantly to maintain the view of process as structural disequilibrium. That process is immanently unlimited. Legitimation of the increasingly bureaucratized Soviet social system therefore requires a theoretical linkage with the external development of social structures. This linkage has been accomplished by a wide-ranging description of "organic relationships."

Mikhail Suslov, longtime CPSU secretary for ideology, identified three organic relationships in his March 1976 speech to the Soviet Academy of Sciences: between "strictly scientific principles" and revolutionism; between the theory and practice of Marxism and analysis of new developments and processes; and between Marxist-Leninist theory and the "irreconcilable struggle against all forms of bourgeois ideology."[20] This is vintage Marxism, as is S. Gililov's assertion of an "organic link between democratic tasks and socialist tasks."[21] Democracy and socialism are conceived as successive phases of social development; the historical importance of democracy derives from its structural linkage with those forces that are propelling society into socialism.

Internationally, there is said to be an organic link between Brezhnev's proposals on world policy at the 25th CPSU Congress and the peace program set up at the 24th Congress.[22] This link emphasizes the continuity of policy and the grounding of policy in the analysis of continuing structural development. A major obstacle in the application of world policy is the perception widely held outside the U.S.S.R. that Soviet goals and the national aims of other states are antithetical. This difficulty is resolved theoretically by the postulation of two more "organic" relationships: within the socialist commonwealth, "solidarity

[20] TASS, March 17, 1976.

[21] Gililov, "Vospitatelnaya missiia kommunistov" [The Educational Mission of Communists], *Kommunist*, No. 15 (October 1975), 102-12.

[22] Interview with Leonid Zamyatin, Moscow Domestic Service, March 23, 1976; Lebedev (fn. 1), 8.

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and mutual assistance" are said to be organically combined with "independence, sovereignty, equality, and non-interference";[23] elsewhere, the "international aims of the working class" are asserted to be organically connected with "national, patriotic interests."[24]

The progressive structural disintegration of bourgeois society is indirectly tied to Soviet social development in the postulation of an "organic interconnection between internal and external factors in the crisis of capitalism";[25] i.e., there is a direct relationship between the internal contradictions of capitalism and changes in the world balance of forces. Furthermore, Soviet theoreticians posit an organic relationship connecting peaceful coexistence and the ideological struggle between socialist and capitalist states,[26] and a correlation between "proletarian internationalism" and peaceful coexistence.[27]

The professed organic relationship with the East European bloc has attracted special attention in the West largely because of an international sensation originating in the U.S. State Department. In a lecture to United States ambassadors in London in December 1975, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, counselor of the Department, called for U.S. support for a more natural and "organic" relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European countries to replace the existing "inorganic, unnatural" relationship based upon "sheer power," which he termed unstable and dangerous. When the text of the Sonnenfeldt lecture was released,[28] it touched off a lively reaction in the United States and loud protests in the press of Yugoslavia and Rumania. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, no controversy ensued, apparently because the Soviet formulation on "organic" relationships had been accepted, either tacitly or explicitly. The Soviet Union had carefully laid the foundation for a special relationship with the bloc countries, supplanting traditional conceptions of sovereignty through a series of treaties and other documents, starting with the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1970 and culminating with the new Polish constitution and the U.S.S.R.-G.D.R. treaty of 1975. Bulgarian Communist Party leader Todor Zhivkov had enthusiastically affirmed the need for an "organic relationship" among

[23] V. Zagladin, "Internatzionalisme—znamia Kommunist" [Internationalism: Communist Banner], *Pravda*, April 20, 1976, p. 3.

[24] Viktorov (fn. 13), 3.

[25] Sh. Sanakoyev, "Capitalism, A Society Without a Future," *International Affairs*, No. 8 (August 1976), 9.

[26] Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle of Ideas," *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1976), 86.

[27] Y. Organisyan, "Proletarian Internationalism and the Present Day," *Sovetskaya Belorussia*, June 8, 1976, p. 3; trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 17, 1976.

[28] *New York Times*, April 6, 1976, pp. 1, 14.

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socialist countries amid persistent rumors that Bulgaria would eventually accept voluntary absorption into the Soviet Union.

The official Soviet doctrinal position on this matter was set out by Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976, and was subsequently reaffirmed by Suslov in his speech to the G.D.R. Party Congress in May and by Brezhnev in his June address to the conference of European Communist Parties. In a discussion of cooperation among the socialist countries in his major speech at the 25th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev spoke of their mutual ties "becoming ever closer" and of the "gradual evening out of their development levels." "This process of the gradual drawing together (*sblizhenie*) of the socialist countries is now operating quite definitely as an objective law (*zakonomernost*)."[29] At the Berlin parley of European Communist Parties in June 1976, Brezhnev spoke of the "profound, organic, and ever-growing friendly ties" among the socialist countries. The integration of Eastern Europe was called an "absolutely new phenomenon, a truly fraternal union of peoples." Marxist-Leninist parties are, Brezhnev said, "the cementing force of this union."[30]

The significance of Brezhnev's formulation lies in the fact that the concepts and terminology employed are identical to those used to describe the integration of nationalities within the Soviet Union. According to Soviet theoreticians, there are four stages in national integration, of which the third is the stage of rapprochement or drawing together (*sblizhenie*) and the ultimate stage is that of merger (*sliianie*).[31] Soviet spokesmen have applied this design for assimilation to East European integration; Brezhnev and others have explicitly identified the current level of integration of Eastern Europe as the third stage.

Statements by President Ford in the 1976 U.S. presidential campaign appeared to reflect the influence of the Sonnenfeldt analysis. His opponent attacked Ford's stance on Eastern Europe, but made admissions concerning the issue of Soviet-Yugoslav relations which indicated that President Carter's administration might go even further than Ford's in recognizing Soviet claims to domination of Eastern Europe. From the Soviet viewpoint, that is something dictated by the world balance of forces; evidently, American officials agree. What is not generally recognized is that this matter of "organic relationships" is not confined to Eastern Europe; rather, it has worldwide implications.

[29] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 1. [30] TASS, June 29, 1976.

[31] See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Socialist Internationalism and Eastern Europe—A New Stage," *Survey*, No. 22 (Winter 1976), 38-54; B. Kozin, "The Drawing Together of the Socialist Countries—An Objective Regularity," *International Affairs*, No. 10 (October 1976), 14-21.

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It is true that the Soviet Union's special relationship with the East European bloc is based upon the legal-political concept of "socialist internationalism," which affects only those countries with socialist regimes. But socialist internationalism is a subcategory of proletarian internationalism, which means the solidarity of the world revolutionary movement, the absence of any distinction between particular party and national interests and those of international communism and, at least implicitly, the primacy of the CPSU and the Soviet Union in the world movement. The Soviets have also postulated organic links between proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence, and between peaceful coexistence and the ideological struggle of socialism and capitalism. While the ideological struggle between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois ideology is viewed as intensifying, the "international aims of the working class" are said to be organically connected with "national, patriotic interests."

Given the alleged centrality of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the world movement, if proletarian internationalism, peaceful coexistence, and national patriotic interests are "organically" linked as Soviet spokesmen maintain, the Soviet center is the true representative of all the world's people, and not only the proletariat. For the Soviet center has been redefined as the "party and state of the entire people"; the center is not purely proletarian and neither is that which is represented in the outside, non-socialist part of the world. Implicitly, then, the foundation has been laid for extension of the applicability of the concept "party and state of the entire people" to the whole world. And, given the "organic" connection between consolidation of the socialist commonwealth and the other "organic" relationships and the view of structural changes as occurring through law-governed processes, the basis has been provided for a *sliianie* approach to the integration of the world under Soviet leadership.

To sum up: the growing "organic" relationships within the socialist commonwealth are represented as a "law-governed" process; this process is "organically" linked with "proletarian internationalism"; "proletarian internationalism" is "organically" combined with "peaceful coexistence"; and "peaceful coexistence," defined as a product of the changed balance of forces, is "organically" tied to the ideological struggle between social systems. Thus, the processes that are effecting the triumph of socialism over capitalism are functionally interconnected; a change in one structural relationship produces change in the others. One may object that the subjective approach, particularly the emphasis upon ideological struggle, appears to contradict the concept of a law-

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governed process. However, Soviet theoreticians apparently view subjective intervention in processes as necessary at crucial points; this "push" channels the relationships of structures, which then proceed in certain directions according to the momentum that has been generated. The flow of the process is thus not haphazard; it follows a law-governed pattern.

Not all of the foregoing is entirely new. From the early days of the Soviet regime, communist spokesmen foresaw the eventual emergence of a global commonwealth. During the Khrushchev era, development of the socialist commonwealth was hailed as the indispensable foundation for the future one of global proportions. What is new are the unprecedented claims concerning the weight of the Soviet Union in world politics and the admitted qualitative change in Soviet society, giving the structural realignment of the world a character quite different from that of earlier Marxist Utopianism. The striking care of Soviet theoreticians in fitting the organic relationships into a cohesive framework indicates the importance of a universal analysis of structure for the legitimation of both domestic and foreign policies. Above all, the analysis of organic relationships provides a justification for expanding Soviet power and for the role of the dominant, complex bureaucratic structures within the Soviet system. Most impressive is the degree to which Soviet power is envisioned as progressing toward world hegemony. This is, of course, a matter of change in the world balance of forces.

III. Détente and the Correlation of Forces

The intensification of the communist bloc's disarray and domestic dissent between 1968 and 1973 coincided with a marked reversion to the "two camps" analysis of world politics, in contrast to the "three camps" classification and the description of a diversity of progressive social forces under Khrushchev. Perception of imminent threat to the system no doubt encourages greater specificity in the identification of enemies. However, with the apparent surmounting of the problems of bloc fragmentation and domestic dissent, there has been no inclination by Soviet spokesmen to downgrade the emphasis upon polarization. Rather, it has been increasingly emphasized: the concept of polarization, one of the cardinal tenets of Marxism, is the most essential analytical tool in the Soviet theoretical approach to the restructuring of international politics.

Although Soviet theoreticians sometimes present a highly sophisticated analysis of the contemporary complexity of social structure in

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both socialist and other systems,[32] the general tendency is toward a simplification in line with the original Marxian formulation. Complex social structures are fitted into a Procrustean bed of polarization analysis that links contemporary ideological revision with pristine Marxism; for both Marx and Lenin, the polarization of social forces and ideology was the penultimate step toward unification of the world.

Whatever persuasive force the concept of polarization has possessed for its ideological adherents has resided principally in the assurance of an inexorable structural realignment in the direction indicated by Marxist theory. The structures subject to realignment are essentially economic formations; "in the last instance" objective economic processes are determinative of movement in the classical Marxist viewpoint. In recent years, the "class basis of international relations" has been repeatedly emphasized. However, this emphasis appears to be in some measure a ritualistic repetition of earlier formulas. In fact, as indicated above, the class basis of domestic social relationships has been substantially redefined; the analysis of world social forces also appears inconsistent with the orthodox Marxist assumption of substructural determinism. Ideology, rather than social class *per se*, now appears to be the principal ingredient of Soviet polarization analysis; the real criterion for classification is clearly one's position regarding the contemporary revision of Soviet ideology.[33] Viewed from a Marxist perspective, this projected ideology represents the interests of social forces; it is obvious that it is a representation not of the interest of a proletariat moving toward universality, but of the interest of the bureaucratic control structures within the Soviet Union. The term "class struggle" thus appears to be a code word for struggle for supremacy between the "Soviet camp" and the "anti-Soviet camp."

Included in the "imperialist" or "anti-Soviet" camp are elements opposed to the Soviet view on the "restructuring of international relations," the "American military-industrial complex, extreme imperialist reactionaries, Zionist circles, professional anti-Communists of all stripes," the "ruling circles of NATO" in Western Europe, and "the Peking leaders";[34] plus "left-wing revisionists," "nationalists," and "proponents of 'regional' or 'national' versions of Marxism."[35] The Chinese

[32] Gililov (fn. 21), 102-12; Viktorov (fn. 13), 2-3.

[33] T. T. Timofeyev, "Leninskii klassovi analiz i sovremenni revizionizm" [Leninist Class Analysis and Contemporary Revisionism], *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 5 (May 1974), 31-44.

[34] *Izvestia*, July 13, 1974, pp. 3-4.

[35] Speech by Mikhail A. Suslov to the USSR Academy of Sciences, *Pravda*, March 18, 1976, p. 2.

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regime is said to have deserted socialism and socialist ideology and to have placed itself "objectively" in the imperialist camp. Overtures to the new Chinese leadership in late 1976 indicated a possible effort for rapprochement, but at the 25th CPSU Congress Brezhnev still described "Maoist ideology and policy" as "openly hostile to Marxism-Leninism," and China as an "important reserve for imperialism in its struggle against socialism."[36]

The center of the imperialist camp is, of course, the United States; the center of the socialist camp is the Soviet Union. "The countries that are building socialism and communism, primarily the Soviet Union," Mikhail Suslov said in March 1976, constitute "a powerful base for the development of the world revolutionary process."[37] The various aspects of "restructuring of international relations" are all tied, directly or indirectly, to the internal structural changes of the centers and to their changing relationships. Paramount importance is ascribed to the balance or correlation of forces.

A Soviet spokesman stated in January 1976 that the "changing balance of forces between the two social systems in favor of socialism has been the decisive factor determining the acceleration of the fundamental restructuring of international relations."[38] In a speech on June 14, 1974, Brezhnev specifically related this perception to Soviet policy making: "Having evaluated the overall balance of forces in the world, we arrived at the conclusion a few years ago that there was a real possibility for bringing about a fundamental change in the international situation."[39]

While the restructuring of international relations is conceived as a continuous process initiated by the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet spokesmen maintain that a fundamental or qualitative change in the process of restructuring has occurred in the 1970's. That fundamental change relates to internal social and economic development and to the degree of success in ideological conflict; its most overt manifestation is the perceived change in the military balance.[40] As the principal guarantors against anti-Soviet "imperialist adventures" and as the mainstay of the "reliable defense of the entire socialist camp,"[41] Soviet military forces are accorded an exalted place in the doctrine of "correlation of forces."

The massive Soviet arms buildup of recent years is justified by the

[36] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 3.
[37] TASS, March 17, 1976.
[38] Lebedev (fn. 1), 6.
[39] *Pravda*, June 15, 1974, p. 1.
[40] *Kommunist* (fn. 12), 6.
[41] A. A. Grechko, "Glavnoi roli KPSS v stroeni armiie razvitie sotzialisticheskem obshestve" [The Main Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of Developed Socialist Society], *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 5 (April 1974), 30-47.

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alleged Western acceleration of the arms race, the imperialists' desperation and willingness to "resort to the most extreme means," and their resistance to the "restructuring of international relations."[42] Western advocates of détente frequently maintain that the Soviets are merely interested in parity of strength with the United States and its allies; however, Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly asserted that the "correlation of forces" is changing decisively in favor of the socialist camp. Foreign Secretary and Politburo member Andrei A. Gromyko has written that "the present marked preponderance of the forces of peace and progress gives them the opportunity of laying down the direction of international politics."[43]

Détente and peaceful coexistence are viewed by Soviet spokesmen as resulting from the favorable shift in the balance of forces and as forms of struggle between the two systems; agreements between the two reflect Soviet success in the "diplomatic struggle of the two worlds."[44] Détente is viewed as a form of class struggle;[45] processes of détente are specifically attributed to imperialist defeats;[46] and peaceful coexistence is said to represent a class policy conducive to the strengthening of the socialist countries and the undermining of imperialism.[47] Forms of cooperation between the imperialist and socialist camps and the struggle of ideologies are described as being structurally connected; both develop "within the framework of the transition from capitalism to socialism," the "change in the alignment of forces."[48]

According to Brezhnev, "Détente by no means annuls the battle of ideas."[49] At the 25th CPSU Congress, the General Secretary said that détente does not alter the laws of class struggle and does not help capitalism or freeze the status quo. Rather, détente is the "path to more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction."[50]

Beginning in mid-1975, with Suslov's speech on the 40th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress,[51] "proletarian internationalism"

[42] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, February 23, 1976, p. 1.

[43] Gromyko, "Programma mira v deistvii" [The Peace Program in Action], *Kommunist*, No. 14 (September 1975), 5.

[44] Sh. Sanakoyev, "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and Effectiveness," *International Affairs*, No. 6 (June 1971), 10.

[45] *Pravda*, December 27, 1975, p. 1.

[46] Zakharov (fn. 26), 92.

[47] N. Kapchenko, "Socialist Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (April 1975), 8.

[48] Zakharov (fn. 26), 87.

[49] *Pravda*, October 15, 1975, p. 1.

[50] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 3.

[51] M. A. Suslov, "Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie v avangarde borbi za mir, sotzialnoe i natzionalnoe osvobozhdenie" [The Communist Movement in the Avantgarde Struggle for Peace, Socialism, and National Liberation], *Kommunist*, No. 11 (July 1975), 3-10.

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assumed primacy as the conceptual basis for Soviet policy toward world revolutionary forces under conditions of détente. There followed an internal debate over tactics, which apparently had not been entirely resolved at the end of 1976. In August 1975, Konstantin Zaradov had criticized parliamentary methods and had called for direct revolutionary action among the masses;[52] he was subsequently singled out for special praise by Brezhnev. Meanwhile, on the practical level, the CPSU continued to encourage flexible tactics and collaboration with non-communist political forces, under the direction of Boris N. Ponomarev, CPSU secretary for relations with non-ruling Communist Parties. At the 25th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev increased the ambiguity in regard to the tactics dictated by "proletarian internationalism" when he asserted that there would be "no compromise on matters of principle" with "right and left revisionism," but encouraged cooperation with other forces of the left, saying that ties with progressive non-communist parties did not mean "ideological convergence with them."[53] Despite this lack of clarity on tactics, there was no doubt about the perceived structural significance of national liberation movements in the world realignment and the application of "proletarian internationalism" to the former colonial areas.

National liberation movements are viewed as having entered a new phase coincident with the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism. Increasing Soviet support for national liberation movements, particularly in southern Africa, is presumably based upon the assumption that the general crisis of capitalism makes the West more vulnerable to pressure. Conditions are favorable for the success of national liberation movements; these successes mean detachments from, and the weakening of, the imperialist system; the processes of change inevitably increase the relative strength of the socialist camp in the world balance.[54] This relative strengthening of socialism would presumably occur without any direct connection between Moscow and the national liberation movements, but direct Soviet assistance is seen as accelerating the processes of change. Moreover, the general analysis of the world's structural realignments by Soviet theoreticians presents the Soviet Union as being necessarily the center of the world revolutionary movement. Success of liberation struggles is credited to the increasing weight

[52] *Pravda*, August 6, 1975, p. 3; cited in Robert H. Donaldson, "U.S.S.R. Profile," in Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1976* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 1976), 66.

[53] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 4.

[54] See V. Zhurkin, "Detente and International Conflicts," *International Affairs*, No. 7 (July 1974), 90.

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of the socialist system in the world balance. The qualitative jump in the political, economic, and military power of the Soviet Union is the central element in the increased weight of the socialist camp. The Soviet Union is therefore seen as the structural center of the world revolutionary process. Soviet spokesmen have recently made this quite explicit, vigorously reasserting Soviet leadership of both the socialist commonwealth and the world revolutionary movement.[55] The claimed centrality of the CPSU and the Soviet Union has been the most controversial aspect of the contemporary Soviet formulation of "proletarian internationalism." Brezhnev was compelled to downgrade these leadership claims at the June 1976 parley of European Communist Parties, but the theoretical formulations discussed above have not been renounced.

The easing of tensions associated with détente is regarded as a definite plus for the socialist camp and a necessary loss—though a rationally minimized one—for the imperialist camp. Détente does not prevent the further disintegration of imperialism and it does not resolve the inner tensions of bourgeois society. The imperialist camp, principally the United States, is seen as enmeshed in economic crisis (reflected in high inflation and unemployment), and in the "ideological and political crisis" of bourgeois society (reflected in high crime rates, political corruption, and internal dissension).[56] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is alleged to be a highly stable society.

According to KGB Chief Yuri Andropov in his address on Lenin's anniversary in April 1976, "Soviet society is more stable and monolithic than ever. All its classes, social groups, peoples, and generations are united."[57] Given the Soviet emphasis in both theory and practice upon the roles of coercive agencies, we might conclude that this internal stability, if it exists, represents a kind of imposed equilibrium, with a high potential for unresolved and explosive conflict within the Soviet social system. However that may be, the structural development of the two systems does appear in important respects to conform with the Soviet model. In view of the success in reconcentrating control following the 1968-1970 disturbances in the communist bloc, it appears that the structures of socialism cohere around a central control structure within

[55] See speech by Mikhail A. Suslov to the USSR Academy of Sciences, *Pravda*, March 18, 1976, p. 1; T. Timofeyev, "Razvitie rabochii klassa i sovremennik ideologicheskii borba" [Development of the Working Class and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle], *Pravda*, January 17, 1976, pp. 3-4; P. Rodionov, "An Ardent Fighter for Communism," *Pravda*, March 10, 1976, p. 6; trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 15, 1976.

[56] See Brezhnev's speech to the 25th CPSU Congress, *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 4.

[57] *Izvestia*, April 23, 1976, p. 1.

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the Soviet bloc in a way that is unfeasible for the diverse elements of the Western bloc. Whether that is a long-run strength or weakness may indeed be questioned, but it is supportive of the Soviet theoretical position.

Given the differences in cohesiveness between the centers, the overall change in the correlation of forces, and the structural realignments of international relations that have taken place, rational behavior for the capitalists, in the Soviet view, involves acceptance of détente; it is perceived as providing conditions for the further augmentation of the socialist camp's weight in the world balance. While a vocal band of "professional anti-communists" are said to carry out a vigorous rearguard action against détente, the dominant elements of the imperialist camp are viewed as pursuing a rational course. For the capitalists, according to Communist ideology, only short-run rationality is possible; in the long run, there is no rational course that can avert disintegration of their system. Rational capitalist strategy therefore dictates cutting short-run losses as much as possible; in Soviet eyes, that is the Western motivation for acceptance of détente. The consistent Soviet view of relations between the two camps is that of a zero-sum game, with the socialist camp more immune to the effects of structural disequilibrium than the imperialist camp, and with the weights of the players progressively changing in favor of the former.

The current Soviet view of capitalist rationality conforms with Marx's analysis of rational bourgeois behavior and with Khrushchev's assessment of the environing conditions for peaceful coexistence. There is no perceived fundamental change in capitalist mentality and behavior; what has been changed decisively is the weight of the competing forces and their internal structural cohesion. Not only are the imperialist circles seen as powerless to prevent the external structural realignments unfavorable to them; their domestic social problems would be worse without détente than with it. Y. Zakharov expressed this point in January 1976: "There is substantial evidence to show that in a situation marked by international tension the Western countries would find it more difficult to resolve their problems. An exacerbation of the economic crisis in combination with the energy and raw materials crisis would evidently hit them much harder."[58]

Rational Western acceptance of détente is thus also connected with phenomena referred to as "economic restructuring of international relations."[59] Aspects of this economic restructuring include: the develop-

[58] Zakharov (fn. 26), 91.

[59] V. Stepanov, "The Restructuring of International Economic Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 8 (August 1976), 27-31.

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ment of the socialist economies and their increasing coordination through COMECON; steadily increasing economic cooperation between the socialist countries and the developing countries; intensification of the internal economic contradictions of capitalism; the emergence of powerful blocs of countries producing raw material which are opposed to imperialism, especially OPEC; the Soviet interest in the acquisition of advanced Western technology to accelerate economic development; the interest of the capitalist countries in alleviating economic crises by selling advanced technology and assuring supplies of vital raw materials; and the common interest of all countries in preserving the environment, in the exploration of the oceans and outer space, in integrated transport systems, and in the fight against hunger and disease. East-West trade, according to Soviet estimates, provides two million jobs in the industrially advanced capitalist countries.[60] Thus, although the economic restructuring of international relations points toward the long-run dissolution of capitalism, the exigencies of the current crisis are viewed as compelling capitalist economic cooperation with the socialist camp. This cooperation is perceived as rational for the socialist camp from both short-run and long-run viewpoints, and is likely to expand further, but will not lead to integration of the fundamentally different economic systems; they will continue to be competitive.[61]

Détente, as the tactical centerpiece of political and economic restructuring, is perceived by Soviet spokesmen as inevitably gaining momentum.[62] The restructuring of international relations creates favorable conditions for further realignment in accord with Soviet interests: it includes the establishment of "zones of peace" in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean; creation of a "system of collective security" for Asia, presumably directed against China; final dismantling of the "system of colonial oppression"; and progress in nuclear arms limitations and central European disarmament.[63] In all these matters, rational behavior by the American center of imperialism, its capitalist allies, and the "progressive" forces not directly controlled by Moscow is, according to Soviet spokesmen, behavior based upon acceptance of the perception of a decisive qualitative increase in the weight of the socialist camp in the world balance of forces. If forces outside the Soviet orbit act in defiance of the claimed new realities of the world power balance, their positions will be worse than would be the case with voluntary acceptance of progressive restructuring within the framework of détente.

Here it must be noted that Soviet spokesmen have entangled them-

[60] *Ibid.*, 28. [61] *Ibid.*, 30. [62] Kapchenko (fn. 47), 7.
[63] Interview with Leonid M. Zamyatin, Moscow Domestic Television Service, March 23, 1976; trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, April 2, 1976.

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selves in a blatant contradiction—a contradiction that tends to be obscured by the complexity of the analysis of processes of détente, especially in the economic area. Soviet theoreticians do not assess the strength of sociopolitical structures in absolute terms. Rather, given their theoretical presuppositions, they necessarily evaluate the power of structures as relative to each other. Yet, Soviet spokesmen maintain that détente improves the position of capitalism in contrast to possible alternative policies in the short run; at the same time, they assert that processes of détente enhance the strengthening of the socialist camp, both in the short and the long run, and provide preferable policy alternatives for the Soviets.

There appear to be four possible conclusions that may be drawn in dealing with this contradiction in the Soviet analysis of détente: (A) The relationship between the camps is no longer a zero-sum game but a variable-sum game, with mixed gains and losses. Some Soviet sources cited above do seem to argue along these lines. However, when Soviet analysts deal with the systems in general theoretical terms, they explicitly deny this view of a variable-sum game. Moreover, its acceptance would undermine the entire framework of Marxist social analysis. (B) Détente improves the position of the capitalist camp in relation to the socialist camp, as a small minority in Soviet leadership circles reportedly fear. (C) Détente improves the position of the socialist camp in relation to the capitalist camp, as claimed by American critics of détente. (D) Détente strengthens the relative position of the capitalist camp in the short run and of the socialist camp in the long run. The last is a plausible view from the Soviet standpoint, but it cannot be squared with authoritative Soviet pronouncements. The old Soviet "ebb and flow" rationale for policy is obviously not applicable, since temporary stabilization of capitalism is tied to the "ebb" of revolution, while the present period is perceived as one of "flow." Moreover, if détente provides some measure of temporary stabilization for capitalism, then presumably the relative power of the socialist camp would be greater in the short run as well as in the long run without détente. Conclusion (C) appears to be the most persuasive answer to this contradiction.

In their analysis of restructuring, Soviet spokesmen have evolved certain rather definite rules of détente, specifying behavior that is acceptable or unacceptable in relations between the two opposing camps. These may be summarized as follows:

(1) There is no coexistence in matters of ideology or in the case of a national struggle for liberation.

(2) Forms of ideological struggle which threaten the socialist system

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are violations of détente (for instance, bourgeois propaganda emphasizing individualism or Western conceptions of rights).[64] In response to Western charges concerning Soviet violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinski accords, Yuri Andropov said in April 1976 that there had been no agreement "to support efforts to harm socialism in support of the plans of reactionary circles."[65]

(3) The Helsinki accords are seen as legitimizing the status quo in Eastern Europe and ruling out-of-bounds any Western attempts to influence developments there.

(4) American or other Western efforts to sustain anti-Soviet or anti-"progressive" forces anywhere threaten the framework of détente and are regarded as "imperialist resistance to the restructuring of international relations."[66]

(5) Soviet support for West European Communist Parties and national liberation movements is permissible behavior within the framework of détente. Western participation in détente involves not only the explicit acceptance of the restructuring of international relations that has occurred, but also the implicit acceptance of the process of restructuring, which continues to develop progressively.

Specific events in the course of 1976 clearly illustrate the double standard contained in the Soviet formulation of the rules of détente. When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that the United States would not support a country in the NATO area that permits Communists in its government, *Pravda* charged that this violated the Helsinki agreements.[67] Kissinger's stern warning to the U.S.S.R. and Cuba in January 1976, and his subsequent protests concerning the intervention in Angola, were criticized by the Soviet leadership as inimical to détente.[68] His efforts to effect a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia[69] and the alleged threat of possible military intervention by the U.S. in Lebanon[70] were also scored as subverting the framework of détente. On the other hand, the Soviets felt free to criticize actions by the United States within its own geographical sphere of influence, charging that in negotiations over the Panama Canal Zone, the U.S. sought to impose "a new variation of the one-sided treaty and thereby reaffirm its 'right' to undivided rule over a part of the territory of an independent country."[71]

[64] *Pravda*, February 20, 1976, p. 1.
[65] *Izvestia*, April 23, 1976, p. 2; cf. *Pravda*, February 20, 1977, p. 1.
[66] *Sovetskaya Kultura*, February 20, 1976, p. 3.
[67] *Pravda*, April 18, 1976, p. 1.
[68] *Pravda*, February 1, 1976, p. 1; February 5, 1976, p. 2; May 14, 1976, p. 1.
[69] *Izvestia*, August 14, 1976, p. 3.
[70] *Pravda*, April 8, 1976, p. 1.
[71] *Pravda*, May 5, 1976, p. 1.

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Soviet spokesmen have thus elaborated the rules of the game according to which the "socialist camp," perceived as structurally highly coordinated, is granted at least formal immunity against actions detrimental to its cohesion. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, as the center of world realignment, is free to further the disintegrative processes that are actively undermining the structure of the imperialist camp (which is perceived as structurally fragmented).

IV. The New Brezhnev Doctrine

The analyses and formulations discussed above provide the Soviets with a comprehensive doctrinal scheme to explain and justify key domestic and international policies in the 1970's. Marxist-Leninist theory has been revised, updated, and in some fundamental respects radically altered, to narrow the gulf between theory and perceived objective reality and to legitimize contemporary Soviet social structure and the Soviet role in world politics.

Many figures in the subsystem of the Soviet polity concerned with theoretical formulation—most notably Mikhail Suslov—have contributed to this enterprise. But all basic theoretical change in the Soviet Union requires the authenticating stamp of the top leader; therefore the name most often associated with this doctrinal revision by the Soviets themselves has been that of Leonid Brezhnev.

The main points of the new Brezhnev Doctrine, which is far more comprehensive than the original one, may be summarized as follows:

(1) There has been a qualitative change in world power relationships, or the "correlation of forces," favorable to the socialist camp and its center, the Soviet Union. The balance continues to change in the Soviets' favor; it has already been altered drastically enough that the Soviets are free to enunciate a kind of socialist Monroe Doctrine. Backed by the massive increment in the bloc's military, political, and economic power, the Soviet leadership demands that the capitalists refrain not only from interference in the Soviet base bloc, but also from efforts to counter the progressive restructuring occurring elsewhere.

(2) Changes in world political structures are "organically" related; a change in one structure leads to changes in the others. The direction of change is determined by the weight and cohesion of the structures in the general process. There is a special, developed organic relationship between the Soviet Union and its East European affiliates, which is linked with a global pattern of organic relationships. Processes of international restructuring are inextricably connected with Soviet domes-

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tic restructuring; in regard to the latter, subjective factors and increasing control by the dominant social structure are accorded priority of emphasis.

(3) The dominant Soviet structure, a web of complex bureaucratic power whose role has been redefined in essentially antirevolutionary or anti-Utopian terms, has emerged as the center of the world. The qualitative change in the world correlation of forces is the principal determinant of the continuing processes of restructuring in international relations. The most important component of that qualitative change is the rising power of the Soviet Union, which is perceived as structurally coordinated on a firm monolithic basis. Global political change is thus largely governed by this stable center.

(4) Given the Soviet Union's weight in the process and its interest in restructuring, the dominant Soviet social structure is identified with all world revolutionary forces, specifically with those whose actions tend to diminish the weight of the Soviets' chief competitor in the world balance. The qualitative change in the correlation of forces and the gathering momentum of processes of restructuring leave the Soviet center free to promote the further disintegration of competing structures. This freedom is the obverse of the restraint required from the capitalist states vis-à-vis the socialist system and processes of restructuring.

Certain corollaries follow from this framework of doctrinal propositions. They include:

(1) Any possible temporary stabilization of capitalism is dependent upon acknowledgement of the decisive change in the correlation of forces and, in fact, of the Soviet movement toward supremacy.

(2) Revolution anywhere outside the Soviet base bloc weakens capitalism and increases the relative power of the Soviet Union.

(3) Rational action by both capitalists and revolutionists will lead to Soviet world dominance, provided the cohesion of the socialist center is maintained.

This theoretical reformulation is consistent with the traditional Soviet structural mode of analysis of political and social development. However, there are significant variations or alterations in the substance of the analysis; some pertain to the chronology of structural change while others amount to a drastic alteration of theory.

(1) The socialist system is now seen as having sufficient weight in the world balance to determine the course of events—a stark contrast

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to the doctrine of "capitalist encirclement" accepted as applicable up to 1959.

(2) Given the qualitative change in the correlation of forces, the basis has been laid for "socialist encirclement" of capitalism, which is seen as the actual course of world realignment today. The projections of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in regard to the structural relationships of the two systems are perceived as being progressively realized.

(3) The view of the socialist center has been decisively revised in an anti-Utopian direction. The legitimation of bureaucratic structure, combined with a view of a virtually inexorable, "organic," "law-governed" restructuring of the world, points toward universal dominance by a partial, differentiated structure, rather than the astructural unification of the world projected by Marx.

(4) Ideology, coercion, and potential force are now regarded as more important than economic development *per se*. The Soviets present a more subjective view of social development, with emphasis upon the "superstructure" from both short-run and long-run viewpoints.

(5) With communism redefined and with capitalist encirclement ended, there is now no theoretical barrier to communism in one country or region.[72] If Marxist Utopianism is indeed the energizing and legitimizing core of the Soviet "goal-culture," and if perceptions of growing disparity between end goals and immediate reality constitute the phenomenon potentially most dysfunctional for Soviet social cohesion, then the reconceptualization of ideology plays a major role in any Soviet drive for world hegemony.

For Marx, theory was both a practice and a material force. Soviet doctrine on the restructuring of international relations fully accords with this Marxian perspective; over the last decade the Soviets have devoted awesome efforts to sharpening the theoretical sword. Western apologists for détente may wishfully indulge in the assumption of a Soviet desire for parity with the United States; the new Brezhnev Doctrine explicitly refutes that assumption. In their reconceptualization of doctrine, the Soviets have proclaimed the imminence of world hegemony—usually with clarity, always in resounding tones.

[72] Cf. Gilison (fn. 4), chap. 5.

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CHINESE CONFLICT CALCULUS AND BEHAVIOR: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management

By STEVE CHAN*

As we move into a world of increasing interdependence and mutual vulnerability between nations, the risks and consequences of international conflict—especially that of a military nature involving major powers—will be magnified. To improve the chances for avoiding, containing, and resolving such disputes, we need to understand how nations go about managing situations involving the actual or potential use of military force, as well as the rationale or calculus that provides the basis for their selection of policies.

This paper deals with the treatment of military conflicts by the People's Republic of China. Two general questions are examined. First, what is the nature of the Chinese strategy of conflict management?[1] By strategy of conflict management, I mean deliberate policy programs designed to monitor the actions and intentions of one's actual or potential adversaries, to deter them from carrying out unwanted policies, to engage in military conflict with them should deterrence fail, and to control and resolve such conflict lest it threaten more important domestic or foreign policy goals. Second, what are the strengths and weaknesses in China's treatment of military conflicts? I will make this appraisal by comparing China's past behavior with a set of ideal requirements for one approach to successful conflict management—that of "coercive diplomacy" discussed by Alexander George and his colleagues.[2]

Clearly, in the case of China as well as of other nations, efforts to

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[1] Obviously, Chinese leaders do not hold identical views about the most appropriate way to manage international conflicts. I am therefore referring only to the general orientations that enter into the decision process of Peking's foreign policy elite.

[2] Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simon, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

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identify the strategies of conflict management of foreign policy elites face several important problems. The data on the rationales and processes behind a nation's manifest policy behavior are often inaccessible to the researcher,[3] who has to rely instead on *post hoc* inference of motives and calculations from the manifest behavior. Yet, as shown in Graham Allison's work on the Cuban missile crisis,[4] this behavior can often be "explained" by a number of plausible rationales and processes.[5] To compound the analytical problem, our knowledge of the "manifest" behavior is of necessity always incomplete; many of the foreign policy interactions between nations are concealed from the public (for example, secret diplomatic communications and clandestine troop movements). Furthermore, with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union,[6] the universe of actual or potential military conflicts involving individual nations contains a rather small number of contemporary cases, and thus provides a poor basis for inductive generalization. This limitation is especially pertinent in single-case studies where the behavioral traits observed may be more indicative of the history of the particular conflict examined than of some coherent policy calculus shared by the national elite of interest.

In this paper, I do not offer any breakthrough with regard to the above questions, but will attempt to reduce, in three ways, the threat they pose to valid inference. First, I will examine China's conflict behavior in five past instances of actual or potential military involvement.[7]

[3] The Chinese seldom discuss their views and analyses of actual or potential military conflicts involving themselves openly; see Steve Chan, John A. Kringen, and Davis B. Bobrow, "Chinese Views on Crisis Diagnosis and Management: Insights from Documentary Analysis" (University of Maryland 1976), mimeo. Recently, some materials shedding light on the private appraisal of international conflicts by the Chinese leaders (e.g., the volume, *Long Live the Thought of Mao Tse-tung*) have become available in the West. For an example of research based on such data, see Allen S. Whiting, "New Light on Mao; Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations," *China Quarterly*, No. 62 (June 1975), 263-70.

[4] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

[5] Davis B. Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 204-28.

[6] Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, "Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument: An Interim Report," paper delivered to the International Studies Association, February 1976; Blechman and Kaplan, "The Use of Military Force Abroad by the United States since 1798: An Annotated Bibliography of Unclassified Lists of Incidents Prepared by the U.S. Government," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIX (December 1975), 708-12; Leo Hazlewood, John J. Hayes, and James R. Brownell, Jr., "Planning for Problems in Crisis Management: An Analysis of Post-1945 Behavior in the U.S. Department of Defense," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI (March 1977), 75-106.

[7] All of the conflicts examined took place at China's periphery, and were to varying degrees related to Chinese efforts to maintain border security. It is reasonable to expect that in the short- and mid-term future, direct Chinese military involvement in international conflicts is likely to be restricted to countries contiguous to China, since China

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To the extent that this behavior displays a reasonably consistent structure across different historical contexts, there is a fairly sound basis for inferring the presence of a stable and coherent approach to conflict management, and the rationale on which this approach is based. The comparative focus of this analysis reduces the danger of unwarranted inference, which often stems from the overinterpretation of idiosyncratic factors operating in particular case histories.

Second, the Chinese regime places a great deal of emphasis on the development and propagation of explicit policy rationales. These publicly articulated rationales may be checked against the observed behavioral patterns.[8] Correspondence between the two will tend to enhance the credibility of, although by no means remove all doubts about, our interpretations. Conversely, discrepancies between the policy logics expounded by Peking and its observed conflict behavior will suggest the need for caution. At present, we lack sufficient knowledge about the Chinese processes of decision making to explain such discrepancies, which could be a result of a number of factors.[9]

Third, there is a growing body of literature on China's policy calculus in international conflicts.[10] This literature provides a rich mine of observations concerning the strategic and tactical considerations that

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will lack the capability to carry out large-scale conventional operations abroad. For discussions on the use and development of Chinese military capabilities, see Allen S. Whiting, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 402 (July 1972), 55-66; Robert F. Dernberger, "The Economic Consequences of Defense Expenditure Choices in China," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: 1975), 467-98.

[8] For discussions on Peking's logics for diagnosing and managing international conflicts as induced from its media statements, see Davis B. Bobrow, "Chinese Communist Response to Alternative U.S. Continental Defense Postures," in Bobrow, ed., *Weapons System Decisions: Political and Psychological Perspectives on Continental Defense* (New York: Praeger 1969), 151-213; and Bobrow, "Peking's Military Calculus," in Bobrow, ed., *Components of Defense Policy* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965), 39-52; Chan and others (fn. 3).

[9] Among these plausible factors are considerations such as our imperfect understanding of Chinese decision logics, our incomplete knowledge of Chinese policy behavior or unwarranted inference of the calculations behind this behavior, bureaucratic politics in Peking's foreign policy decision-making processes, and elite deception in public statements of policy rationales.

[10] The most relevant works are: Bobrow (fn. 8); Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1975); Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (March 1965), 80-99; Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and China's Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1970); Thomas W. Robinson, "Peking's Strategy in the Developing World: The Failures of Success," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 386 (November 1969), 64-77; Scott A. Boorman, *The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1969).

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are germane to Peking's policy formulation, observations that can offer an important basis for efforts to set forth the Chinese strategy of conflict management and serve as a check against unwarranted extrapolations. Thus, to the extent that the beliefs and concerns attributed to the Chinese conflict managers in this analysis are congruent with the observations of other analysts, we can again be more confident about our inferences.

The discussion starts with a search for patterns in China's treatment of past military conflicts. Next, the requirements for successful conflict management are outlined according to a model of coercive diplomacy. The relative strengths and weaknesses in the Chinese approach to coercive diplomacy are then examined on the basis of these discussions. The paper concludes with a brief statement on implications for further research.

Patterns of Conflict Behavior

The five military conflicts examined are: (1) the Korean War, 1950; (2) the Sino-American confrontation over Quemoy, 1958; (3) the Sino-Indian border conflict, 1962; (4) the escalation of the Vietnam War, 1964-65; and (5) the Sino-Soviet border clashes, 1969. These conflicts took place over a period of almost twenty years, during which major changes occurred in Chinese domestic politics and the international environment.[11] To the extent that China displays a consistent pattern of behavior despite important changes in its national leadership, international alignment, and the nature of individual conflicts, we can be more confident that this behavior is not a result of the idiosyncrasies of particular case histories, but is reflective of the core elements of the conflict management calculus of Peking's officials. Naturally, this behavioral convergence across different historical contexts tends to enhance confidence in the validity and durability of the results of the analysis.

A review of the existing literature suggests several similarities in the temporal organization of China's actions in the various conflicts.[12] These

[11] The most important of these changes are, of course, the Cultural Revolution in China, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet-American détente.

[12] This discussion has benefitted from a large body of previous research on Chinese decision making in the five conflicts. The most helpful studies on the Korean War are Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan 1960); Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: Free Press 1975). On the subject of the Quemoy conflict, the most relevant works are Whiting (fn. 3); Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in Halperin, ed., *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1967), 265-303;

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actions are characterized by rather distinct sequences, and reflect five general phases: (1) probing, (2) warning, (3) demonstration, (4) attack, and (5) détente.[13] The first four phases indicate a pattern of gradual conflict escalation. Temporary lulls in propaganda and military activities tend to intervene at the transition periods between these phases. During these transition periods as well as upon entry into a new phase of confrontation, the Chinese are likely to employ détente measures to contain further escalation. If, as in the case of Quemoy in 1958, these détente measures are successful, the situation returns to the pre-crisis state of affairs. Unsuccessful détente measures are likely to lead to further intensification of conflict, as in Korea in 1950.

Since the Chinese belief system operates against the acceptance of an enemy's verbal statements as a true indication of his intentions,[14] Peking emphasizes the need for *probes* to test the behavioral reactions of the enemy. China's actions during this initial stage of conflict development generally serve two purposes. First, they facilitate the determination of the enemy's intentions and capabilities. Second, they act as low-intensity deterrents to enemy actions and intentions that might threaten the status quo preferred by Peking (as in the cases of Korea and Vietnam).

Melvin Gurtov, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in Chinese Motives," *Modern China*, 11 (January 1976), 49-103; Charles A. McClelland, "Action Structure and Communication in Two International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Free Press 1969), 473-82. Useful discussions on the Sino-Indian border conflict are provided in Whiting (fn. 10); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Pantheon 1970). For discussions on Chinese decisions and actions in the early period of the Vietnam War, see Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York: Pegasus 1967), and Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in Tang Tsou, ed., *China in Crisis*, Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968), 237-68; Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965-1966," *ibid.*, 23-27; Harold Hinton, "China and Vietnam," *ibid.*, 201-36, and Hinton, "Vietnam Policy, Domestic Factionalism, Regionalism, and Plotting a Coup," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown 1970), 119-57; Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-1966," *China Quarterly*, No. 49 (January-March 1972), 32-75; David Mozingo and Thomas Robinson, "Lin Piao on the People's War: China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam" (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, RM-4814-PR, November 1965); Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, "The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning" (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, R-548-PR, February 1971); Whiting (fn. 10). Finally, for analyses on the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969, see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (December 1972), 1175-1202; Neville Maxwell, "The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao," *China Quarterly*, No. 56 (October-December 1973), 730-39. It should be noted that the quality of information available on these conflicts varies a great deal. Information on the Sino-Soviet clashes is especially poor.

[13] Some of the conflicts did not develop beyond the warning (the Vietnam case) or demonstration (the Quemoy and Sino-Soviet cases) phases.

[14] Chan and others (fn. 3).

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During the probing phase, such actions usually take the form of more frequent border patrols into the disputed territory, troop movements to the trouble spot, and activation and expansion of military bases near it.[15] Generally, no attempt is made to conceal these actions through such means as masking military insignia, camouflaging troop transports and military construction sites, or manipulating electronic communication patterns. Indeed, the Chinese allow these displays of force to be monitored by enemy ground observations, foreign diplomats stationed in Peking, and such other means of detection as electronic eavesdropping and high-altitude photography. In the historical cases being examined, most analysts agree that China's adversaries were not unaware of its military preparations.[16]

Depending on the enemy's response to their probes, the Chinese will either revert to the pre-crisis posture or escalate their actions to the warning stage. In the Korean, Vietnam, Sino-Indian, and Sino-Soviet cases, probing measures failed to deter China's adversaries from carrying out their intended policies.[17] In the case of Quemoy, Chinese probes apparently did not elicit any overt response by the United States.[18] American passivity in this case had the same effect as the intransigence of China's adversaries in the others: it prompted the Chinese to escalate their actions to the warning stage.

The escalation of conflict to the *warning* stage can generally be identified by more explicit and belligerent Chinese statements and, oftentimes, by the outbreak of minor military clashes. During this phase, there is usually a significant increase in diplomatic activities. China's policy positions and concerns are transmitted through official communications (e.g., the exchange of Chinese and Indian diplomatic notes in the Sino-Indian case, the Chinese cables to the United Nations in the Korean case); through conferences with third parties (e.g., Chou

[15] The various analyses done by Whiting (fn. 12) are particularly helpful for illuminating this aspect of Chinese behavior.

[16] In addition to the studies by Whiting, McClelland, and Maxwell (fn. 12), see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press 1974); Steven A. Hoffmann, "Anticipation, Disaster, and Victory: India, 1962–71," *Asian Survey*, XII (November 1972), 960-79; H. A. DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," *Orbis*, VI (Fall 1972), 435-52.

[17] The immediate objectives for India and the Soviet Union in their border dispute with China were, of course, to evict the Chinese from the territories under contention. In Korea and Vietnam, the U.S. objectives were, respectively, to reunify Korea under a pro-West regime and to coerce North Vietnam, by escalating the air war to that country, to abandon its support for the Viet Cong. In the case of Vietnam, China was interested in avoiding a repetition of the Korean history, which could have resulted from American conflict escalation to North Vietnam.

[18] See Whiting (fn. 3); McClelland (fn. 12).

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En-lai's meeting with Indian Ambassador Panikkar in the Korean case, discussions between Chinese and Soviet leaders in the Quemoy case); or through editorials and press releases in the domestic media. Frequently, these signals of increased concern are accompanied by mass campaigns with the purpose of educating and mobilizing the population (e.g., the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Campaign, the Liberate-Taiwan Campaign).

During this phase, verbal threats are generally backed up by military activities, such as a rising incidence of border skirmishes, air combats, and the interception of enemy planes that intrude into Chinese airspace. While these military encounters do not challenge the established position of China's adversaries directly, they signal China's intention if these adversaries fail to heed its warnings.

An examination of the frequency and timing of "threshold events" such as those described above suggests that they are not random occurrences. For example, Chinese actions against U.S. overflights during 1965 were clustered around two time periods: late March and early April, and late September and early October. Within two weeks of China's first public threat to send fighting forces to Vietnam (March 28, 1965), three American intelligence planes were shot down (on March 31, April 3, and April 10). Then, on September 20 and October 5, China again took the initiative in attacking U.S. planes that had intruded into Chinese airspace.[19] Between these two peaks of warning activities, there were no such combat clashes between the Chinese and American air forces, even though U.S. planes continued to fly over Chinese territory. As Daniel Tretiak has indicated, there was no consistent relationship between Chinese reports of U.S. violations of Chinese airspace, Chinese warnings against these violations, and Chinese actions to intercept the intruders.[20] However, China's protests and air defense actions tended to rise during periods of conflict escalation in Vietnam, thus suggesting that they were being manipulated to communicate warnings against a Korea-type of invasion of North Vietnam by the United States.

If the warning activities fail to have the desired effect on the enemy, the Chinese are likely to initiate demonstrative actions intended to reinforce the credibility of their threats. But between the warning and

[19] Chinese actions in this case coincided with the rising incidence of harassment by commando teams from Taiwan. See Chan, "Conflict Modelling and Management: Chinese Foreign Policy Behavior in the Vietnam War, 1963–1965," Ph.D. diss. (University of Minnesota 1976).

[20] Tretiak, "Challenge and Control," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 17, 1966, pp. 216-21.

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demonstration phases, there is usually an interim marked by a reduced level of military hostility initiated by China. In the Korean and Sino-Indian cases, Peking continued to explore diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict. Such efforts help to provide additional clarification of the enemy's intentions before China embarks on further conflict escalation. They would obviously also tend to strengthen Peking's case in world opinion should the Chinese leaders decide to pursue this course of action.

Between the warning and demonstration phases, the Chinese are also likely to accelerate their military preparation for an assault on the enemy. However, they will not make any major effort to hinder enemy military activities during this time. The ensuing lull in overt military hostility often causes China's adversaries to become complacent about their own capabilities or about Chinese intentions. As a result of this overconfidence, their military dispositions (e.g., overextension of logistic lines, dispersion of forces) become vulnerable to Chinese attacks.

The *demonstration* phase normally opens with a limited Chinese attack on enemy positions. Despite abundant signs pointing to Chinese preparations for a military offensive, this attack usually comes as a shock to Peking's opponents, primarily as a result of their misperception of China's intentions, and not of its capabilities. Such demonstrative actions took the form of the attack on the South Korean forward elements near the Yalu River on October 26, 1950; the assault on the Indian outpost at Che Dong (Dhola) on October 10, 1962; the initiation of an intense bombardment of Quemoy on August 23, 1958; and the ambush of Soviet border guards on Chenpao (Daminsky) Island on March 2, 1969.

The choice of targets for China's initial demonstrative actions is interesting in several respects. First, the Chinese commanded local superiority in terms of terrain, manpower, fire power, logistical support, and distance to rear bases at each of the conflict sites. Second, Peking enjoyed considerable legal backing in its claim of ownership regarding the actual sites of the military clashes in the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet cases.[21] The Indian outpost at Che Dong was situated north of the McMahon Line, which was, according to the Indians, the international border between India and China. Similarly, Chenpao Island was situated on the Chinese side of the mainstream (*Thalweg*) of the Ussuri

[21] Quemoy is, of course, only a few miles off the Mainland coast. Its status as Chinese territory was not under dispute. In the Korean War, the Chinese forces did not attack the South Koreans until the latter had reached the Yalu River, which demarcates the Chinese-Korean border.

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River, which is generally accepted for demarcating national boundaries. Third, in the cases of Korea and Quemoy, the Chinese chose to engage the South Korean and Kuomintang forces instead of the American forces in combat. This tactic of conflict through indirection reduced the risk of forcing the United States to retaliate, thus decreasing the danger of an unwanted escalation of conflict. Such behavior is, of course, also congruent with the Chinese emphasis on attacking the "weak links" in the enemy position.[22]

The initial military clashes initiated by China are usually limited in scale and duration. They, too, are often followed by a short pause, presumably to allow both the Chinese and their adversaries to reassess the situation. However, if the enemy is not deterred from his threatening behavior, Peking is likely to escalate the intensity of its demonstrative actions. Thus, the Chinese initiated a series of more intense attacks on the Indian positions on Thag La Ridge and in Ladakh on October 20, 1962; on the American forces attempting to rescue the encircled South Korean forces on November 2, 1950; and on the Soviet forces around the disputed Chenpao Island on March 15, 1969.[23] In the case of Quemoy, the Chinese escalated the bombardment in early September 1958 in an attempt to blockade the island.

China's demonstrative actions are generally applied over a period of weeks, and with gradually increasing pressure on the opponent. Moreover, they are likely to be accompanied or followed by *détente* measures signalling China's willingness to settle the conflict. In the Sino-Indian case, these signals were communicated explicitly through proposals for unconditional talks between the premiers of the two countries. In the Korean case, the signals were tacit. After the initial military encounters on October 26 and November 2, the Chinese and North Korean forces took the initiative to disengage, rather than to follow up the strategic surprise they had gained in an all-out offensive. However, the limited Chinese objectives in these cases (to prevent China's opponents from upsetting the existing regional balance of power) could have been responsible for this behavior. In contrast, the military operation against the Paracel Islands in 1974 appeared to be aimed at achieving a rapid and decisive victory on the basis of tactical surprise and overwhelming military superiority.

On the basis of enemy reactions to the demonstrations, Peking decides whether to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. In order to provide oppor-

[22] Bobrow, "Peking's Military Calculus" (fn. 8).

[23] Robinson (fn. 12) has, however, indicated the possibility that the Russians might have initiated the March 15 clash.

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tunities for the parties to reassess the situation and, hopefully, for its adversary to pull back from a confrontation, Peking usually interrupts its military operations by intermittent pauses.[24] The abatement of overt hostility, of course, also serves as a tacit signal for a de-escalation of the conflict.

At this point in both the Korean and Sino-Indian conflicts, there was a lull in the fighting, lasting about three weeks. In both cases, the initiation of the *attack* phase on the part of China was precipitated by military actions by its opponents. An Indian attack on Chinese border positions from Walong on November 14, 1962, triggered a Chinese counteroffensive on November 16. This counteroffensive soon developed into a major co-ordinated attack on Indian positions in both the eastern and western sectors. Similarly, the period of combat abatement in Korea came to a close with MacArthur's "end the war" offensive on November 24, 1950. On November 26, the Chinese launched a counteroffensive which eventually pushed the United Nations forces out of North Korea. On both occasions, the scale and co-ordination of the Chinese counteroffensives suggest advance planning.

Such a large-scale ground attack did not take place in the case of Quemoy. Indications suggesting that Peking had decided to pull back from a Sino-American confrontation came almost immediately after President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles threatened U.S. intervention on September 4. On September 6, Chou En-lai publicly proposed the resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. This signal for *détente* was followed by other unilateral steps toward arms control. On October 6, Peking announced a unilateral cease-fire, and on October 25, a policy of even-days-of-the-month bombardment of Quemoy was instituted.

A major escalation was similarly averted in the Sino-Soviet case. Both sides appeared to have taken temporary measures of détente after the clash on March 15. For a while, neither side attempted to occupy or patrol the disputed Chenpao Island.[25] In the meantime, diplomatic communications between Peking and Moscow intensified. They eventually

[24] Pauses in military actions during this initial period of armed combat are not likely to be a result of Peking's logistic problems. Similarly, the periodic slackening of China's bombardment of Quemoy cannot be confidently attributed to problems of military supply and equipment, although it might have been affected by weather conditions in late August 1958. For a discussion of this issue in the Quemoy case, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "Perception and Action in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Quemoy Decision," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan 1976).

[25] There is some disagreement among analysts as to whether the Chinese occupied the island after the clashes in March. Robinson (fn. 12) reports that they did not, while Maxwell (fn. 12) indicates that they did.

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led to the opening of the border talks in Peking in October 1969, although no agreement to resolve the dispute has as yet been achieved.

Détente measures were employed by the Chinese to limit the further escalation of conflicts even after the start of large-scale military operations. After overrunning the Indian positions in Aksai Chin and the Northeast Frontier Agency between November 18 and 20, China declared a unilateral cease-fire on November 21 and announced its intention to withdraw to the *status quo ante bellum* control line. On December 1, the Chinese forces pulled back to their earlier positions; in the eastern sector, this pullback involved a withdrawal to some twenty miles beyond the actual control line before the outbreak of the border war.

Requirements for Coercive Diplomacy

The patterns of China's conflict behavior suggest a purposeful orchestration of policy. Further, the similarities in Peking's action across different historical contexts imply the presence of a relatively stable and coherent strategy of conflict management. To a significant extent, Peking's behavior approximates the "coercive diplomacy" model which, according to Alexander George and his colleagues,[26] involves the limited and controlled use of force, or the threat to use force, in order to attain specific political objectives. The purpose of coercive diplomacy is to alter the opponent's will, and not necessarily his capability, to carry out adverse policies. In this sense, Peking's behavior in the cases examined above can be regarded as examples of coercive diplomacy, and the strengths and weaknesses of this behavior can be appraised according to the requirements of coercive diplomacy.

On the basis of the discussion by George *et al.*, the chances for successful coercive diplomacy are improved to the extent that the following conditions are present.

Centralized control. The central authority must be able to monitor closely the development of the conflict situation, and to have undisputed power to decide on appropriate actions, including full control over the initiation, modification, and termination of these actions. This condition stresses—at the expense of local discretion and the potential overloading of the center—the need to preserve flexibility and secrecy in decision making by the center, to facilitate its rapid response to crisis developments, and to assure fidelity in the execution of its decisions. It requires a tight command structure through natural or forced consensus and

[26] George and others (fn. 2), especially pp. 1-35.

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speedy and accurate communication between the center and the periphery.

Clear signals. Before the opponent can comply with the protagonist's demands, he must be in a position to receive, understand, and react to these demands. Therefore, steps must be taken to ensure that (1) communication channels are not blocked; (2) "noise" that contributes to misinterpretation of signals is reduced or eliminated; and (3) ample lead time is provided for the opponent to respond. The preservation of unimpeded communication channels indicates the desirability of maintaining diplomatic contacts with the adversary,[27] and, more unconventionally, of avoiding such measures as camouflaging troop movements and shooting down the opponent's intelligence planes.[28] The danger of misperception suggests that the protagonist should avoid taking ambiguous or inconsistent actions.[29] To reduce the possibility of the enemy's misinterpretation of his intentions (e.g., interpreting warning signals of troop mobilization as an indication of intention to launch a pre-emptive strike), the protagonist should reiterate his policy positions in various media, rely on multiple communication channels (e.g.,

[27] Diplomatic communications also provide an important means to control the speed and direction of conflict development. Moreover, they enable the protagonist to maximize the impact of his military operations, and to reduce the possibility of his policy objectives being misunderstood by the enemy. It is, however, often very difficult to initiate and maintain diplomatic contacts while a conflict is developing. Such contacts are never under the unilateral control of any one party, as the U.S. found out in the Vietnam and Arab-Israeli conflicts.

[28] Graham Allison (fn. 4) indicates that President Kennedy was extremely dismayed by a U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy's concern was based on possible Soviet misinterpretation of this overflight as an indication that the U.S. was preparing for a massive nuclear attack. This logic may be reversed to understand possible Soviet concern over the same incident. From the perspective of the Kremlin, shooting down the U.S. intelligence plane might be misconstrued by Washington as a Soviet effort to conceal military preparations for imminent hostility, and would consequently increase the danger of a U.S. pre-emptive strike. More generally, as nations become increasingly vulnerable to the military capabilities of their adversaries, there is likely to be greater incentive to establish shared warning systems, such as the one currently in place in the Sinai. For a discussion on this topic, see Davis B. Bobrow, "Defusing Military Tension in the Third World," paper delivered to the International Studies Association, March 1977.

[29] It is possible that inconsistent policy behavior on the part of the United States contributed to the outbreak and escalation of the Korean War. For example, as Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (fn. 12), has indicated, both MacArthur and Acheson excluded Korea from the U.S. "defense perimeter" in speeches made before the outbreak of the conflict. These speeches could have misled the North Koreans into believing that the U.S. would not respond militarily to their attack on South Korea. Similarly, Truman's order for the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Straits—despite his previous promise of U.S. neutrality in the Chinese civil war—might have undermined the credibility of later U.S. assurances of nonbelligerence as far as the Peking leaders were concerned. In addition, the credibility of Washington's assurances was damaged by contradictory statements made by MacArthur with regard to U.S. policy objectives.

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through private citizens,[30] international organizations, or third-party governments), and reinforce verbal signals with nonverbal signals. The protagonist should also provide ample time for his opponent to evaluate the situation and to choose his course of action, so that the danger of precipitous and extreme reactions by his opponent is reduced. This consideration suggests that he should sequence his actions with intermittent pauses.

As we will see with regard to the outcome of Peking's signalling behavior in the past, these measures for ensuring clear communication can often entail important risks and liabilities. Explicit demands may result in rigidity and premature commitment to policy positions; unambiguous signals may be counterproductive due to the problem of unintended audiences;[31] and giving ample lead time to the opponent may present him with an opportunity to mobilize his resources for a countermove.

Appropriate demonstrations. To give credibility to his threats, the protagonist should back his words with deeds. Demonstration and warning measures must be convincing, discriminating, and easily controllable. In order to make his threats convincing, the protagonist can demonstrate his resolve to resist possible enemy aggression by putting his valuable assets in the path of this aggression.[32] In order to avoid underestimation of his determination or overestimation of his objectives by the enemy, the protagonist should adopt demonstrative measures that match the requirements of the situation. Both the nature of these demonstrative measures and their targets should be weighed according to their potential impact on the enemy and major third-party governments. The protagonist should especially avoid giving his opponent and his opponent's allies the impression that he is about to resort to large-scale warfare, or confronting them with a requirement to escalate the conflict in order to compensate for actual or anticipated military and political losses. Finally, in order to maintain control over the develop-

[30] For instance, John Scali, the ABC correspondent, played an important role in the Cuban missile crisis. The use of quasi-official personal representatives by decision makers in crisis situations enables them to bypass normal bureaucratic channels in the search for a tentative basis for conflict settlement.

[31] Unintended audiences may include the opponent's allies and domestic public, who might be alerted to block any concession. They may also include the protagonist's own allies. For instance, in the 1958 Quemoy conflict, the U.S. was faced with the problem of trying to convince Peking of its resolve to defend the offshore island, while at the same time having to avoid that this threat would be exploited by Tapei to provoke an unwanted Sino-American confrontation.

[32] In this respect, the Sinkiang-Tibet Road in Aksai Chin and the Chinese troops in Laos and North Vietnam served as "hostages" that would trigger Chinese involvement in case of enemy invasion.

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ment of events, the protagonist should localize the scope and impact of his demonstrative actions and be in a position to terminate them quickly and, if necessary, unilaterally. This last condition is especially difficult to obtain in situations where there is a rough parity in the contestants' capabilities, or where the opponent's incentives (such as those of ideological groups and irrendentist movements) preclude any appearance of compromise. In practice, military conflicts can rarely be contained or terminated without the mutual consent of both sides.[33]

Graduated escalation. Diplomatic and military pressure on the enemy should be gradually increased over a period of time. The application of this pressure must be incrementally increasing, interposed with pauses, and coupled with détente measures. The incremental intensification of pressure reduces the danger of miscalculation, while the intermissions between escalations provide an opportunity for both sides to reappraise the situation. These steps help to preserve policy options, and at the same time reduce the potential costs of policy changes or reversals. Détente measures should be applied to complement the demonstrative actions as additional incentives for the enemy to alter his policy.

In practice, these desiderata for successful coercive diplomacy are, again, extremely difficult to implement. The protagonist's restraint can be easily misunderstood as a lack of resolve, and his attempts at détente may be rejected as a deception to gain a temporary respite before escalating the conflict further. Gradual conflict escalation, preceded by explicit warning, also results in the loss of the element of surprise in military initiatives. Moreover, such an option is often not available to decision makers, who are faced with the serious opportunity costs of delaying actions.[34] Finally, as we have seen in the case of U.S. policies in Korea

[33] Of course, such consent need not be explicitly stated and agreed to by the parties. A *de facto* cease-fire can be instituted without a formal conflict settlement, as in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. Similarly, in limited wars such as Vietnam and Korea, a tacit understanding about the "rules of the game" restrains the potential for conflict escalation. The Communists did not challenge U.S. air and naval superiority, and the U.S. did not, with the exceptions of the Cambodian and Laotian incursions, attempt to capture the Communist sanctuaries.

[34] In a crisis, decision makers tend to perceive themselves confronted with "now or never" situations. Thus, for example, the Kaiser was under tremendous pressure to mobilize the German Army in response to the Russian mobilization in the First World War; President Kennedy had to rush to a decision before the Soviet missiles became operational in the Cuban missile crisis; and President Truman had to choose very quickly between intervention and nonintervention before the North Koreans could capture the entire peninsula in the initial days of the Korean War. Pressure for a swift response in these cases precluded the possibility of graduated escalation. With regard to China's decision to intervene in Korea, the rapid advance of the U.N. forces in October 1950 might have upset Peking's timetable for a gradual escalation of warning and demonstration activities. On the other hand, Peking might have tried to seize the opportunity presented by the Cuban missile crisis to attack India in 1962, while India's chief allies

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and Vietnam, it is often politically difficult for the central decision maker to maintain a policy stressing restraint and perseverance when the interests of important domestic institutions and groups operate against such a policy.[35]

The Chinese Strategy of Conflict Management

Sound coercive diplomacy, as we have seen, requires skillful policy "tuning" to satisfy a number of competing concerns. In the real world, numerous practical constraints hamper the successful implementation of the requirements outlined above. Therefore, it is difficult to provide a neat appraisal for a nation's performance in any specific conflict with regard to these requirements. We can, however, identify some general areas of strength and weakness in Peking's conduct of coercive diplomacy as indicated by its patterns of conflict behavior. Such an assessment should help to illuminate not only the nature of the Chinese strategy of conflict management, but also the hazards and difficulties in carrying out coercive diplomacy in general.

Centralization of control. We have relatively little information about the operational command structure in the Chinese military. As a result, the degree of control exercised by decision makers in Peking over local conflict situations can only be inferred on the basis of limited data. The available evidence suggests that Peking places significant stress on centralized decision making in dealing with issues of national security. Local commanders are prohibited from carrying out actions without explicit prior approval from the center.[36] We can infer that centralized control is likely to receive greater emphasis in China's strategy of conflict management because Chinese leaders have in the past shown a

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were embroiled in their own crisis. For a discussion on the temporal coincidence of the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban missile crisis, see Whiting (fn. 10).

[35] As shown in the dispute between Truman and MacArthur, it is particularly difficult for the central decision maker to keep his military "leashed" in fighting a limited war. Furthermore, in an extended conflict the central decision maker can very quickly deplete his political "capital" vis-à-vis various domestic constituents. There will be great pressures for dramatic escalation or complete withdrawal.

[36] In one of the secret Chinese military documents that have become available in the West, we find the following injunction to officers at the regimental level: "In neighboring countries (including fraternal nations and nationalistic countries) if and when in these border regions there occurs any international incident, it is required to report quickly to superiors and await the decisions and orders, if any. Under no circumstances should an officer upon his own personal responsibility take steps to carry out an unauthorized decision." This document is part of the secret Chinese military journal, *Kungtso T'ung Hsun* [Bulletin of Activities]; see J. Chester Cheng, ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army* (Stanford: Hoover Institution 1966), 191.

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strong commitment to programs fostering enforced or natural consensus with the elite's policy rationales and plans.[37] Thus, political commissars in the military serve as watchdogs to ensure the faithful execution of the center's decisions, while ideological indoctrination promotes a common frame of reference for individuals located at different points of the command structure.

Clarity of warning signals. Peking's past conflict behavior seems to stress strategic warning to the enemy about China's intentions while preserving the possibility of tactical surprise about the specific nature, timing, and locale of its initiatives. As we have seen earlier, Peking usually engages in extensive warning activities before international disputes reach the "crisis" point. These signals are often provided in the form of diplomatic threats and protests, domestic propaganda campaigns, and military mobilization. In Korea and Vietnam, China's verbal warnings were quite explicit about the conditions under which it would intervene in the conflict.[38]

However, there appear to be two major "flaws" in Peking's signalling in the two historical cases—the Korean and Sino-Indian conflicts—where Chinese efforts at deterrence failed. First, despite ample verbal and nonverbal warnings, China's opponents dismissed its threats as bluffs. They were not credible partly because the Chinese tend to exaggerate verbal hostility in their relations with adversaries.[39] Given Peking's proclivity for verbal belligerence, it is difficult for its adversaries to discriminate between real and phony threats. In the Korean case, the fact that Chinese troops were not actually in North Korea also diminished the credibility of Peking's threats of intervention.[40]

Second, as Allen Whiting has pointed out, Peking did not appear to provide sufficient lead time for its opponents to reconsider and reverse their policy courses in the Korean and Sino-Indian cases.[41] China's warning signals did not intensify until quite late in the conflict (around July in the Sino-Indian case, and around September in the Korean case). The impact of these warnings was reduced because there was already considerable bureaucratic momentum in the Indian and U.S. Governments to carry out, respectively, the "forward policy" and the "unifica-

[37] Obviously, this is not to argue that local insubordination does not exist in China, or that its leaders hold homogeneous views on policies of conflict management. The literature on the Vietnam War cited in footnote 12 provides a particularly interesting examination of disagreements within the elite.

[38] Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (fn. 12); Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle* (fn. 12).

[39] Chan and others (fn. 3).

[40] In the Vietnam War, China stationed troops in both North Vietnam and Laos to discourage U.S. invasion.

[41] Whiting (fn. 10), 220-21.

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tion of Korea." Reversal of these policies had become more difficult and unacceptable to these governments because of "sunk costs" in their international prestige as well as in domestic public opinion and bureaucratic consensus. Parenthetically, the lateness of China's warning signals might have been a result of its miscalculation of the enemy's intentions or difficulty in forming a consensus among the leaders about appropriate policies for coping with the external threat.[42]

Appropriateness of demonstrations. Four aspects of China's selection of demonstrative actions are worth noting. First, as we have seen, Peking carries out extensive probes to determine the capability and intention of the opponent before embarking on conflict escalation. This trait reflects the aspect of tactical caution of the bimodal Maoist injunction to "despise the enemy strategically, but to take him seriously tactically."[43] Second, Chinese demonstrative actions seem to be designed to exploit the weak links in the enemy's defense posture (e.g., the Indian outpost at Che Dong, Quemoy Island, Chenpao Island, and the South Korean troops), resulting in Chinese superiority at the site of military clashes. Peking's choice of conflict sites thus reflects Mao's dictum on the importance of possessing local superiority in specific military encounters. Third, as indicated earlier, in selecting targets of demonstrative actions, China has shown a preference for conflict through indirection. The targets of these actions are often the proxies or client states of its main adversary rather than the main adversary proper. This behavior suggests a concern for limiting the risk of conflict escalation, which might be triggered through reciprocation of hostility by China's main enemy. Fourth, Chinese demonstrative actions are usually initiated and terminated very quickly. Such temporal limitation, coupled with the geographical restriction of these military operations, serves to curtail the danger of conflict escalation. Again, this behavior is consonant with the Maoist injunction of delivering swift and

[42] Although we have little information about these possibilities in the Korean and Sino-Indian wars, evidence from other conflict situations indicates the plausibility of these explanations. The analyses by Zagoria, Ra'anan, Yahuda, and Gurtov (fn. 12) suggest disagreements among the leadership in the Vietnam and Quemoy conflicts. And Edgar Snow provides an interesting example of China's miscalculation of U.S. intentions in the Vietnam War. When he interviewed Mao Tse-tung in 1965, Mao thought that the fighting in Vietnam "would perhaps go on for one or two years. After that the United States troops would find it uninteresting and might go home or go somewhere else." Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House 1971), 218.

[43] Such caution, of course, does not preclude the possibility of policy miscalculation. In the case of Quemoy, the lack of U.S. response to the initial Chinese probes prompted Peking to escalate the conflict. Mao later admitted that he had miscalculated the American reaction to the intensification of China's bombardment of Quemoy. See Whiting (fn. 3).

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decisive blows against the enemy, and then disengaging quickly before he is able to retaliate.

Despite these apparent strengths in the conduct of China's demonstrative action, Peking's behavior in the Sino-Indian case probably backfired because it heightened India's public attention to the border dispute. As a result, it increased the political cost for Nehru to order a reversal of the "forward policy." China's action might thus have contributed to the rigidification of the Indian policy position, which in turn compelled the Chinese to intensify their pressure. The apparent failure of the Peking leaders to consider the impact of their action on the domestic public of the opposing nation might actually have helped to lock the antagonists into a collision course.[44]

Control of escalation. Chinese conflict behavior tends to be characterized by graduated and intermittent escalation. Periods of conflict abatement provide an opportunity for both sides to re-evaluate the situation. In addition, as shown in the Korean and Sino-Indian cases, these temporary lulls can encourage the enemy's complacency and entice him to walk into a Chinese "trap."[45] Again, this pattern reflects the Maoist strategy of luring the enemy away from his areas of strength and then encircling him for annihilation.

Peking tends to employ a variety of détente measures for controlling the momentum of a conflict. These measures (e.g., unilateral ceasefires, troop disengagements, proposals for conflict negotiation) are usually applied immediately after each series of military operations. They provide escape hatches for both China and its adversary to avoid "locked-in" confrontations. Furthermore, the use of conciliatory measures such as "temporary truces," possibly helps to create dissension in the enemy's ranks.[46] Again, these tactics are consonant with Maoist pub-

[44] Whiting (fn. 10), 221. The lesson of the importance of unobtrusive signalling was not forgotten by the Peking leaders. In the Vietnam War, China (and the United States) did not publicize the presence of Chinese troops in North Vietnam and the occasional casualties suffered by both sides in the American air raids. Conflict signalling in this case required adroit manipulation to serve several purposes simultaneously: to communicate to the U.S. leaders the credibility of the Chinese threat to intervene in the conflict if the U.S. escalated the war to North Vietnam; to undermine the position of radical groups in the U.S. *and China* who might favor an escalation of the conflict; and to avoid the possibility of North Vietnamese leaders taking the Chinese threats as *carte blanche* to escalate the conflict, thereby actually prompting the American counter-escalations that these threats were intended to deter.

[45] Whiting (fn. 3) reports that Mao used the term "trap" even in the Quemoy conflict.

[46] Unilateral military disengagement might have produced exactly the opposite effect in the Korean War. According to George and Smoke, the Chinese action led MacArthur to believe that Peking was merely bluffing. It also diminished the "acute concern that all Truman's advisers had felt during the first week of November over the riskiness of MacArthur's military strategy." George and Smoke (fn. 16), 229.

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lic injunctions on how a weak actor can overcome his initial inferiority and eventually defeat a stronger party. Recognizing China's temporary inferiority in international power relations, its leaders emphasize the importance of engaging in confrontations with superior parties only under carefully controlled conditions, and of manipulating the "incidental" aspects of these confrontations (e.g., time, place, target, and scale of confrontation) to their advantage.[47]

Further Research

The chances for avoiding and resolving international disputes are improved when there is a sound understanding of the methods of conflict management and communication among different national elites. In the preceding discussion, I have presented an overview of the Chinese approach to conflict management and signalling. Owing to the various limitations of the analytical method and materials that I have pointed out, further research efforts to test and improve this understanding should obviously be pursued.

Concerning the general intellectual orientation of an analysis such as the present, country specialists can easily develop the same sort of involvement as ethnographers do with regard to their tribes.[48] They often tend to be all too eager to impress the reader with the special and perhaps unique nature of the country and behavior being studied. The opposite tendency can, of course, be equally dangerous. In much of the current research on international conflicts, there is a strong implicit assumption that all regimes will perceive and manage international conflicts in the way U.S. analysts and decision makers would treat such situations.[49] Therefore, there is a need to examine the conflict calculus and behavior of additional national elites and to determine whether factors that have been found to be operating in the decision processes of particular elites are indeed unique or, conversely, universal.

To the extent possible, additional conflicts should be examined in order to determine whether patterns in the Chinese elite's treatment of these situations do repeat themselves. And since the inference of motives and calculations from observed policy behavior is always a problematic endeavor, alternative strategies of inquiry are worthwhile. In particular, documentary analysis of the regime's dogmas and gaming exercises em-

[47] Bobrow, "Peking's Military Calculus" (fn. 8), 52.

[48] Davis B. Bobrow, "Activity, Purpose, and Performance," in Chun-tu Hsueh, ed., *Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations* (New York: Praeger 1977), 1-9.

[49] Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and John A. Kringen, "Understanding How Others Treat Crises: A Multimethod Approach," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI (March 1977), 199-223.

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ploying native subjects can be very helpful for clarifying the general logic Peking applies to conflict management. Finally, quantitative event data can potentially be used to provide indicators for the various phases of Chinese conflict behavior suggested in this paper, and to monitor and demarcate the temporal order and duration of these phases.

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Research Note

POLITICAL CONVERGENCE: An Empirical Assessment

By DANIEL N. NELSON

HOPES for détente are, at least in part, built upon a once widespread expectation—that differences between political life in the Western democracies and communist Europe will diminish over time. Particularly in the aftermath of nearly disastrous confrontations over Berlin and Cuba, there was a hope that "they" were becoming more like "us" and that, eventually, mutual understanding and shared interests would replace brinkmanship. Modernization and/or development were to provide the impetus for such a transformation of world politics. As the SALT negotiations stumble and the condition of human rights in communist Europe is brought to world attention by the President of the United States, scholars and policy makers alike should review with care the findings of a decade's research by political scientists engaged in the study of communist states. This paper will provide such a review and, in doing so, will offer an empirical assessment of expectations regarding political change within the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

I. Convergence Expressed as Three Variables

"Convergence theory" is but a more formal enunciation of beliefs that have been common for many years. Alfred Meyer, for example, documents no fewer than three forms of convergence theory: (1) the communist and democratic states are both moving toward a middle ground of democratic socialism; (2) both systems are changing in the direction of a bureaucratized polity; and (3) both East and West are moving toward a kind of apocalypse wherein regimes are malevolent and citizens depersonalized, in a society in which order and compliance with rules will hold the highest value.[1]

There is thus no single theory of convergence. Neither has there been one source, since authors in both the East and the West have reflected on processes of social and political change. Communist states have had Trotsky and Djilas as well as many others who, seeing the failures of

[1] Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970), 337.

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erstwhile revolutionaries to implement an orthodox Marxist state, have written of the capitalist road down which communist regimes were moving, creating a new aristocracy of vested interests. Meanwhile, Orwellian novels and scholars such as Kornhauser have pointed to the totalitarian seeds within the Western democracies. Parallelling such political treatises has been an extensive literature pertaining to economic convergence.[2]

The present discussion concerns the literature of political science, where broad outlines of a convergence hypothesis have emerged through works that emphasize functional similarities between communist and non-communist states. The core argument is often that, despite structural differences, processes of governing mass-industrialized societies are very much alike. One of the most notable expressions of that sentiment is by Cyril E. Black:

> . . . the process of modernization may within the foreseeable future lead to a convergence and perhaps a universalization of functions, but not of institutions as long as the 175 societies in the world retain their relative discreteness as systems. There is much evidence that Japan and France, the United States and the Soviet Union, or Mexico and Poland are becoming more alike functionally. . . . What they do is becoming more similar, but the way they do it remains different in significant respects.[3]

Many social scientists have thus developed the theme of functional similarity with residual structural differences. Although convergence implies two processes (since the Western democracies themselves may change in directions leading to a political life closer to that of communist states), the focus of this paper is on the change in communist states and the degree to which empirical research supports a convergence hypothesis.

Huntington and Brzezinski have approached the thesis through a careful comparative analysis.[4] While they reject the conclusion that convergence between the Soviet and American systems is now visible, they document many shared characteristics between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Their interpretation is, of course, not too different from Alfred Meyer's well-known bureaucratic model, by which Meyer describes all industrial states as being "characterized by the prevalence of certain totalitarian features," including "the imposition of ceaseless social change unwanted by the constituents."[5] The momentum of socioeconomic

[2] See, for instance, Jan Tinbergen, "Do Communist and Free Economies Show a Converging Pattern?" in Morris Bornstein, ed., *Comparative Economic Systems* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey 1965), 455-64.

[3] Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper and Row 1966), 49.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press 1964).

[5] Meyer, "USSR Incorporated," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of*

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modernization and development, then, leads to certain broadly similar political trends.

Brzezinski has articulated his position more concisely in a 1966 article[6] in which he states that "the effort to maintain a doctrinaire dictatorship over an increasingly modern and industrial society" poses the threat of the "degeneration" of the Soviet system. He suspects, therefore, that political reforms will be necessitated, leading the U.S.S.R. into a "more pluralistic and institutionalized political system."[7] In the same series of articles, Merle Fainsod expresses the thought that a "looser, more pragmatic, and pluralistically-based party" would emerge over time in which "the differentiated interests of an industrial society find freer expression. . . ."[8] The same has been stated for the communist regimes of Eastern Europe in many articles and books. In 1966, for example, Klaus Mehnert was predicting nothing short of a "dissolution" of European communism under the impact of "momentous" changes engendered by "Westerly winds" over Eastern Europe.[9]

Strikingly evident in these (and many other) statements concerning communist governments is the presumption that industrialization, affluence, and international contacts would have a profound effect on the manner in which a communist party rules. Few scholars have doubted that the processes we blithely call modernization and development have had a permanent impact on political life in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The components of development/modernization which are seen to influence politics were neatly summarized by Allen Kassof:

> These include such essential elements as the nature of contemporary technology; the system of mass education; the key role of modern cities; the highly developed transportation and communications facilities; the dominant position of scientific undertakings; a certain commitment to rational procedure in the organization of production and the utilization of human resources; a bureaucratic mode of coordination of various social functions; the high . . . standard of living; the diminished influence of primary social units such as the family and local community; and a range of familiar material indices.[10]

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the USSR (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1964), 21-28; see also Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (New York: Random House 1965).

[6] Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," *Problems of Communism* (January-February 1966).

[7] Brzezinski, ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press 1969), 30-34.

[8] Fainsod, "Roads to the Future," *ibid.*, 134.

[9] Mehnert, "Westerly Winds Over Eastern Europe," in Kurt London, ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1966), 309-23.

[10] Kassof, "The Future of Soviet Society," in Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York: Praeger 1968), 504-5.

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Social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, have not been so naive as to assume that socioeconomic changes will mean an *inevitable* trend toward political institutions that replicate those which exist in Western Europe, North America, and a few nation-states in other areas. Instead, they have identified three generic forms of political change, each connoting a different conception of convergence. The first of these is pluralism.

As used when referring to communist states, this concept implies a process whereby institutions multiply and grow in complexity, carrying with them a diversity of viewpoints and priorities.[11] This process, if it exists, is an ironic one in communist states, since the politically decreed decision to embark on accelerated modernization plans constitutes the primary impetus for movement away from the ideological unity ostensibly sought by the party. Robert V. Daniels, for example, has been explicit in his belief that a "new kind of politics, participatory bureaucracy" is evolving in the U.S.S.R. Since the Soviet Union, like many Western countries, is a "complex modern bureaucratic organization," it too cannot "function purely from the top down. . . ." The problem then becomes keeping the flow of information, advice, recommendations, etc., "within the organizational structure of the Communist Party."[12] In subsequent works, H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths have pursued the same theme by making the case that interest groups are now active in the Soviet policy making process. Although they are careful to define interest groups in the Soviet case as being somehow different from the Western variety (i.e., pluralism among the elites, rather than public pressure groups), their position clearly emphasizes a proliferation of viewpoints among decision makers.[13]

Yet, it has never been made clear in works devoted to communist politics how one might measure pluralism, since opinion polls and other obvious indices are usually unavailable (or very rudimentary). If convergence is to be tested empirically, the variable called pluralism must be further operationalized.

Unlike pluralism, which connotes changes internal to a political sys-

[11] Jerry Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification of Pluralism," *Problems of Communism* XXI (March-April 1972), Alexander Matejko, *Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger 1974).

[12] Daniels, "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold 1971), 22-23.

[13] Skilling and Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971); see particularly Skilling's article "Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses." Also interesting is Philip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process," *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969).

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tem, a second kind of political change thought to co-vary with development is nationalism within the communist bloc. Under the tutelage of Henry Kissinger, American foreign policy was led by an assumption common in political science; namely, that communist foreign policies increasingly have followed traditional patterns of national interest and that the erstwhile communist bloc is far from monolithic. This was not Kissinger's idea alone, but that of many scholars who have perceived nationalism as endemic to the international relations of all communist states as they move away from ideologically based decision making.[14] But, like pluralism, nationalism is not a quality one can isolate and measure easily, particularly in the context of the closed policy-making processes of communist states. Nevertheless, in order to consider convergence theory, we will return to the variable of nationalism and examine the empirical data now available.

A third form of political change inherent to the convergence hypothesis has been discussed by Jerome Gilison in his interesting work on British and Soviet politics.[15] Since very few comparative studies have sought to test the relationship between socioeconomic and political variables among communist states, and even fewer have offered East-West comparisons, Gilison's study provides an important exception to most works that touch upon convergence theory.

It is Gilison's argument that not only do Great Britain and the Soviet Union possess comparable degrees of legitimacy, but that these two systems, despite many institutional differences, achieve willing obedience of the citizenry through many of the same activities and mechanisms. In other words, governing two ostensibly different systems involves a similar functioning of political institutions in order to achieve the central guarantee of stability, i.e., legitimacy.

Consensual legitimacy as the key to stability is achieved in similar ways, according to Gilison, since both Britain and the U.S.S.R. use concepts of representation to justify willing obedience.[16] The representative ethos is reinforced in both systems by institutions such as political parties and representative assemblies. In both Britain and the U.S.S.R., "the party acts as a legitimate link between the masses and the political leadership":

[14] For example, see John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Wiley 1963), 79-89. My article, "The Early Success of Ostpolitik: An Eastern European Perspective," *World Affairs*, Vol. 138 (Summer 1975), 32-50, discusses increasing contact with Western Europe and the independence from Soviet positions.

[15] Gilison, *British and Soviet Politics: A Study of Legitimacy and Convergence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1972).

[16] *Ibid.*, xii.

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> The party in this respect acts as an institution which creates a bond of loyalty and common feeling between the leadership and the masses of citizens . . . even when most frail, the party label or party image is usually the channel through which the citizen relates to politics.[17]

Likewise, representative assemblies function in broadly similar ways: "the primary function of open and full sessions of the representative assembly is to present and publicize views held by politically significant persons."[18] Voting in the Commons and Supreme Soviet are also seen to have the fundamental similarity of "legitimizing government-sponsored legislation and thus imparting authority to law."[19] Even in their policy-making processes, British and Soviet institutions function in ways more similar than commonly thought; Gilison points to the "corporatist" nature of the political stratum in both (i.e., the state coordinates cooperation among functional groups rather than serving a public will).[20]

The logic underlying Gilison's arguments has, to be sure, considerable intuitive force. Stability and a significant degree of consensual legitimacy seem irrevocably tied to one another. Moreover, the latter seems to be universally derived from conformity with salient elements of the ongoing political culture, as well as from regularly meeting national needs. These intuitive truths relate to convergence theory insofar as socioeconomic changes of modernization/development are seen to lead to increasingly similar functions which political systems must perform to maintain legitimacy and, hence, stability.

While one can generally agree that legitimacy connotes the willing obedience of citizens to a particular set of political institutions, there is little direct evidence of popular sentiment in communist states. Like pluralism and nationalism, then, legitimacy should be considered in light of other forms of empirical data that operationalize this variable, albeit indirectly.

In communist studies, convergence theory has thus been expressed in three ways, each focusing on a particular variable:

(1) pluralism
(2) nationalism
(3) legitimacy.

Each of these variables constitutes one form in which the idea of convergence has been implied by political scientists. They are, quite obviously, interrelated and should not be seen as changes that could occur independently from one another. For example, the legitimacy of any

[17] *Ibid.*, 37. [18] *Ibid.*, 93. [19] *Ibid.*, 105. [20] *Ibid.*, 169.

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communist regime is likely to be promoted by the degree to which pluralism exists in domestic politics and nationalism takes precedence in foreign policy. For analytical purposes, however, I will treat them separately in this paper. In my concluding remarks I will return to the interrelationships among these political variables and draw inferences regarding the validity of convergence theory.

II. Convergence as Pluralism

Political scientists engaged in communist studies have struggled with the problem of operationalizing pluralism and related terms such as liberalization.[21] Korbonski, for example, discounts the simplest method of measuring pluralism—counting "the number of political parties, interest groups, and other associations of various hues operating within a given system"—since such a procedure does not focus upon groups that articulate interests "*vis-à-vis* the ruling elite." He therefore concludes that

> . . . the only way to validate empirically the presence or absence of pluralism is to engage in a rather painstaking task of assembling a collection of case studies showing the interaction between the various categories of elites in different countries . . . the gradual loosening of several of the East European political systems provides an opportunity for the study of institutionalized group activities. Such research could also be supplemented by content analysis of mass media and by the study of elections and decision-making processes at various levels.[22]

Korbonski's suggestions are well taken, I believe, but should be modified to recognize that the pluralization of a political system can be plausibly viewed in three forms. First, a kind of pluralism takes place when recruitment for the stratum of political participants (particularly the elite among that group) is broadened in such a way that the uniformity of participants' backgrounds declines. If such a phenomenon occurs in communist states, corresponding to their socioeconomic development/modernization, we may have some cause to regard convergence theory as valid. Such might be one's expectation since, as more highly educated professionals proliferate (e.g., engineers, physicians, economists, enterprise managers, etc.), their inclusion in political institutions cannot long be ignored. This form of pluralism may be contrasted to a political system in which political activities are confined within a narrow stratum—a priestly caste, the military, a traditional

[21] See for instance, Andrzej Korbonski, "Liberalization Processes," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Carl Beck, eds., *Comparative Socialist Systems* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for International Studies 1975), 192-214.

[22] *Ibid.*, 196.

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nobility or, as once was the case in communist states, ideologically "pure" individuals from families of workers, etc.

Pluralism in communist states is, however, more often seen in a different light by political scientists. Attitudinal variances are a particularly important component of pluralization: if greater freedom of expression is not being permitted as development and modernization continue, convergence theory fails to help us understand the political dynamics of communist states. Increasingly diverse backgrounds among political participants would be a vacuous form of pluralism if not accompanied by attitudinal pluralism. That these two forms of pluralism are not necessarily coextensive obliges us to consider both aspects.

Finally, pluralism must be considered in a third form—the degree of access to policy making. It would be misleading to describe a system as pluralistic if, despite attitudinal variations and a diversity of backgrounds among participants in politics, those forms of pluralism had little influence on decision making. To conclude that the pluralization of communist systems is occurring (and, therefore, that one variable in convergence theory *does* co-vary with socioeconomic advances) requires some corroboration of imputs from interest groups or related organizations into policy making.

The extensive data archive on East European elites at the University of Pittsburgh has enabled political scientists to make significant, albeit tentative, judgments regarding the degree of pluralism in the backgrounds of political participants in communist states.[23] Carl Beck, utilizing data from that archive, has derived several important conclusions regarding trends in leadership attributes in Eastern Europe. Examining information about the Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Polish central committees from 1949 through 1968, Beck discovers trends that (particularly when graphically presented) reveal a "rather constant" process of "bureaucratization" in which an "emphasis on non-Party career channels" is clearly evident.[24] Peter C. Ludz has carefully documented the same process, which he labels "professionalization," in the German Democratic Republic. Ludz finds that in the S.E.D.'s Central Committee, "graduates of trade and technical schools, colleges, and universities have increased to a remarkable degree,"[25] and that the

[23] These data are available in machine-readable form from the Eastern European Elite Archive, University of Pittsburgh, William Jarzabek, archivist.

[24] Beck, "Leadership Attributes in Eastern Europe: The Effect of Country and Time," in Beck and others, *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (New York: McKay 1973), 126-27.

[25] Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany* (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1972), 321.

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proportion of members with economic and administrative experience has also risen.

Neither scholar's findings, of course, imply that ruling communist parties have lessened their control over entry into the elite stratum. As I have discussed elsewhere, it is clear that, notwithstanding the wider variety of occupational categories now represented among party members and leaders, communist parties have maintained the *nomenklatura* system. We would be mistaken to believe that altered criteria for recruitment and advancement have meant a disintegration of a confined leadership stratum. In writing about the Romanian situation, I have noted that

> . . . an alternative is open to communist party regimes—an alternative that enables the political elite to remain closed. As long as the Romanian Communist Party has allowed sufficient, albeit incremental, changes in the composition of local leadership, it has maintained its hold on political appointments. In the broadest sense, those adroit and/or necessary "changes" meant altering the criteria for entering the political elite to fit socio-economic changes.[26]

My point is supported by Ludz's observation concerning changes in the party leadership in East Germany:

> Despite this mobility [i.e., upward mobility from diverse career paths and educational backgrounds] which we have generally established for the 1963 Central Committee, the strategic clique (mainly the Politburo and the first secretaries of the SED Bezirk executives) must be regarded as comparatively stable.[27]

In the G.D.R., then, Ludz finds the apex of national and local political leadership to be rather insulated from the effects of the changed recruitment criteria. While different communist parties apparently draw the line at different points, it seems universal that the party's most powerful individuals will not jeopardize their own position by applying a pluralistic ethic when selecting new recruits to join their elite stratum. Beck also observes that "the developmental pattern that emerges [among four East European states over the 1949–1968 period] is marked by the effort to build a Party-centered leadership. . . ."[28] In other words, communist parties have been bringing more diversely educated and broadly experienced people into the party, but elite status is still obtained through a very controlled process emphasizing cadre experience and party education in an individual's background.

[26] Nelson, "Background Characteristics of Local Communist Elites," forthcoming in *Polity* (1978). My assessment of the Romanian political elite at a local level was based upon numerous interviews with such individuals in four counties (*judeţe*).

[27] Ludz (fn. 25), 321.

[28] Beck (fn. 24), 129.

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In addition, Beck's data reveal contrasts among background attributes of leaders in different states. He specifically cites a "Bulgarian pattern" and "Czechoslovakian pattern"; whereas the former is characterized by stable leadership backgrounds with a consistent trend toward more people with prior experience in "officialdom" (Beck's term) and very slow movement away from people who were "revolutionaries" before the accession of the communist regime, the Czech pattern "is marked by a leadership attribute base that is dispersed and fragmented. . . ."[29] That countries as different socioeconomically as these two should also exhibit opposing patterns of recruitment is significant. If more rapid development/modernization from low levels (as in Bulgaria) co-varies with more restricted entry into political leadership, then the convergence hypothesis misleads us by implying the inverse. Elsewhere I have reported findings that run parallel to Beck's, indicating that the statistical correlation between rates of socioeconomic change in nine European communist states and change in politburo education levels (a measure of altered recruitment criteria for leaders) over a twenty-year period was $rho = -.67$, i.e., a moderately strong inverse relationship. That finding, and other data, have led me to conclude that "more rapid socio-economic change often corresponds with leadership 'retrenchment.' "[30]

Thus, data on European communist elites present a complex picture regarding convergence theory. Although it can be demonstrated empirically that political recruitment in such states *has* broadened, this process does not co-vary neatly with socioeconomic development and modernization. Communist states do not appear to be more pluralistic in this regard if they undergo rapid socioeconomic change. Moreover, the broadening of recruitment applies much less to the apex of local and national leadership than to the general party membership. At the least, these findings mean that the convergence hypothesis as applied in political science is too simple to explain trends in recruitment in communist Europe.

There is more difficulty associated with attitudinal research in communist states since these governments provide no data and are suspicious of Western scholars seeking such information. Therefore, the second form of pluralism has been approached in less systematic ways. Political scientists engaged in studies of comparative communism have, quite plausibly, expected that socioeconomic advances would differentiate

[29] *Ibid.*, 143.
[30] Nelson, "Socio-economic and Political Change in Communist Europe," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI (June 1977), 359-88.

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communist societies, making it impossible to maintain ideological unity. The formation of interest groups, at first imperceptible, would become increasingly obvious as an outgrowth of occupational specialization and competition for the allocation of resources. Economic managers, military officers, the scientific community, the party apparatus, etc., have all been viewed as nascent interest groups in communist states, but the actual empirical measurement of attitudinal differences has been accomplished to a very limited degree.

For Poland and Yugoslavia, attitudinal data are relatively plentiful. A project on "International Studies of Values in Politics" during the mid-1960's resulted in numerous publications by the principal investigators, all using data produced by comparable samples and questionnaires in four countries (the United States, India, Yugoslavia and Poland).[31] Other political scientists, such as M. George Zaninovich, and Jan F. Triska with Ana Barbic, have conducted attitudinal research in Yugoslavia during subsequent years.[32] In these works it has been quite apparent that "the overriding hypothesis of the greater complexity and heterogeneity of mass-citizen value orientations in Yugoslavia has been fairly well established."[33] On the other hand, it has also been clear that the attitudes (i.e., values) of Yugoslavian elites are not only different from the general population,[34] but are also "relatively homogeneous and internally consistent."[35] Thus, while the convergence hypothesis correctly implies a co-variance between development/modernization and a differentiation of attitudes, it fails to identify the distinction between mass and elite attitudes and the degree of consistency within either group.

Milton Lodge has utilized innovative techniques to gather empirical evidence regarding elite attitudes in the U.S.S.R.[36] By means of content analyses of Soviet "specialist" journals, Lodge confirms that there exists a careful articulation of functional group interests, in particular those of the central party apparatus, the central economic bureaucrats, the

[31] These data are available at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Publications from these data include, among others, Philip Jacob and others, *Values and the Active Community* (New York: Free Press 1971), Henry Teune and Krystof Ostrowski, "Political Systems as Residual Variables," *Comparative Political Studies*, VI (April 1973), 3-21.

[32] See Zaninovich, "Elites and Citizenry in Yugoslav Society: A Study of Value Differentiation," in Beck (fn. 24), 226-97; Triska and Barbic, "Evaluating Citizen Performance on the Community Level," paper delivered at the 1975 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

[33] Zaninovich (fn. 32), 285.

[34] Triska and Barbic (fn. 32), 46.

[35] Zaninovich (fn. 32), 285.

[36] Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 827-39; and "Attitudinal Cleavages Within the Soviet Political Leadership," in Beck (fn. 24), 202-25.

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military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. He concludes that "the trend is away from Party dominance toward what appears to be a 'polyarchical' system, toward what H. Gordon Skilling calls a 'pluralism of elites.' "[37] These findings, which suggest nothing less than an erosion of party dominance, are somewhat similar to the findings about Yugoslavia, in that both research efforts discovered trends toward a differentiation of values. There are, however, no comparable data for the *citizenry* of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Lodge's ominous findings concerning the Soviet elites stand in contrast to Zaninovich's statement about the relative homogeneity of Yugoslav elites.

For Romania, I have measured participatory attitudes in a survey of people's council deputies and local elites. My findings closely correspond to data from other European communist states: socioeconomic advances do seem connected with disagreements over the priorities of, and solutions to, local problems. In Romania, however, it was less the standard of living already achieved than the rate at which an area was changing that co-varied with differentiated elite opinion.[38]

Convergence theory would lead us to believe, then, that socioeconomic changes do tend to promote less unified political attitudes. But the differentiation of values may occur more among the elites in one communist state, while in another the attitudes of the mass citizenry exhibit greater differentiation. Complex intervening variables are likely to be responsible for such variance among communist states, although political science has not been able to identify (much less measure) such variables adequately.

Broadened recruitment patterns and differentiated values would be forms of pluralism without policy impact unless *access* to decision makers also increased. To infer from more diversified backgrounds of political participants and increasingly diffused attitudes that convergence was taking place would be to ignore the most important component of pluralistic systems—where different values are not only articulated, but are actually incorporated into decisions about new laws, programs, and so forth. Ideologically, communist systems cannot readily accept a diversity of interests: after all, the principal cause of conflict (private ownership of the means of production) has been substantially removed. How, then, have political scientists measured this aspect of pluralism in communist states?

Concerning the Soviet Union, Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech

[37] Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes" (fn. 36), 838.

[38] Nelson, "Sub-National Political Elites in a Communist System," *East European Quarterly*, x (December 1976), 459-94.

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have written a pioneering article based on two case studies of the influences exerted by one community of interests (educators). Their cases were the Education Act of 1958 and the issue of how university graduates were to be assigned jobs.[39] Schwartz and Keech make the central point that general interest groups can "influence Soviet policy formation, even in some rare cases when some top political leaders oppose their position."[40] Thoroughly documenting how education officials fended off Khrushchev's proposal for educational reform and achieved a law much more to their liking, this research strongly supports the proposition that modernization has generated a kind of pluralism with political importance. The authors find that, particularly for those experts with rare technical capabilities, the prospects for access and policy influence are considerable.[41]

Interesting comparisons are possible between Soviet and Polish decision-making processes with respect to the relative access of divergent viewpoints and priorities in each. For instance, political sociologist Jacek Tarkowski (University of Warsaw) has also utilized the case study approach regarding an educational issue.[42] In his examination of one *powiat* (a pre-1975 unit of local government), Tarkowski focuses on decision-making processes when the authorities at the *powiat* level were thwarted by the next higher level (*województwo*) in their desire to have two new schools built (because the *województwo* authorities were concerned about the most efficient means to achieve results dictated by the five-year plan). In this case, significant restrictions on the autonomy of *powiats* were countered by a highly effective campaign launched by local elites. Support was mobilized via official (party and people's councils) and unofficial (such as "native sons" now in higher office) channels at the *województwo* level and the national education ministry.[43] The eventual success of these efforts suggests, as did the cases examined by Schwartz and Keech, that considerable latitude exists for interest groups of various types to operate within communist systems. In other words, the diversity of values documented by Lodge, Zaninovich, and others *does* make its way into decision-making processes.

Convergence theory would have us believe, however, that it is *be-*

[39] Schwartz and Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 840-51; and "Public Influence and Educational Policy in the Soviet Union," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York: Free Press 1971), 151-86.

[40] *Ibid.*, 152.

[41] *Ibid.*, 181.

[42] Tarkowski, "A Study of the Decisional Process in Rolnowo Powiat," *Polish Sociological Bulletin*, XVI, No. 2 (1967), 89-96.

[43] *Ibid.*, 93-94.

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cause of socioeconomic development/modernization that such pluralization is taking place. Attempts by political scientists to verify such co-variance have met with mixed results. Dennis C. Pirages has studied the comparative political access (that is, the citizens' ability to articulate demands and the elites' responsiveness) in communist states, using aggregate data to construct an index for both socioeconomic levels and access.[44] Pirages points out that most political scientists expect citizens with more education, more mobility, and more media exposure to make greater demands on, and offer greater support to, the political system. He then sets out to test the proposition that "the socio-economic development level of nation-states should be positively correlated with greater access to elites." A necessary assumption for such a test, of course, is that elites are sufficiently rational so as not to ignore increased participatory demands by more educated and more mobile citizens.

Pirages finds that, "Contrary to expectation, the party-state elites in the most socio-economically developed countries have not developed less coercive and more responsive relations with their citizens at a faster pace than the less developed countries."[45] The data employed by Pirages are for socioeconomic levels rather than for rates of change, and therefore leave open the possibility of other relationships. Yet, intuitively it does not seem correct to expect more rapidly changing communist societies such as Bulgaria and Romania to rely less on coercion and to allow greater access for interest groups than, for example, Poland or Czechoslovakia (where there have been notable instances of "liberalization" and vocal dissent). Since neither the hypothesis tested by Pirages nor its inverse appears to account for variations in access to policy making in communist states, the emphasis which convergence theory places on socioeconomic development and modernization as explanatory variables is too simple. Differences among the political histories of communist states—for example, differences in the origins of socialist movements—as well as such obvious factors as variations in the level of the Soviet presence may well account for more of the variation in access than does the level or rate of socioeconomic change.

If communist states are becoming more pluralistic, the components of that process suggest a much more complex transformation than the causal relationship between development and modernization on the one hand and political change on the other, as implied by convergence theory. The recruitment of political participants has been, and is being,

[44] Pirages, "Socio-economic Development and Political Access in the Communist Party-States," in Jan F. Triska, ed., *Communist Party-States* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1969), 249-81.

[45] *Ibid.*, 273.

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broadened due to new criteria that emphasize expertise and practical experience; there remain, however, significant obstacles before an individual enters the elite stratum. In all communist states, the party leadership remains insulated not only from the general citizenry, but from the regular party membership as well. The diversity of opinions and priorities is well documented for communist systems, but a diffusion of values does not, apparently, follow solely from a country's socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, some communist states tend to have a leadership with a dispersion of values, while in others the leaders are much more unified than the population in general. Finally, although there are opportunities for interest groups to have access to policy making in communist states, it is by no means clear that access grows as a direct result of socioeconomic advances or the rapidity of such change.

III. Convergence as Nationalism Among Communist States

As an integral part of convergence theory, social scientists have argued that development and modernization will encourage, among communist states, a return to more independent (i.e., deviant from Soviet behavior) patterns of diplomacy and international trade. Although this contention has taken numerous forms, the concept "nationalism" has been commonly applied to describe the phenomenon.

Over a decade ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote of a communist camp that was "neither homogeneous, monolithic, nor unchanging" because (for one reason) there are "specific, particular interests of the component units."[46] About the same time, Richard Lowenthal was predicting a disintegration of the international communist movement.[47] Implicit in most assessments of this type is the belief that socioeconomic development in communist states is an important independent variable for explaining deviation from Soviet policy. To be sure, other variables such as Soviet military presence, reliance on Soviet trade, or various historical factors are regarded as the *most* vital determinants of the degree to which each state is nationalistic. Nevertheless, even those scholars who deny the thrust of convergence theory write of the long-term effects that modernization and development may have on foreign policies: "The progress toward more complex industrial societies, the pressures for decentralization, the increasing weight of pragmatic technocrats instead of political bureaucrats and the emergence of a Euro-

[46] Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1967), ix.

[47] Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* (New York: Oxford University Press 1966).

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pean-minded younger generation, the future elite, are forces that deeply influence the direction in which the national revival will in fact be moving."[48] Political scientists have thus explicitly and implicitly tested the expectation that socioeconomic changes co-vary with nationalism.

Perhaps the most direct effort to conduct such a test was made in the work of William R. Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber.[49] After constructing a composite index of socioeconomic levels for East European states from five component indicators measured over almost twenty years, the authors found the rank-order correlation between such levels and conformity to Soviet policy to be .57 (at $p = .031$).[50] Contrary to expectation, then, high levels of socioeconomic development often correspond to conformity with the U.S.S.R. in foreign policy. At the least, advanced socioeconomic conditions in communist states should not alone be regarded as predictors of greater foreign policy independence. Indeed, as Kintner and Klaiber speculate, less sophisticated economies (such as the Balkan states) may allow greater movement from Soviet norms, since there is less dependence on Soviet oil, gas, and other materials crucial to industry.[51]

Related efforts have been made to measure the cohesion of the communist bloc. Despite all expectations of convergence theory, Harvey Joel Tucker concludes that the period between 1957 and 1970 exhibited a "continuing high cohesion" among the foreign policies of the ruling communist parties.[52] Operationalizing cohesion through voting in the U.N. General Assembly and attendance of communist parties at important meetings, he recognizes that Yugoslav and Albanian dissent, plus Romanian divergence within the bloc, have somewhat reduced aggregate levels of cohesion among communist states; but he points to the significant voting agreement and similar attendance patterns that remain. Most important for our consideration is the lack of any relationship between either socioeconomic levels or rates of change and the states' intra-bloc actions. States as socioeconomically diverse as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia had virtually identical voting patterns and attendance records from early 1956 through early 1971.[53] Obviously, factors such as the presence of Soviet troops and trade with the U.S.S.R. would more strongly correlate with such international behavior.

[48] Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor 1969), 447.

[49] Kintner and Klaiber, *Eastern Europe and European Security* (New York: Dunellen 1971), 254.

[50] Conformity to Soviet policies was also operationalized through the construction of an index from many component measurements, as described *ibid.*, chap. 13.

[51] *Ibid.*, 255.

[52] Tucker, "Measuring Cohesion in the International Communist Movement, 1957–1970," mimeo (Indiana University, February 1973), 38.

[53] *Ibid.*, 23, 29.

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P. Terrence Hopmann arrives at a similar conclusion regarding cohesion. Data derived from the content analyses of communist leaders' initial responses to four major international events (such as the outbreak of the Korean War or the first Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) are found to have "generally confirmed" the hypothesis that "the greater the intersystem conflict, the greater the intrasystem cohesion."[54] Like Tucker, Hopmann considers systemic factors rather than domestic socioeconomic change to be responsible for the extent of nationalism in foreign policy.

Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Johnson have found empirical evidence to the effect that there exists "a rather strong negative relationship between level of socio-economic development and degree of national autonomy."[55] Using both judgmental and statistical measures, they operationalize "penetration" of East European communist states by the Soviet Union. Their findings suggest, as did those of Kintner and Klaiber, that the more advanced communist states are also the least autonomous, and that the "most significant variable in explaining political system stability and change in East Europe is . . . Soviet security."[56]

Contrary to the implications of the convergence hypothesis, then, political scientists have found Soviet penetration and general systemic variables to be stronger predictors of nationalism (or of foreign policy autonomy) than socioeconomic factors. If any relationship exists, it may well be in the opposite direction from that expected by convergence theory—namely, that more advanced socioeconomic conditions among communist states favor less nationalism, greater penetration, and reduced opportunities for truly autonomous foreign policy. We should not expect, then, that the Soviet bloc will disintegrate under the weight of development and modernization; any disintegration that occurs cannot be traced accurately unless one emphasizes the roles played by Soviet military and economic penetration as well as the impact of external threats on alliance cohesion.

IV. Convergence as the Consensual Legitimization of Communist Regimes

As Gilison argues, one might plausibly expect modernization and development to foster increasingly similar behavior by states seeking to preserve stable government in mass-industrialized societies through

[54] Hopmann, "The Effects of International Conflict and Détente on Cohesion in the Communist System," in Kanet (fn. 39), 335.

[55] Triska and Johnson, "Political Development and Political Change," in Mesa-Lago and Beck (fn. 21), 267.

[56] *Ibid.*, 282.

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popular legitimacy. There are two distinct questions that deserve empirical investigation. First, we need to know whether or not communist states, as they advance socioeconomically, become less coercive and increasingly disposed to seek the public's support. Second, we must seek out data that would help us gauge the degree to which communist regimes are willingly obeyed and to which they possess consensual legitimacy, and whether or not such support has increased or decreased.

There is little question that the Soviet Union and other communist states have leaders who prefer a willingly obedient citizenry to a populace coerced into submission. The former is a more efficient means to govern in the long run and allows for the possibility of extraordinary efforts by truly dedicated individuals. In pursuit of this legitimacy, communist regimes emphasize the socialization tools under their control, such as state educational institutions and the media, as well as extensive participatory opportunities in people's councils, citizen committees, and mass organizations.[57]

Notwithstanding their efforts at political socialization of their citizens, communist regimes are, of course, not above harsh treatment of dissidents. The Soviet harassment, exile, and arrest of dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, Alexander Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov, and many others is underscored by the Czech crackdown on signers of Charter 77, and the GDR's imposition of exile on Wolf Biermann, a well-known singer of ballads. These events, all late 1976 and early 1977, make it clear that expectations one might hold regarding increasing consensual legitimacy for communist regimes must be tempered by the recognition that variables *other* than socioeconomic conditions are responsible for the policies of communist regimes toward their citizens.

Various forms of empirical data are now available to ascertain the levels of legitimacy maintained by communist states and, to some degree, the trends in that legitimacy. Zaninovich's research has already been cited regarding the pluralization of communist systems. Although Zaninovitch found a considerable degree of value homogeneity among elites, his data demonstrate a "rather serious cleavage between its [Yugoslavia's] elite and its non-elite population regarding the nature of their value orientations. . . ."[58] Not only is there a cleavage between the elite and the worker-peasant population, but the latter category has

[57] For a study of the political role played by *schools* in communist states, see Nigel Grant, *Society, Schools and Progress in Eastern Europe* (New York: Pergamon Press 1969) esp. chap. 5. Perhaps the most complete treatment of socialization efforts in the U.S.S.R. is *Soviet Political Indoctrination* by Gayle D. Hollander (New York: Praeger 1972). The best country-specific study of political education is Peter John Georgeoff, *The Social Education of Bulgarian Youth* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1968).

[58] Zaninovich (fn. 32), 272.

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highly differentiated value orientations. The attitudes characteristic of workers and peasants quite clearly do not suggest that Belgrade possesses consensual legitimacy. For example, "the data indicate . . . the deeper conviction that exploitation is inevitable, that conflict is unavoidable and necessary, and that you are unwise to have faith in most other people."[59] Of particular relevance to any consideration of the convergence hypothesis is Zaninovich's finding that such independent variables as nationality and religious conviction are most closely associated with the dispersion of peasant-worker values; socioeconomic variables such as education or income levels are not strongly correlated with value distinctions.[60] Yugoslavia's communist leadership has thus far failed to instill consensual legitimacy in a population in which attitudes still co-vary with the most traditional attributes of a person's background, such as nationality and religion.

The Soviets are particularly thorough in their efforts to assure the successful socialization of youth. Charles D. Cary has examined data collected by Soviet scholars that measure the social activities of school-age children, both in school and during extracurricular programs.[61] While there is a uniformly high level of social activity among students of all grades, both sexes, and in all parts of the U.S.S.R., secondary-level students are "on the whole less active and do not find as much satisfaction in their social activity." One sample, cited by Cary, found 56 percent of 490 ninth- and tenth-grade students to be dissatisfied with their social activity. Additional studies in the U.S.S.R. have reported that, although most children participate in some kind of social work, they take no responsibility for planning. As a result, there is a grudging passivity in which organizational responsibilities are avoided. Finally, Cary refers to a 1970 Soviet study of 1,491 school children in which sentiments toward social work were contrasted to activities. While about three-quarters of all grades indicated that they had social assignments to perform, only very small percentages of children in grades 7 to 10 "liked" social work (e.g., the largest proportion was 15 percent of the 9th-grade sample). Once again, evidence assembled by a political scientist tends to indicate that consensual legitimacy, sought by communist regimes through instruments of socialization such as schools, is (at best) incomplete. Whether among the Yugoslavian masses or Soviet school children, the dichotomy between elite and citizen values is apparent.

The Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System generated a number

[59] *Ibid.*, 248. [60] *Ibid.*, 258-67.

[61] Cary, "Political Socialization of Soviet Youth and the Building of Communism," in Gary K. Bertsch and Thomas W. Ganschow, eds., *Comparative Communism* (San Francisco: Freeman & Co. 1976), 289-99.

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of studies during the 1950's and early 1960's, the most important of which was *The Soviet Citizen*, originally published in 1959.[62] Although this massive sociological survey was of refugees and now appears dated (since the interviews were conducted in 1950–51), large portions of the data are directly relevant to a convergence hypothesis. Inkeles and Bauer found remarkably strong support among over 2,000 respondents for the idea of a welfare state and a basic socialist economy, but an equally strong dislike for the leadership and selective aspects of their policies, such as agricultural collectivization and secret police (KGB) activity. Since their sample was large enough to differentiate according to age groups, it was possible for the authors to infer from the 1950 interviews that younger Soviet citizens were becoming somewhat more attached than older ones to the institutions of communist society, such as state ownership, control, planning, and so forth. Simultaneously, discontent was becoming more focused upon the leadership; that is, the younger the citizen, the more likely he or she was to focus discontent on the leaders rather than on the entire system.[63] Overall, the Harvard Project documented a broad congruence between citizens' values and institutions in the Soviet Union, while identifying major sources of disaffection and hostility, including consumer shortages, nationality prejudices, police terror, etc. In concert with the work of Cary, then, this earlier research suggests that the Soviet regime has had the potential to achieve consensual legitimacy by building upon a passive support for state and party institutions. The nature of the Soviet leadership's values and some of its specific policies have, however, made that consensus elusive.

For several years, Czechoslovakian public opinion surveys offered a unique insight into the failures of a regime's efforts to foster consensual legitimacy. Otto Ulc has utilized many of these surveys.[64] He states flatly that "intensive socialization efforts by the Party for two decades did not yield the desired results and with many issues (e.g., love for the Soviet Union) its efforts were clearly counterproductive. . . ."[65] This does not mean that the Czechoslovakian citizenry was largely antisocialist—indeed, a Czech Academy of Sciences survey of June 1968 demonstrated that only one of every twenty citizens favored a return to capitalism.[66] Despite this core belief upon which consensual legitimacy might have been based, many statistics cited by Ulc lead to an inescapable conclusion: notwithstanding twenty years of indoctrination, the

[62] Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (New York: Atheneum 1968).
[63] *Ibid.*, chap. X.
[64] Ulc, *Politics in Czechoslovakia* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 1974).
[65] *Ibid.*, 9. [66] *Ibid.*, 19.

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communist regime faced a highly dissatisfied population by the mid-1960's. After the Soviet invasion, fully 88 percent of the Czechoslovakian population, according to one survey, had negative reactions (such as oppression, uncertainty, disappointment, betrayal, depression, etc.), to the political situation.[67]

The Czechoslovakian data are enlightening because convergence theory implies that advanced communist states should, like their mass-industrialized counterparts in Western Europe or North America, seek and obtain consensual legitimacy through comparable functions. Contrary to such a hypothesis, a state that ranks high on all measures of development and modernization faces the antagonism of its citizens.

On a wider scale, I have pursued this apparent irony using comparative data, and found that high socioeconomic levels exhibit a fairly strong relationship with domestic political conflict ($rho = .74$ for the nine European communist states). Low rates of socioeconomic change also have a moderately strong negative association with higher frequencies of domestic violence.[68] From these results one can infer, as from the specific Czech surveys, that willing obedience as an observable expression of consensual legitimacy is usually weaker under the advanced and slowly changing socioeconomic conditions of such states as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Communist states that are less like mass-industrialized societies (but are changing more rapidly), e.g., Bulgaria or Romania, usually have fewer cases in which willing obedience is challenged.

V. Conclusion

Ideas central to convergence theory between communist and Western industrialized systems—such as pluralism, nationalism, and legitimacy—have been considered by various political scientists through empirical studies. What emerges from their analysis, even in cases where the thrust of research has not explicitly been convergence, is a complex portrait of relationships between socioeconomic and political change in communist states.

Some elements of one variable implicit to convergence theory—pluralism—have been documented by political scientists. Broadening recruitment, a diffusion of values, and increasing access to policy making have been verified. None of these processes are without qualification (e.g., country-to-country differences or elite/mass cleavages), however, and strong doubts can be raised regarding the hypothesized co-variance between such trends and modernization/development.

[67] *Ibid.*, 23.

[68] Nelson (fn. 30).

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Nationalism appears to have little to do with socioeconomic advances. Indeed, autonomy of foreign policy is least evident in the most developed communist states. Other variables as obvious as external threats and Soviet penetration are strongly associated with nationalism (operationalized as "deviance from Soviet policy").

Consensual legitimacy has been sought by communist regimes, increasingly so after the Stalinist years. There have, however, been too many instances of crackdowns on dissent to presume that coercion is a forgotten tool; and there is too much empirical evidence that socialization has been less than successful to conclude that socioeconomic change co-varies directly with concern for public support.

Efforts to measure components of convergence theory have therefore raised many questions while providing a good case for doubting the expectation that development and modernization will yield political systems on the American model. To be sure, political change related to socioeconomic programs is taking place within all communist states. The lessons to be learned from an empirical consideration of convergence theory are that these programs do not promote identical changes in all communist states, and that many intervening country-specific and systemic variables strongly affect political institutions and their functions.

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Review Articles

PROFESSOR RENZO DE FELICE AND THE FASCIST PHENOMENON

By A. JAMES GREGOR

Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini il duce: gli anni del consenso, 1929–1936*. Turin: Einaudi, 1974, 949 pp., Lit 15,000.

Renzo De Felice, *Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice* (An Interview with Michael A. Ledeen). New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976, 128 pp., $5.95.

DURING the last decade-and-a-half we have seen a qualitative change in works devoted to the study of fascism (however "fascism" is construed). The appearance, in Germany, of Ernst Nolte's *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*[1]—and the publication, in Italy, of Renzo De Felice's *Mussolini il rivoluzionario*[2]—marked a new phase in the study of the complex phenomena we speak of as fascism. Although we have no assurance that singularly curious books on the subject will no longer be written,[3] or that egregiously mistaken tracts will no longer be republished,[4] serious scholarship has produced an increasing number of volumes that have contributed to our comprehension of that significant period of European history identified with the fascist phenomenon.[5]

It seems reasonably clear that after a generation of tendentious scholarship—scholarship that could not help but be influenced by the passions generated by the most destructive war in human history—a new phase was opened by the all but simultaneous appearance of the books by Nolte, De Felice and Eugen Weber.[6] In Europe and in the United

[1] Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche: Die Action française, der italienische Faschismus, der Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Piper 1963).

[2] De Felice, *Mussolini il rivoluzionario* (Turin: Einaudi 1965).

[3] This is particularly true with respect to National Socialism; cf. Walter C. Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Praeger 1973). See my review in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (March 1974), 317-18.

[4] In 1973, Pathfinder Press in New York republished Daniel Guerin's *Fascism and Big Business*, first published in 1936. A new edition of Rajani Palme Dutt's "orthodox" Stalinist interpretation of fascism, *Fascism and Social Revolution*, was published by Proletarian Publishers in 1974. See my comments on both in Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism* (New York: General Learning Press 1974), chap. 5.

[5] See my review, "Fascism and Comparative Politics: A Review Essay," *Comparative Political Studies*, IX (July 1976), 207-22.

[6] Weber's brief *Varieties of Fascism* (Princeton: Van Nostrand 1964) was one of the

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States a new generation of scholars (all more or less in the same age group) began a reinterpretation of the history of the entire period. The availability of new materials, the partial abatement of passions, the publication of state documents, the accessibility of archives, the remarkable advance in research techniques, all contributed to the production of significantly more competent treatments of fascism. Among these, De Felice's monumental biography of Benito Mussolini occupies a distinguished place. It has become impossible, at least in the United States, to deal with Italian Fascism in whatever guise without coming to grips with the work of De Felice. Because of the marginal role played by Marxist scholars, as well as the lack of political implications that fascist studies might have in English-speaking political environments, De Felice's work has been dealt with, by and large, on its merits.[7] De Felice's biography of Mussolini is recognized as a definitive work which will in all probability remain *the* biography of Mussolini for the foreseeable future.

The fourth volume of what is to be a six-volume work on Mussolini is easily the equal of the antecedent three. With the possible exception of the first volume, *Mussolini il rivoluzionario* (which revealed a Mussolini all but unknown, or forgotten, by both scholars and the intelligent lay public), *Mussolini il duce* is the most fascinating to-date. Not only is the volume a profound, eminently competent, and exhaustively researched work; it is absorbing. To read it is to relive, in significant measure, one of the most fateful periods of Italian, and European, history.

Recognizing that it is not the business of historians to "reconstruct the past" in all its infinite complexity, De Felice has provided a carefully documented account that affords the reader insight into a period that its contemporaries could not have. De Felice's careful, and serenely objective, treatment of personalities and circumstances leaves the academic reader with a sense of satisfaction, with a knowledge that the available evidence has been reviewed and selected without specifically ideological or political bias. The reader receives a sense of the logic of events in a narrative that is at once persuasive, effectively organized, and well written.

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first attempts to treat the fascist phenomena with a studied measure of detachment and objectivity.

[7] This must be partially qualified by the appearance of Denis Mack Smith's review of De Felice's work in the *Times Literary Supplement* of October 31, 1975, republished with an exchange with Michael Ledeen in Italian as D. Mack Smith and M. Ledeen, *Un monumento al duce?* (Florence: Guaraldi 1976).

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This is not to say that much of what De Felice says will be easy for lay and academic readers to accept. We have been told for so long, for example, that Mussolini was a man without culture, without intelligence, and without ideological persuasion,[8] that it is awkward to be admonished that such judgments are "simplistic" and, at best, only partially true. That Mussolini was in fact, a man of substantial (if disorganized) education, who read widely and possessed an "impressive intellectual curiosity" (*Mussolini il duce*, 24, 32-38) is an assessment which many English-language readers (and almost all Italians) accept only with much reluctance. Furthermore, much of the discussion in chapter 3 concerns Mussolini's efforts to control education, the mass media and the flow of information in Fascist Italy, in order to create a "new consciousness" among Italians; it is incontestable evidence that his political behaviors were animated by conceptions of a "new society" and of "new men" to people it, which—however incoherent and vague, fully qualify as an ideological persuasion (*Mussolini il duce*, 201, 339; cf. *Fascism*, 55ff., 67, 70, 74-75).

We have become so accustomed to hearing that Mussolini was cruel and "incapable of true affection"[9] that to learn otherwise (*Mussolini il duce*, 298, 300-302) is disconcerting to many. To find out that all the easy explanations of Fascist foreign policy—for instance, that Mussolini's policies were dictated by his francophobia[10] or by his reading of Nietzsche[11]—leave much to be desired, can only afflict many readers with the uncomfortable necessity of having to modify conventional prejudices.

Books like those by De Felice are calculated to initiate reassessments that are sometimes painful—particularly when existing convictions are comfortable or politically conventional. We are still living in the backwater of the war against fascism; and the effort to treat generic fascism, or Italian Fascism, with historic detachment is certain to provoke a sense of moral outrage among a great many people. There are many Anglo-American academics who, even today, can only address themselves to the fascist phenomena in terms of "the moral collapse of West-

[8] Richard Collier, for example, told English-language readers that Mussolini was, at best, a "superficial reader" (*Duce!* [New York: Viking 1971], 46), who read "only those writers who spoke for violence." Roy MacGregor-Hastie insisted that Mussolini only "fluttered from philosopher to philosopher" and derived from his reading "nothing but momentary gratification. . . ." (*The Day of the Lion* [New York: Coward-McCann 1963], 29). Furthermore, MacGregor-Hastie insisted that Mussolini had "neither philosophy, policy, or programme. . . ."

[9] Laura Fermi, *Mussolini* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1961), 14.

[10] Cf. Alan Cassels, *Fascist Italy* (New York: Crowell 1963), pp. 79-81.

[11] Elizabeth Wiskemann, *The Rome/Berlin Axis* (London: Collins 1966), chap. 1.

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ern civilization."[12] Such sentiments could only be more prevalent among Italians.[13] Very few, if any, academicians would be content with a similar treatment of the Stalinist period of Russian history or the strife-torn and violent period of the Chinese revolution. Academicians, of course, are not required to be moral skeptics any more than they are required to be apolitical. But what seems equally clear is that simple moral judgment is no substitute for systematic comprehension of complex periods of history (cf. *Fascism*, 113-14). The most responsible moral judgments are those that rest in substantial part on an accurate and publicly defensible interpretation of events.

In effect, De Felice's work is calculated to generate considerable discomfort among many academicians and much of the lay public. He does much to disabuse us of the inaccuracies, simple stupidities, and gross misconceptions with which too many of us have lived for more than a generation. More than that, he has made a perhaps quixotic effort to remain detached from his subject matter in an environment characterized by tendentiousness and factionalism. In no sense can his work be characterized as apologetic of Italian Fascism, but he has ventured to tender a balanced judgment of both Fascism and its leader—something that politically committed historians and social scientists find difficult to tolerate.

De Felice has complained that most of the discussion generated by his work has rarely transcended the level of political recrimination (*Fascism*, 111).[14] The evidence seems to support his complaint. It has been ten years since the appearance of *Mussolini il rivoluzionario*, and the substantial criticisms of that work have been, at best, marginal. The reasons are not difficult to discern.

In order to undertake a substantive criticism of De Felice's work on Mussolini, what is minimally required of the critic is not only a competence equal to that of De Felice, but familiarity with *all* the documentary material he has consulted, in order to identify relevant bits of evidence he may have neglected. It seems obvious that responsible criticism could only originate with someone who has devoted as much time and intellectual energy to the subject as he. There are not many candidates who can satisfy such qualifications.

[12] Gilbert Allardyce, *The Place of Fascism in European History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1971), 3.

[13] Cf. Leo Valiani's comments on De Felice's *Intervista* in "No, il fascismo fu proprio nero," *Corriere della sera*, July 5, 1975; Giovanni Ferrara, "Il fascismo? C'è il rischio di 'capirlo' troppo," *Il Giorno*, July 3, 1975; and the Introduction to De Felice's *Fascism*.

[14] Cf. "Mussolini e il professore," interview with Francesco Perfetti, in *Il Settimanale*, II (July 23, 1975).

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De Felice has remained very close to documentary sources (*Fascism*, chap. 1); when documentary evidence is lacking, he has generally qualified his narrative as provisional (cf., for example, *Mussolini il duce*, 768). There are occasions when De Felice tenders a *judgment* supported by *selective* reporting of documentary materials. In such cases—when, for example, he advances a judgment concerning the "collective sentiments" of a large number of political actors—De Felice has apparently undertaken a content analysis to identify theme persistence and frequency in a large body of literature (*Mussolini il duce*, 234). Any criticism of such judgments would require a rather tedious survey of relevant literature (which publications should be the subjects of such an assessment? covering which period? and how are specific themes identified?) and would involve much more inferential argument than any specific allusion to documentary references. There are even more complicated and problematic judgments that are difficult to document with convincing references; all require a rich research background.

Where De Felice allows himself to tender broad judgments—like the purported influence of the thought of men like Giovanni Gentile and Oswald Spengler on Mussolini's intellectual maturation and political behavior (*Mussolini il duce*, 34-53)—there is considerable latitude for reassessment and re-evaluation. In effect, the further any author removes himself from simple summary reports of documentary evidence, the more subject to reservations his judgments become. Thus, although it is unlikely that significant criticism will be advanced in any abundance against the essentially factual claims made by De Felice, it is more than likely that his judgments concerning the mood of the general population or the elite, intellectual influences, psychological dispositions, and so forth, will be subject to considerably more reservation.

Finally, when we leave the level of judgmental and interpretive opinion and engage De Felice on the level of broad schematizations, historic trends, and methodological convictions, the argument will become increasingly heated (if not necessarily more illuminating). Almost *everyone* (rightly or wrongly) feels competent to participate. As a matter of fact, most of the discussion precipitated by De Felice's work turns almost exclusively on just such issues. Very few critics have taken issue with him in terms of documentary evidence and publicly discriminable fact. Most commentators have addressed themselves to the more general comments De Felice has provided in his interview with Ledeen, which has become a best-seller in Italy, and which has now appeared in English as *Fascism: An Informal Introduction to its Theory and Practice*.

One of the motives for the publication of this brief volume, entitled

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Intervista sul fascismo in Italian, was a desire to "provoke" complacent and conventionalist colleagues to rethink the entire problem of Italian Fascism.[15] That his interview provoked his colleagues and the general reading public has become evident in the immediate reaction generated by its appearance. But that it will move his audience to rethink the "fascist phenomenon" is, at best, doubtful. De Felice himself has recognized that he failed to anticipate the degree of acrimony his comments would precipitate.[16] He has, in fact, been charged by his critics with moral insensitivity,[17] with dark political motives,[18] and finally, with professional incompetence.[19] All of which is, to say the least, unfortunate.

A political phenomenon as complex as fascism requires not only meticulous intellectual independence and discipline, but a minimum amount of cool and objective detachment on the part of both the researchers and their critics. All of which implies not moral skepticism, but the affirmation that *cognitive judgments* be distinguished as rigorously as possible from *moral opinion*—and that the latter not confound the former.

There is an almost irrepressible disposition among people, when they deal with social and political reality, to allow moral judgments to take the place of studied inquiry. We all, in varying degrees, allow ourselves to become captive to a kind of easy Manichaeanism, a convenient world view in which there are only black and white judgments and no shades of grey—in which morality, beauty, and truth inhabit one side of the barricades, and bestiality, ugliness, and mendacity stand opposed on the other. In almost every contest between contending social and political forces, such a disposition manifests itself among participants. One finds it in racial and religious conflict, and it is just as prevalent in instances of political competition. North Americans have long been familiar with its influence. For years we were taught that communism (however "communism" was construed) was simple bestiality and that communists apparently took simple pleasure in terrorism and suppressing freedom. Political necessity has succeeded in tempering North American opinion; we are no longer content with a demonological interpretation of communist movements and communist regimes. There has been no similar political necessity to require a more systematic ef-

[15] Cf. "Dibattiti/De Felice e il fascismo," *Espresso*, June 29, 1975.
[16] Cf. De Felice's comments (fn. 14). [17] Valiani (fn. 13).
[18] Nicola Tranfaglia, "La pugnalata dello storico," *Il Giorno*, July 6, 1975; Ferrara (fn. 13).
[19] Paolo Alatri, "Il nero c'è ma non lo vede," *Messagero*, July 7, 1975; cf. also Tranfaglia (fn. 18).

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fort at objectivity in understanding fascism—and, as a consequence, we have an entire industry devoted to the publication of demonological tracts that reveal that Hitler was a "magician," or that he was in league with the "occult forces of evil."[20] Less absurd perhaps, but seemingly no less motivated by the same impulses, are those books that conceive fascism to have been the consequence of Adolf Hitler's sexual perversions[21] or Benito Mussolini's syphilitic infection.[22] One further step removed from the absurd, but still animated by the same factious impulses, is the interpretation that makes fascism the product of a "conscious conspiracy" of the "magnates of high finance."[23]

Happily there are few today who take such efforts seriously. The price paid for tendentiousness is an almost total inability to explain an important part of European and world history. Under such conditions, fascism becomes an inexplicable parenthesis in history, in which men mysteriously give themselves over to evil: Hitler, with his handful of misfits, mesmerized the entire population of Germany, and Mussolini, aided by a small group who "sacrificed all ethical scruples," somehow succeeded in sweeping 45 million Italians into "the wild adventure that was his life."[24]

These are, of course, the most debased forms of the demonological thesis that De Felice seeks to discredit in his interview. Western intellectuals have very little patience with those who speak of the rise of communism as an instance of a collapse of Western morals, but the identical vacuity is all too often taken as a meaningful explanation of the rise of fascism. Because so many have invested so much in just such an explanation, De Felice's attempts to maintain a critical objectivity in the study of Italian Fascism is conceived either as evidence of moral frailty or as crypto-fascism.

All of this is unfortunate. It seems reasonably clear that generic fascism is perhaps one of the least understood phenomena of the 20th cen-

[20] Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, *The Morning of the Magicians* (New York: Avon 1968); Trevor Ravenscroft, *The Spear of Destiny* (New York: Bantam 1974); J. Herbert Brennan, *The Occult Reich* (New York: New American Library 1974).

[21] Langer (fn. 3). Cf. Gregor (fn. 4), chap. 3.

[22] Cf. Antonio Trizzino, *Mussolini ultimo* (Milan: Bietti 1968).

[23] The most notorious expression of this is to be found in Palme Dutt (fn. 4). De Felice maintains, "It is unthinkable that Italy's great economic forces wanted to bring fascism to power. . . . The industrialists certainly had no thought of giving fascism exclusive power" (*Fascism*, 63). Cf. De Felice, *Le interpretazioni del fascismo* (5th ed., Rome: Laterza 1974), 51-81.

[24] Cf. Fermi's introduction (fn. 9). Robert Payne, in his recent book on Hitler, tells us that Hitler was an "improbable adventurer who conquered the German people by the sheer force of his will . . ." and that a "single man" had caused "such havoc." *The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Praeger 1973), ix.

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tury.[25] Despite all the volumes, monographs, and essays devoted to the subject, we have as yet no comprehensive or generally accepted interpretation.[26] We are, in effect, very much in need of a searching and competent reappraisal of the entire complex sequence we now identify with the fascist period.[27] There are few academics better equipped to assist us in that enterprise than Renzo De Felice.

De Felice has the temerity to admit that we have only begun to come to grips with the fascist phenomenon—that the study of fascism is "still in its preliminary phase" (*Fascism*, 36). This judgment, conjoined with his efforts to maintain as objective a posture as possible with regard to the entire complex manifestation, has scandalized much of the Italian lay public and not a few of his international colleagues. More than that, De Felice has hazarded some generalizations that have evidently outraged many of the intellectual *benpensanti*, particularly those who vaguely characterize themselves as "of the Left."

De Felice has ventured to suggest several things that are apparently ideologically unacceptable. Anyone possessed of conventional wisdom simply *knows* that fascism was irretrievably counterrevolutionary, conservative, and reactionary—and uncompromisingly right-wing. To intimate anything else would be to court public disdain and academic opprobrium. Happily, De Felice is supremely independent and has proceeded to suggest that not only did Italian Fascism have "modernizing" and "progressive" features (*Fascism*, 49, 68, 73)—and that it was a "revolutionary phenomenon" (*Fascism*, 54)—but he has gone so far as to suggest that it shared some affinities with the historic "radical left-wing" (*Fascism*, 67).[28]

There is, in fact, more than a little substance in De Felice's judgments. For some time it has become fairly common knowledge among specialists that Italian Fascism was characterized by features that could only be described as progressive and modern. It has even been characterized as a "modernizing movement."[29] If we are not disposed to go

[25] Gregor, "Fascist Lexicon," *Transaction*, VIII (May 1971), 54-58; Eugen Weber, "Passato e presente del Fascismo," *Intervento*, I (April 1972), 119-42.

[26] In this connection, De Felice's *Interpretazioni del fascismo* (fn. 23) is instructive.

[27] Cf. the discussion in Juan Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Walter Laqueur, ed., *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1976), 3-121.

[28] There is an extensive discussion of many of these issues in Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory*, III (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 175-411.

[29] Gregor, "Fascism and Modernization," *World Politics*, XXVI (April 1974), 370-84; Gregor, "Fascism and the 'Countermodernization' of Consciousness," in *Comparative Political Studies*, X (July 1977), 239-58. Juan Linz has refused to include "anti-modernizing" among the defining attributes of Fascism. Cf. Linz (fn. 27), 108, n. 22.

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quite that far, all that is necessary is to review some of the judgments tendered by Fascism's most outspoken critics, starting as early as Giulio Aquila's first systematic effort to understand Fascism from a Leninist perspective.[30]

Although Aquila contended that the "essence" of Fascism was "reactionary" and "counter-revolutionary" in 1923, he nonetheless granted not only that it "appeared revolutionary" to many, but also that it conducted a struggle against the old political classes of Italy which had effectively obstructed Italy's modernization; and that consequently the struggle against the "traditional Italian State" was "objectively progressive."[31] In Aquila's Leninist judgment, Mussolini's "revolutionary phraseology" was convincing precisely because of this "objectively progressive" aspect of Fascism. Moreover, Aquila was prepared to grant that Fascism concerned itself with "augmenting industrial productivity"[32]—a feature we now tend to identify with economic modernization.

Contemporary Leninists have been still more direct. Mihaly Vajda of the Hungarian Academy of Science has recently insisted that Fascism was the "only progressive solution" to the impasse that had settled down on the Italian economy after the First World War.[33] Vajda has gone so far as to suggest that the available "socialist" solutions of the period were intrinsically "reactionary"—calculated to obstruct Italy's industrialization! In Vajda's judgment, not only did Italian Fascism have "progressive" and "modern" features, it was the *only* progressive solution to Italy's economic problems—a statement far more scandalous than anything De Felice has said.

If these judgments by Leninists are not surprising enough, one need only peruse some of the more specialized literature emanating from the Soviet Union. At about the time that Vajda was publishing his piece in the United States, Alexander Galkin of the Soviet Academy of Sciences delivered himself of an essay in which we are told that, while Fascism was indeed "conservative," it nonetheless created a state that "acted as a guarantor of economic development."[34] Furthermore, Galkin states that "Economic measures were also applied which, for all their limited nature, created the impression of definite progress. The policy of social philanthropy was elevated to a state level."[35] Thus, even

[30] Aquila, "Il fascismo italiano," in De Felice, ed., *Il fascismo e i partiti politici italiani* (Rocca San Casciano: Cappelli 1966), 421-97.

[31] *Ibid.*, 437.

[32] *Ibid.*, 451.

[33] Vajda, "The Rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany," *Telos*, XII (Summer 1972), 12.

[34] Galkin, "Capitalism, Society, and Fascism," in *Social Sciences* (USSR Academy of Sciences), II (1971), 130-31.

[35] *Ibid.*, 134.

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a Soviet academician seems to grant some elements of modernity and progress to fascism.

Karin Priester, from an independent Marxist position, has suggested that while Fascism was a "conservative-reactionary" regime, it was not "conservative" in the "ordinary sense."[36] One of the principal programmatic themes of historic Fascism was the protection and growth of economic, and particularly industrial, production.[37] Its programs, in fact, involved Fascism in a struggle with the "old ruling class." According to Priester, Fascism's success in that struggle was due, at least in substantial part, to its "objectively progressive" aspects.[38]

Very similar judgments are found in Otto-Ernst Schueddekopf's recent work on Fascism. At the same time he informs us that Italian Fascism was animated by "a completely reactionary, backward-looking *Weltanschauung*," we are told that it was an "anti-reactionary revolutionary mass-movement" which manifested the features of an "*Entwicklungsdiktatur*,"—a dictatorship for development.[39] Although such judgments sound paradoxical, they do indicate that Schueddekopf, like De Felice, is prepared to recognize some progressive and modern features in Italian Fascism.

The point of the foregoing is to indicate that the best of modern scholarship—and this includes some of the more competent Marxist treatments—is prepared to recognize the modern and progressive aspects of Italian Fascism. It would seem that De Felice's judgments are neither idiosyncratic nor heretical.

As much could be said concerning De Felice's readiness to identify the "revolutionary" character of Mussolini's Fascism. It is because the lay public has been so long accustomed to hearing that Fascism was counterrevolutionary, that the suggestion that it was, in fact, revolutionary provokes a kind of instinctive resistance.

Anyone, of course, who has thought seriously about revolution as a concept recognizes that it has no standard definition. The term is employed in variable and ambiguous ways.[40] To attempt to standardize its use, Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky have provided a "min-

[36] Priester, *Der italienische Faschismus: Oekonomische und ideologische Grundlagen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein 1972), 294.

[37] *Ibid.*, 203, 211-12, 216, 225, 227, 231, 243.

[38] *Ibid.*, 208.

[39] Schueddekopf, *Revolutions of Our Time: Fascism* (New York: Praeger 1973), 112-13, 99.

[40] For a superb treatment of the concept, see Eugen Weber, "Revolution? Counter-revolution? What Revolution?" *Journal of Contemporary History*, IX (May 1974), 3-47. Cf. also Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88 (March 1973), 23-52; and the exchange between Mack Smith and Ledeen (fn. 7), 59, 60.

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imum definition" of the concept for use by social scientists: "A revolution may be said to exist when a group of insurgents illegally and/or forcefully challenges the governmental elite for the occupancy of roles in the structure of political authority."[41] Once the minimum definition of the term is established, one can make whatever distinctions may be theoretically and empirically useful. Tanter and Midlarsky thus establish "mass revolution," "revolutionary coup," "reform coup" and "palace coup" as subclasses of generic revolution. Others have made still other subspecific distinctions. Some speak of "great revolutions,"[42] and others of "jacobin revolutions,"[43] but the minimum definition remains, "it is change, effected by the use of violence, in government, and/or regime, and/or society."[44]

When Paolo Alatri objects to De Felice's use of the term "revolutionary" to characterize Italian Fascism, his objection arises from the fact that Alatri, as a Marxist, employs the term to cover *only certain kinds of social change*. But one cannot legislate the use of words. The concept "revolution" is generally used in the literature of history and social science to indicate violent social, regime, and/or governmental change. For all the unwillingness to use the term "revolutionary" to characterize what transpired in Fascist Italy, it is quite clear that the most sophisticated authors recognize Fascism's revolutionary character. Galkin, for example, argues in his essay that Fascism introduced a "new state form" —what he calls "state monopoly capitalism."[45] One may disapprove of this new state form which abandons bourgeois democracy, but the recognition that it is a *new* state form, and that it was the product of extra-constitutional violence, clearly identifies it as revolutionary. That Italian Fascism was not the kind of revolution that Marxists advocate is clear. But that it was revolutionary has now become all but commonplace in the specialized literature. In his most recent comments on Italian Fascism, Paul Hayes insists, "Indeed, Fascism [was] inherently revolutionary in the case of Italy."[46]

There is no reason why anyone should be scandalized by De Felice's suggestions that Italian Fascism had some progressive, modern, and

[41] Tanter and Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XI (1967), 264-80.

[42] Cf. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage 1938); George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York: Vintage 1938).

[43] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System*, Hoover Institution Studies 3 (Stanford, Calif. 1964).

[44] *Ibid.*, quoted in Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 159.

[45] Galkin (fn. 34), 129.

[46] Hayes, *Fascism* (New York: Free Press 1973), 149.

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revolutionary features. Indeed, such judgments have been generally accepted by the international academic community.

Much the same can be said of De Felice's judgment concerning the left-wing affinities of Italian Fascism. Schueddekopf has simply affirmed that "there are unmistakable spiritual links between right and left."[47] There is, in fact, an increasingly large body of literature that alludes to just such affinities.[48]

Actually, De Felice's thesis is much more specific. He is alluding to certain features of the revolutionary and left-wing tradition that conceived a new society in terms of a totalitarian democracy in which citizens would be inured to the responsibilities of the future world system through systematic educational propaganda. It is no longer seriously questioned by anyone familiar with the origins of Fascism that Mussolini and the first Fascists were squarely in this tradition. It produced the principal ideologues of Fascism—for instance, Roberto Michels, Sergio Panunzio, A. O. Olivetti, and Paolo Orano.[49] That such men were opposed to parliamentary democracy is not evidence of a right-wing disposition. If such were the case, then Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Castro would be similarly right-wing, for they are equally opposed to bourgeois parliamentarianism. The fact is that elitism, the presence of a charismatic leader, nationalism, militarism, and the one-party and anti-parliamentarian state do not unequivocally distinguish right-wing from left-wing revolutionism. No one is obliged to approve of either left-wing or right-wing traditions, but it is indefensible not to recognize the affinities they share. Paul Hayes has simply stated that "the socialist aspects of fascism are those most commonly ignored, perhaps because they conflict with the convenient explanation that fascism was a right-wing movement."[50] It may be convenient to forget these affinities, but it hardly constitutes ground for being outraged with De Felice when he reminds us once again of their existence.

In substance, there is very little in the text of De Felice's *Fascism* that should cause anyone any particular *intellectual* discomfort. That some people's *political* sensibilities may be irritated is to be expected.

So many people have profited politically from the identification of

[47] Schueddekopf (fn. 39), 195.

[48] Cf. Gregor, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974). The vast body of literature on totalitarianism attempts to highlight the similarities; for a bibliography, cf. Gregor (fn. 4), chap. 7.

[49] Emilio Gentile has provided a good account of these elements in the thought of the young Mussolini; see his *Le origini dell'ideologia fascista* (Rome: Laterza 1975), chap. 1.

[50] Hayes (fn. 46), 63; cf. Leonard Shapiro, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Praeger 1972), 83ff.

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Mussolini's Fascism with Hitler's National Socialism that when De Felice recommends that a sharp distinction be made between them (*Fascism*, 40ff.), considerable political distress was to be expected. But, once again, the distinction between National Socialism and Fascism has long been acknowledged in the serious professional literature.[51] Schueddekopf has maintained that "despite Hitler's assumption of some of the external characteristics of Fascism early on, and Mussolini's recourse to National Socialist methods later, any similarity between the two systems remained superficial. The two men, and the states they created, were fundamentally different. The famous friendship and the Axis pact came relatively late in the day as the result of the political situation."[52]

De Felice's distinction between National Socialism and Mussolini's Fascism has long since become part of the patrimony of contemporary scholarship. Thus, almost every substantive judgment tendered by De Felice in his interview can be supported by similar judgments advanced by specialists. Even De Felice's disclaimer that, irrespective of all the published material devoted to Italian Fascism that has become available over the years, we still find ourselves in the preliminary stages of adequate explanation, is reflected in Schueddekopf's remark, "No serious historian has as yet attempted to give a final judgment about Fascism."[53]

One issue, however, that merits further reflection is De Felice's disinclination to conceive of the possibility of a "generic fascism"—a political persuasion that might have been shared by more than one or two movements in Europe, or elsewhere in the world for that matter (*Fascism*, 98ff.). He is averse to "generalizing" (*Fascism*, 41), and as a consequence is not disposed to address himself to the problem of generic fascism.

It is obvious that any talk about a generic fascism can very easily degenerate into empty speculations and thin abstractions; it is equally clear that every generalization must sacrifice some specifics, and that every abstraction necessarily neglects some particulars. For all that, generalizations and abstractions are the very substance of science. As distinct from history, social (and by implication, political) science is a

[51] Authors like A.F.K. Organski have simply denied that National Socialism was a "fascism." Cf. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York: Knopf 1965); Organski, "Fascism and Modernization," in Stuart J. Woolf, ed., *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: Random House 1969). I have argued that there are similarities between the two, but that the differences between them are emphatic. See Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies* (New York: Random House 1968), chaps. 4 and 5.

[52] Schueddekopf (fn. 39), 76. [53] *Ibid.*, 213.

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generalizing discipline. The relationship between social science and history is very complex, but it seems intuitively clear that each needs the other. The historian needs an orientation before he can decide what to look for in the vast mass of surviving documents that confronts him. He must have generalizing concepts at his disposal—more frequently than not borrowed from social science. (De Felice, for example, makes prominent use of the term "charismatic leadership," a generalizing concept which originated in political sociology.) The social scientist, in turn, can use detailed history as a test case for his generalizations. Ideally, both historians and social scientists will modify their claims as a consequence of their interaction.

The question of whether two political movements are sufficiently similar to merit identification with the same name is a question that cannot be decided by legislation. We talk of "polyarchic" and "parliamentary" systems, and yet we know that the polyarchic parliamentary system of the United States is different from that of Italy in any number of ways. But we conceive of some similarities that subtend both systems so as to warrant the use of the common term. It would seem that the differences between the political systems of Italy and the United States are of a significantly smaller magnitude than the differences between them and the political systems of the Soviet Union or National Socialist Germany. Similarly, when specialists talk of socialist systems, they are no doubt aware of the significant differences between the orchestrated political regime of the Soviet Union and that of Castro's Cuba. They may be equally aware of the imposing differences between Arab Socialism, African Socialism, and socialism. In effect, they may very well be uncertain what the denotation of the term "socialist system" might be. In trying to decide, they may invoke *one* or *two* criteria: e.g., socialist systems have ideological recourse to the doctrines of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, or socialist systems abolish private ownership of the means of production. Alternatively, they may invoke *many* criteria; as a consequence, the number of systems that are entered under the rubric will be severely restricted. We may then have no more than one or two socialist systems.

No less could be said of fascist systems. There have been many proposed classificational schemata that pretend to distinguish fascist from socialist systems, and both from parliamentary regimes. None has been generally accepted. But this is not to say, as De Felice suggests, that such efforts "tell us nothing." It is true that they may *explain* nothing. What they may do, rather, is help to define elements within the domain

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of discourse. In searching out such definitions, one can attempt to arrive at defensible generalizations: e.g., what was the social or historic function of this or that kind of political system? Or, what was the recruitment base of this or that kind of revolutionary movement? How one defines one's domain of discourse helps shape the kinds of questions one can intelligently ask.

De Felice's tendency, as a historian, to restrict his domain of discourse to the complex phenomenon that matured on the Italian peninsula is perfectly comprehensible. The kinds of questions he wishes to answer could only be answered by a detailed treatment of specific sequences of events. But this is not to say that the kinds of issues, the kinds of crises, and the collective dispositions of Italians were unique after the First World War, and that they had absolutely no counterpart anywhere in Europe or anywhere else in the world. Issues, crises, and moods in the contemporary world are hardly ever restricted to one politically circumscribed environment. It is clear that the historian writing the history of Fascism in Puglia will write a different history than the historian writing the history of Fascism in Ferrara. Each was the arena for different protagonists, different social forces, different political elements; and yet there will be a historian who will write the *general* history of Fascism in Italy. To do so, he will have to generalize, and he will have to take recourse to abstractions. He will sometimes point out similarities and neglect differences. In effect, he will do what historians and political scientists do when they attempt to write a history of generic fascism in Europe.

De Felice finds it plausible to argue that Mussolini's Fascism shared *certain* similarities with the left-wing revolutionary traditions of Europe. It is clear to most of us that some such similarities obtain. But if he is willing to grant that, why should he resist if there are those who try to show that any number of fascist movements in Europe shared a common *ideological* perspective, *recruitment* base, or socioeconomic *function*? If one can argue that Mussolini's Fascism shared *some* ideological affinities with the revolutionary left, why can it not be said that fascist movements, whatever their individual historic destiny, their individual failures or successes, or their undeniable individual differences, shared *certain* ideological elements, recruitment bases, or socioeconomic functions? Whether it serves any specific intellectual purpose to do so is another question. But it would seem that the very logic of De Felice's position would require that he be prepared to recognize the legitimacy of tracing affinities of ideological elements, recruitment

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bases, or socioeconomic functions between political systems—affinities that might permit the classification of one or another movement, or identify a class of such movements, as fascist.

Of course, if one insists on using ideological, recruitment, or functional criteria independently, one may generate several different classificational schemata. De Felice, for example, seems to feel that Italian Fascism was the product, by and large, of middle-class aspirations; more specifically, the aspirations of a subset of the middle class, namely, the "emerging middle class" (*Fascism*, 46-50). He seems to think this is so because he can explain some of the historic sequences on the Italian peninsula by referring to that subclass. Still, if one were not concerned with the explanation of *those* specific events, but merely wished to identify all the political environments in which *ideological* themes that characterized Italian Fascism made their appearance, the singling out of the middle class as the bearer of those ideas would not be particularly relevant.

I would suggest that the reason we do not have a defensible typology of fascist movements or regimes is that each author tends to have a significantly different purpose in mind. De Felice wishes to explain a specific sequence of historic events. Eugen Weber's generalizations concerning Codreanu's fascism would therefore hardly be helpful to him (*Fascism*, 90-91). But there are those who, rather than seeking explanation of specific sequences, are attempting to understand why our century is so alive with mass movements, charismatic leaders, ideologies of terror, violence, and militarism. For example, there are those who attempt to come to understand, in the most preliminary fashion, the relationship between retarded industrial development, late national unification, and collective political behavior. Late industrialization and nation building may produce a pervasive sense of national inferiority, and thus the recourse to violence for the redress of collective grievance that the sense of inferiority may engender, as well as acceptance of a providential leader who promises the new and equitable society that only revolution can bring.

Such considerations might suggest affinities, not only between Mussolini's Fascism and the fascism of Codreanu's Iron Guard, but also between prewar Japanese fascism and the fascism of Juan Perón. It is obvious that such construals are beset with terminological and substantive problems; they are concerned with very general problems, and as a consequence are notoriously porous and tentative. The questions to which they address themselves probably will never be answered with any assurance. But that is equally true with respect to any efforts at

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generalizing, typologizing, and categorizing. Political scientists have few classificational efforts that satisfy the majority of specialists; they cannot therefore abandon their efforts in the exclusive pursuit of the detailed scrutiny of a single case—because one of the problems lies precisely in deciding what is to count as a "single" case. In a clear sense, the fascism of Reggio Emilia is a single case distinct from the fascism of Ferrara, just as the Fascism of Italy constitutes a single case distinct from the fascism of Codreanu's Iron Guard.

Political scientists are compelled by the logic of their discipline to continue their classificational and typologizing efforts. And they will continue to debate the merits of one system as opposed to another. The day may come when we settle on a classification that can effectively accommodate all the genera, species, and subspecies of our universe of discourse. But that day is apparently far off.

For the time being, we must be satisfied with the contemporary state of the art. With respect to Italian Fascism, there is much in the work of De Felice with which we can be content; there is also much that merits long deliberation and serious discussion. Most of his judgments are the consequence of a thorough familiarity with most of the contemporary professional literature. It would be difficult to find any other author who could better inform the reader about Italian Fascism. If De Felice's *Fascism* succeeds in enticing the public to read his authoritative biography of Mussolini, or any of his other works, it will have served laudatory purpose. If it provokes any of his critics to a reconsideration of conventional wisdom, it will have accomplished more than De Felice had any reason to expect.

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THE GLOBAL LOGIC OF THE NEOCONSERVATIVES

By FOUAD AJAMI

Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations*. New York: Basic Books, 1976, 214 pp., $10.95.

I

EQUALITY, men have been endlessly told by rulers, scholars, and religious teachings, knows no limits; once the passion for it is unleashed, it can wreak havoc on fragile social orders that must either allow for inequality, slip into mediocrity, or succumb to anarchy and chaos. "Some of you," the Quran instructs the faithful, "we have placed over others in rank." Other traditions and the weight of history have rendered similar advice: equality is not of this world, and there is very little use trying to bring it about, for even if established orders are overthrown, the same sorts of relationships are bound to begin all over again. The slave would try to be a master—and would thereby confirm that inequality is the natural order of things. The "revolution betrayed" is an established historical theme that denies to revolutionary and egalitarian claims the sense of moral assurance they might once have possessed. When the dust settles, new orthodoxies emerge to stultify life, new inquisitors crack the whip, and the nouveaux riches act in even more repugnant ways than the old aristocracies.

Conservatives have always dwelled on what they think is the historical record. They have sought to deflate the appeal of egalitarian claims, to add a somber note to the frenzy and enthusiasm associated with the politics of rebellion and challenge. "At the very center of conservative thought," notes Michael Walzer, "lies this idea: that the present division of wealth and power corresponds to some deeper reality of human life . . . and that all efforts to change it, temporarily successful in relation to their bloodiness, must be futile in the end."[1] Indeed, in conservative writings on society, one sees a bewilderment, an inability to comprehend why a futile quest for equality has engaged the energies and imagination of so many. Robert Nisbet, a prominent conservative thinker, expresses that kind of exasperation. He contends that the egalitarian quest falls outside logic and rationality; it is the nature of such

[1] Walzer, "In Defense of Equality," *Dissent*, XX (Fall 1973), 399.

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ideas as equality "that they are stayed by neither fact nor logic."[2] Rather like passion and religion, in Nisbet's view, equality acquires a momentum of its own and "feeds on itself as no other single social value does."[3]

The Inequality of Nations stands in the conservative tradition. Its author, Professor Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University, is a well-known student of international politics who became something of a celebrity in early 1975 when he called for a military takeover of Arab oil fields. He did so because he saw in the oil crisis a manifestation "of an egalitarianism which, if permitted to run its logical course, is likely to result first in chaos and then in an international system far harsher than today's or even yesterday's system."[4] In the months that followed, he turned his attention to the new egalitarianism in two widely read essays published in *Commentary*; they are incorporated into *The Inequality of Nations*. The book was written, Tucker states in the preface, "largely out of protest against the intellectual confusion that has attended current discussions of equality in relation to international society." In part, notes Tucker, the confusion extends earlier confusions and mistakes about domestic equality into the debate about global equality. For the rest, it is a function of "the failure to distinguish properly between domestic society and the greater society beyond" (p. ix).

Tucker's point about the extension of the debate provides the appropriate intellectual context within which his book and the larger issue of global equality must be placed and understood. The arguments and concerns that erupted earlier on the American domestic scene now entered the global arena. By the end of the 1960's, black militance, growing alienation among the young from the structures and assumptions of American society, quotas, and affirmative action had all but shattered the liberal consensus of the post-World War II era. These developments touched off a discussion of the "new egalitarianism" and the dangers posed to order and meritocracy by radical egalitarian demands for social justice. Equality of opportunity was no longer widely dominant as a goal of liberal politics; reformers were now demanding equality of results. Social policy was seen as an instrument for narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor.

The radicalization of some who had once shared centrist liberal assumptions was not the only defection from the centrist consensus: a

[2] Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford 1975), 203.

[3] *Ibid.*, 202. See also Nisbet's essay, "The Fatal Ambivalence of an Idea," *Encounter*, XLVII (December 1976), 10-21.

[4] Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention," *Commentary*, Vol. 59 (January 1975), 31.

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so-called neoconservative school grew up. Convinced that liberalism was much too benign and soft to cope with the task of social regeneration, and that too many concessions and moral compromises were being made under the pressure of radical groups and perspectives, the neoconservatives took it upon themselves to shore up the defenses of American society against the assault of egalitarian claims and sensibilities. With such writers as Daniel P. Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, Irving Kristol, and with such forums as *Commentary* and *Public Interest*, this sort of sentiment was bound to carve a place for itself in the marketplace where public policy and scholarship come together.[5] Neoconservative analysts wrote and reflected on a broad range of issues, but the radicals' attack upon inequality was their central concern and obsession. Equality, complained Irving Kristol, has been discovered, and thanks to the disaffection of a "new class" of intellectuals from bourgeois society and its values, has become the most important criterion for judging the legitimacy of a particular social order. Such a view, he warned, is dangerous and historically unfounded; it would cast a "pall of illegitimacy over the entire human race . . . that implicitly indicts Jerusalem and Athens and Rome and Elizabethan England, all of whom thought inequality was necessary to achieve a particular ideal of human excellence, both individual and collective."[6]

These words were written in 1972. If Kristol thought the demand for equality was about to exhaust itself, global events were to prove him wrong. The germ of radical egalitarianism had infected people outside the boundaries of Western society; striving for equality was no longer limited to the confines of the state; the global political system had become its domain. The so-called North-South conflict between the rich and the poor, an issue that had always lurked in the background, became transformed with the deployment of the oil weapon in 1973. The neoconservatives had another egalitarianism issue to contend with; Kristol himself symbolized the shift in emphasis. "Insignificant nations," he observed in a commentary on the oil crisis, "like insignificant people, can quickly experience delusions of significance. . . . In truth, the days of 'gunboat diplomacy' are never over. . . . Gunboats are as necessary for international order as police cars for domestic order."[7] In time, other

[5] The neoconservatives have been brilliantly analyzed in Sheldon Wolin's essay, "The New Conservatives" *New York Review of Books*, XXIII (February 5, 1976), 6-11, and in Michael Walzer's essay (fn. 1). *The Public Interest*'s special issue, "The American Commonwealth," No. 41 (Fall 1975), contains an assessment, by the most prominent American neoconservatives, of the problems confronting American society at this time.

[6] Kristol, "About Equality," *Commentary*, Vol. 54 (November 1972), 42.

[7] Kristol, as quoted in Noam Chomsky, *Peace in the Middle East* (New York: Vintage 1974), 6.

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analysts were to take up the same theme. The "insignificant" had to be stripped of their delusions. Whether threatened with military invasion as they were by Kristol, Robert W. Tucker, and Edward Friedland and his associates,[8] or taken on at the United Nations by Daniel P. Moynihan[9] who urged the United States to oppose the so-called new majority, the hitherto insignificant were to be taught the realities of international politics: that inequality is here to stay; that order is underpinned by it; that cracks in the Western edifice and the guilt of some Westerners should not be taken as a license for "cheeky" behavior at the United Nations, raw-material cartels, and illusions about the ease with which a "new" international order can be created.

II

Such is the intellectual context within which Tucker's study should be viewed. He himself makes no reference to the early essay in *Commentary* which foreshadows this work, but its weight and burden can be discerned. I do not think it unfair to link the book with Tucker's call for a military stand against what he saw as a manifestation of the new egalitarianism. Indeed, Tucker is billed on the jacket of the book as a "distinguished political scientist whose call for a Western military takeover of the Persian Gulf oilfields in response to the oil embargo of the early 1970's created a worldwide intellectual and journalistic sensation."

Publisher's hyperbole does not detract from the merits of Tucker's study. Unlike other hostile—as well as favorable—commentaries on Third-World egalitarianism, Tucker's is learned and thoughtful; it brings to bear on the subject a style of analytical rigor and argumentation familiar to those who know his earlier work. Furthermore, it helps place a topical concern in a deeper tradition of analysis. Tucker draws on the earlier and richer debate on inequality within nations—while still making a distinction between the rules that obtain within the state and those that apply to relations among states—and he anchors the debate about today's global inequalities in a discussion of other periods of history when different rules governed the relations among countries.

Tucker identifies the traditional international system of the past as the site of something approximating Utopia. A reading of his book confirms Karl Mannheim's contention that conservatism as such "has

[8] Friedland and others, *The Great Détente Disaster* (New York: Basic Books 1975).
[9] Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," *Commentary*, Vol. 59 (March 1975), 31-44.

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no utopia"[10] and that it is only the opposition of other Utopias (liberal, socialist, and so forth) that brings about a conservative "counter-utopia which serves as a means of self-orientation and defence."[11] The conservative counter-Utopia lacks the excitement, the certitude, and the promise of redemption associated with other Utopias, but that is precisely where the conservatives have always seen the superiority of their vision. For them the liberal and socialist visions that emerged out of the Enlightenment were "vaporous and lacking in concreteness"; the superiority of their own vision could be confirmed in "discovering the significance of the past, in the discovery of time as the creator of value."[12]

In Tucker's view to look at the past, at the traditional international system, is to find an antidote, a corrective to the "confusions" of today's system. "The history of the international system," he notes, "is a history of inequality par excellence . . . states are, as it were, born unequal; so much so, indeed, that the natural inequalities among individuals appear almost marginal" (p. 3). The international system, a system of anarchy and self-help, has always been conducive to oligarchy. Tucker finds the sobering truth about international life in the Athenian dictum to the Melians recorded by Thucydides: "That the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must" (p. 4).

If Thucydides and his contemporaries understood and accepted the harsh "facts" of life, from where do present confusions stem? What sorts of doctrines and developments promote an egalitarianism that dares demand that the rich help the poor, that the powerful refrain from deploying their military force against the weak, that the same rules that apply within nations (taxation, community, noncoercive politics) should obtain in the world at large? What made it possible for the Arab oil states—a group for whose talents and capabilities Tucker does not have a great deal of respect—to undertake an action against the West that would have been unthinkable in earlier times? Surely, such developments would have been inconceivable to those who subscribed to the rules of mercantilism which once governed the politico-economic relationships of states. For, as Tucker correctly states, mercantilism was an explicit doctrine of inequality: "It was designed to preserve and increase inequality within the core of European states and between this core and the non-European periphery" (p. 15).

Although Tucker emphatically exonerates mercantilism from such confusions, he is less than clear as to the culpability of liberalism. He recognizes that liberalism promised greater equality than it delivered;

[10] Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1936), 229.
[11] *Ibid.*, 230. [12] *Ibid.*, 235.

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that, even though the liberals promised to spread the benefits of a liberal-capitalist international order, in practice these "assumptions extended only to those people at approximately the same level of development, that is, the people sharing Western civilization" (p. 15). But in one of his essays in *Commentary* he also concedes the ease with which a great measure of economic egalitarianism can be extracted directly from the liberal tradition: the theory of liberalism recognized that egalitarianism "did not stop at the boundaries of the state"; and it held out the promise of economic equality on the grounds that "free trade, besides being proportionately beneficial to all, would promote a gradual equalization in international economic distribution."[13]

Yet the triumph of the liberal-capitalist international order and its world market system produced quite different results. Interdependence and inequality proceeded hand in hand; countries were integrated into the world system; but the result was, as E. J. Hobsbawm notes, increasing inequality: "In widening the gap between the places accessible to the new technology and the rest, it intensified the relative backwardness of those parts of the world where horse, ox, mule, human bearer or boat still set the speed of transport."[14] That is why the gap in per capita income between the richest and the poorest country, which stood at no more than five-to-one at the beginning of the 18th century, widened to its current forty-to-one.[15] Clearly, in such a situation something has to give; an ideology that promised equalization cannot indefinitely sustain rising inequalities and live with them. Eventually, its own myths will be turned against it.

Tucker is unclear on what to make of the role of liberal ideology, and his analysis is far from satisfactory. This flaw is of some consequence to the development of his argument, for as his logic unfolds, a great deal of the responsibility for the popularity of egalitarian arguments is laid at the doorstep of liberal Western elites. Tormented with guilt over inequalities and the plight of the world's poor, traumatized by Vietnam, the liberal elites have succumbed to a "new sensibility" which is totally at odds with the traditional ways of statecraft and the manner in which men had hitherto reflected on and practiced international politics. Indeed, it is one of Tucker's central contentions that the new sensibility of the West represents an even sharper break with the past than does the new egalitarianism of the Third World. The latter is a claim made by states for an improved position in the global hierarchy; as

[13] Tucker, "A New International Order?" *Commentary*, Vol. 59 (February 1975), 43.
[14] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital* (New York: Scribner's 1975), 60.
[15] Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Shadow of the Stationary State," *Daedalus*, No. 102 (Fall 1973), 98-99.

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such, it is as old as the game of states. The former represents—to use a favorite cliché of the neoconservatives—a failure of nerve on the part of Westerners who are no longer willing to bear the burden of empire: they still want to dominate, but are "squeamish" about it.

III

In light of the importance of the new sensibility to equality to Tucker's overall argument, and its presumed novelty as a force in world politics, an examination is particularly warranted. What are the roots of this sensibility? And in what way does it break with the conventional mode of political analysis?

One immediately encounters the impact of other neoconservative thinkers in Tucker's view of the new sensibility. Just as Kristol dismisses egalitarianism within the boundaries of American society as a fantasy entertained by a disaffected class of intellectuals[16]—a fantasy to which common men and women are not particularly inclined—Tucker finds the same individuals and the same alienation from the West behind the new sensibility; in their insistence on global welfare, these individuals express their disillusionment "with what their own societies have wrought" and a general "distaste and hostility toward societies from which a substantial portion of liberal elites is increasingly estranged—though for reasons that remain, after much speculation, unclear" (p. 145). While Kristol blames it all on Christopher Jencks and John Rawls, Tucker attributes the new sensibility to Robert McNamara and Gunnar Myrdal. The former—having changed constituencies—always invokes the "forgotten 40 percent" of the world; the latter keeps insisting on the notion of collective global responsibility.

The new sensibility was born at a time of great intellectual confusion; it also bears the marks of general disillusionment caused by the cold war and the old politics. According to Tucker,

> The origins of the new political sensibility may be traced back to the middle to late 1960's. It is in this period that liberal intellectual elites in the West became increasingly preoccupied, in a way they had not been before, with the issues of international inequalities of income and wealth (it is in the same period that they became increasingly preoccupied with domestic inequalities of income and wealth). . . . In its emphasis on equality as the principal moral imperative of our time, in its insistence on the duty of the rich to redress global inequalities, and in its conviction that inequalities of income and wealth represent the most serious long-term threat to world peace, the new political sensibility may be distinguished from the view that prevailed during the years of the classic

[16] Kristol (fn. 6).

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cold war. Whereas earlier views were inevitably influenced by the hegemonic conflict and the security-power necessities it imposed . . . the new political sensibility is clearly a post-cold war outlook (p. 52).

For the dominant belief in hegemony, the advocates of new sensibility substitute interdependence; they assert that, instead of the rivalry between the superpowers, the major issue of our age is equality, and that the struggle that really counts in the long run is between rich and poor. In this context, Tucker singles out Zbigniew Brzezinski as a propagator of the new sensibility; in Brzezinski's assertion that "equality is becoming the most powerful moral imperative of our time, thus paralleling the appeal of the concept of liberty during the 19th century,"[17] Tucker finds ample proof that the new sensibility has burdened international politics and the traditonal relations of states with radically alien and new responsibilities. The change was rendered possible by the notion of interdependence which argues that we live in a consensual world, and that the preservation of national sovereignty in that consensual world should give way to the kind of politics that prevails in a genuine political community. Behind this talk about interdependence, Tucker senses a growing ambivalence toward the state—an ambivalence that is based, in his view, on shaky foundations: domestic opinion in the United States does not accept it, nor does the international system on the whole substantiate it. This ambivalence rests on a tendency to generalize from conditions that obtain within states to the international system as a whole. The tendency is confined to a few liberal intellectuals and is not shared by the masses of ordinary men and women in the United States: "For if a large portion of Western liberal elites finds no more difficulty in distinguishing between the United States and Bangladesh than between California and Mississippi, it is safe to say that the general public continues to find a great deal of difficulty and that democratic governments will continue to prove responsive to the distinction the public draws between its collective welfare and the welfare of those outside the state" (p. 110). If mass democracy in the United States can be counted on to check the illusions of the liberals, so can the behavior of the Soviet Union; policymakers there do not seem to believe that the East-West conflict has come to an end, that equality is the issue of our age, or that the state system is on the decline.

On this point, Tucker's argument represents something of a consensus among conservatives. It maintains that the North-South issue has been overdramatized and that the real global conflict—resolutions at the

[17] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51 (July 1973), 726.

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U.N. notwithstanding—is still between the arsenals of the two superpowers. This interpretation suggests that the new sensibility inadequately reads the balance of forces in the world, shackles the power of the United States by such doctrines as the "growing disutility of military force," and leaves the West ill-equipped to deal with the rivalry of the Soviet Union. Indeed, we are already in the midst of the revival of cold-war sentiments and rekindled concern with the military might of the Soviet Union.

The resurgence of the cold war reflects a number of factors: (1) a belief that the threat from the Third World has receded and become more manageable than was thought to be the case when it erupted in 1973; (2) a growing uneasiness with détente and a conviction that the Soviet Union, sensing the reluctance of the United States to assert its global power, is taking the liberty to do so itself (as its recent involvement in Southern Africa would seem to suggest); (3) the fact that the obsession with the threat of the Third World, overdramatized as it was in 1974 and 1975, was bound (thanks to the ease with which both journalism and scholarship alike succumb to trendy things), to run out of steam—particularly when the adversary, symbolized by the Arab oil producers, proved not to be as intransigent as earlier prognoses had indicated. The sudden concern with the Third World probably did create a certain distortion in the way global politics was read and analyzed and thus prepared the way for the more recent desire to "set things straight" and to identify the correct enemy.

Tucker does not find the advocates of the new sensibility astute in their judgment of Third-World egalitarianism and its motives. They are inclined to sympathize with Third-World egalitarianism and to believe that their own perspectives and commitments converge with those of Third-World egalitarianism. Not so, says Tucker: the two concerns have different conceptions of equality as well as different emphases. The new sensibility arises out of a vision of shared humanity, out of a desire to see to it that the minimal needs of individuals are satisfied; the new egalitarianism is motivated by a desire for greater power within the present international system. The former expresses ambivalence toward the state; the latter seeks to aggrandize the power of states. In this view, the egalitarian quest of the Third World, while deriving some benefits from the new sensibility in the West, aims at a radically different world system from the one visualized by advocates of the new sensibility. This argument would lead us to believe that Western liberals are unwitting instruments of Third-World leaders who are playing an entirely different game, one as old as the system of

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states. "The challenge to the global status gap of wealth and power is a challenge by states made on behalf of states. The subjects of the new egalitarianism are states and states alone. It is states and states alone that have duties and, above all, rights" (p. 61).

IV

What explains the inability of the liberals in the West to see their own "true" interests and to recognize that the new egalitarianism aims at goals and a world different from their preferences? What—other than that unspoken belief that the rich and successful can often be deceived by the poor, who are full of tricks and cunning—can account for the failure of those who sit at the top to comprehend the aims of the state builders in the Third World? For Tucker, as it is for the British economist P. T. Bauer and others of their persuasion, the answer is the debilitating guilt that many in the West have come to feel about the basis of their wealth, about their right to it in a world of poverty and suffering. Bauer opens one essay on the subject[18] with a quotation from Yeats: "Come fix upon me that accusing eye. I thirst for accusation." And in a remarkable passage quite similar in tune to Kristol's and Nisbet's assertions that these sensibilities in the West are the product of guilt-ridden intellectuals and that they defy logic and reasoning, Bauer finds arguments and evidence against egalitarian claims as well as lamentations of Western guilt to be totally irrelevant, unlikely to "affect conduct and measures which are rooted in emotion, often reinforced by the play of personal and political interests."[19]

Guilt about a highly unequal world has led Western liberals to confuse the general proposition of equality with the more specific one of equality in the relations of states. Tucker and other critics of Third-World egalitarianism are committed to drawing as firm a distinction as possible between the two. Presumably, the first—equality as a general prerogative extended to individuals—is not as disruptive and radical a concept as the second, though the neoconservatives have no kind words to say about either. Their tolerance toward equality within states is relative; they become more sympathetic to it when discrediting the claims of Third-World states, as Tucker does when he writes that "there is no warrant for seeing in it [Third-World egalitarianism] the necessary precursor of growing equality within states." Indeed, equality among states may be "quite compatible with a continuing, even perhaps a

[18] Bauer, "Western Guilt and Third World Poverty," *Commentary*, Vol. 61 (January 1976), 31-38.
[19] *Ibid.*, 38.

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deepening inequality among individuals within states" (p. 6). The international system concerns not equality among humans, but among states. We are warned by Tucker and like-minded analysts not to confuse the two. The first goal may be tolerable, but certainly the second is not; societies may pledge themselves to greater equality among individuals in the domestic realm, but it is sheer folly to contemplate equality in the relations among states.

But is the distinction between the two forms of equality so clear? Is it as sharp as it is made out to be by Tucker and by other, less partisan, analysts? Does not the glory of the nation reflect on the individual citizen? And is it possible in a world of states for those interested in equality with their fellows to pursue that general proposition of equality without seeking to democratize the system of states? Yesterday, Third-World nationalism, led for the most part by elites sensitive to their disadvantage vis-à-vis Westerners with whom they came in contact, promoted statehood and independence as the preconditions for equality among humans. Today's egalitarian quest is a part of the same process; the system of states is again perceived to be an arena in which the desire for greater equality among men expresses itself through the state. That is why I have reservations about accepting, for example, the sharpness of Stanley Hoffmann's distinction between equality among states and the more general phenomenon of equality among men, as reflected in the following passage:

> What the United States is facing in today's world is mainly a demand for state equality. Some of the states that push this claim are oppressively inegalitarian at home. This is not enough of a reason to resist the demand, but, by itself, resisting it does not demonstrate a *general* inability to grasp equality. It only shows an unwillingness to make the *state system* more democratic.[20]

Hoffmann's point is well taken, and such a distinction has to be made. But to make it with such sharpness and totality is to lose that all-too-important connection that men have come to make between their own worth and the worth of the nation-state with which they identify, whose passport they carry, and onto which they project their own ambitions and desires for supremacy over other men who carry different passports and identify with different states. The attention paid by the world community to the remains of the American pilots and other American military personnel killed in Vietnam makes it clear that even in death,

[20] Hoffmann, "No Choice, No Illusions," *Foreign Policy*, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77), 120; emphases in original.

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some states can secure for *their* citizens the respect and deference that elude others. All things being equal, a Chilean clearly does not appear to be as important as an American because of the inequality of their states. The intimate connection between the place of the state in the international pecking order on the one hand, and the salience of its individual citizen on the other, animates the current quest for global equality. It can be seen in the desire of the Saudis and the Brazilians to change the system of states and state-ranking, and in the attempt of the Americans to sustain it. E. H. Carr perceived such a connection when he wrote about politics in the interwar period: "The conflict between privileged and underprivileged, between the champions of an existing order and the revolutionaries, which was fought out in the nineteenth century within the national communities of Western Europe, was transferred by the twentieth century to the international community. The nation became, more than ever before, the supreme unit round which centre human demands for equality and human ambitions for predominance."[21] And such is the situation in our own world. The state remains the outstanding instrument through which men seek dominance, equality, wealth, dignity, and the like. This dimension is missing in Tucker's analysis, for he is more interested in refuting the claims of the new egalitarianism than in understanding the forces that inspire men and societies to push for it.

The problem encountered here is pivotal and of considerable complexity: the relation between equality among states and equality among humans is not an easy one to resolve. In the rhetoric of the Third World the two are used interchangeably, and understandably so. The aim of Third-World spokesmen is clear; it is to endow their demands with the moral power and legitimacy conferred upon human equality as a desired value and goal. That is why we are repeatedly told in Third-World pronouncements that the developing countries are attacking a system which allocates 30 percent of the world's wealth to 70 percent of the world's population. The assumption is that improvements in the economic shares of states will promote equality among humans; that Third-World regimes are attacking international economic arrangements in order to promote equality within their boundaries. Opponents of Third-World egalitarians have naturally rejected such an assumption. They insist that the two forms of inequality are different, and that changes in the distribution of wealth among states do not guarantee increased economic equality to individuals. The point of contention is the capacity and the willingness of the state to distribute in a somewhat

[21] Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (New York: Harper & Row 1964), 227.

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egalitarian manner the increased income secured from the world market: i.e., higher revenues from the sale of oil, copper, wheat, and the like.

The rhetorical claims advanced by both sides reduce themselves to the following question: Do changes in the world system in the direction of greater equality *among* states necessarily translate into greater equality *within* states? On balance, the Third-World spokesmen ask us to believe that the answer is positive, whereas the critics of the Third World imply a generally negative answer. Both positions are in reality mere assertions; to give credence to either is a matter that entails more faith than analysis. Changes in the distribution of wealth among states do not automatically mean increased equality within them. Likewise, they do not necessarily entail, to use Tucker's term, "deepening" inequalities (p. 61). The result depends on the regime and society in question. One regime may allocate wealth generated in the international economic transactions to the upper classes in society; another may do the reverse and expend its new resources to improve the welfare of the citizenry. Both the spokesmen of Third-World egalitarianism and their critics in the First World are on weak grounds when they assert a general proposition as to the relationship between equality among states and equality within them. The claims of the Third World are inflated on this issue. At best, greater equality among states may facilitate the promotion of domestic equalities; the former may be a *necessary* condition, but it is far from *sufficient.* The result depends on domestic politics and priorities. But those who oppose Third-World egalitarianism are also in error. They overlook the conditions now embedded in the world system that must be removed if certain societies in the Third World are to tackle the question of domestic welfare for their citizenry.

Tucker and others who defend the existing distribution of world wealth and power invoke "order," "excellence," and "civilization" in their defense of Western prerogatives, but it should not come as a surprise to them that others do not see it that way. Different peoples have different conceptions of order. That is why the underprivileged try with whatever means at their disposal to bring the international system in line with their own values, preferences, and interests. Ultimately, there is a limit as to what those who wish the world to stand still can say about a system under stress and attack. They equate the world they prefer—and from which they benefit—with order, progress, civilization, and the like; they attack the motives of those who wish to change things, and they question the worth of what the challengers propose. But in the end, what lies behind the veneer of what

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E. H. Carr has called "convenient morality" is their own narrow interest, justified with appeals to seemingly more general and selfless motivations and concerns. Men like Moynihan and Kristol attack nuclear proliferation, the cartelization of raw materials, the radicalization of the United Nations, and they warn of the coming of a new dark age. In their absolutism, in the complete identity they perceive between their own interests and more general goals and values, they forget that others march to different drums; they succumb to the temptation which Mannheim identified as the hallmark of conservative thought: the belief in the "here and now"—that Utopia is always "embedded in existing reality."[22] It is the prerogative of conservatives to think that way, but that way is not binding on their adversaries, on those who entertain different Utopias and believe that man must not only live with existing reality as best he can, but must also seek to transform it.

Contemporary neoconservative thought, aside from questioning the motives of adversaries, fails to come to terms with the ideology of those who wish to change things. Its incapacity results from failing to look critically at social arrangements and to see in them the vested interests that sustain them, or the ways in which they work to the advantage or disadvantage of certain individuals, groups, or states. Consequently, neoconservative thought often degenerates into self-righteous denunciations of those who just do not seem to understand that certain things are here to stay, that the prevailing status quo is endowed with intrinsic moral worth, that nuclear weaponry (or wealth, for that matter) make sense in the hands of Westerners—but become a threat to order when others acquire them. That is why neoconservative thought of the kind subscribed to by Tucker is inevitably reduced to quite a simple formula: Unable to relinquish power, to share it with others, and to trust others with those things that define order—wealth, significance, dignity, weaponry—the neoconservatives urge the rolling back of change; they ask that the gunboats be dispatched again and yearn for the time when things were clear indeed, when the powerful relished power and the weak knew their place and kept it.

V

Tucker's incapacity to perceive that what he calls "order" does not inspire awe, belief, and respect in others is one problem; a more serious one arises in his view of the new sensibility. Throughout his analy-

[22] Mannheim (fn. 10), 233.

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sis, Tucker assumes that the new sensibility is politically radical; to him, its radicalism is a given. Because of its belief in interdependence, its insistence that we live in a consensual world and that equality is on the international agenda, the new sensibility becomes, in Tucker's view, a radical force that breaks with the established pattern of world politics. Two questions arise at this point: How radical is the new sensibility? How widespread are radical sentiments in the West on such issues as Third-World egalitarianism? Surely, an ideology that Tucker associates with Robert McNamara cannot be easily accepted as radical. Nor would Zbigniew Brzezinski qualify as a radical: he himself, it may be safely assumed, would reject such a label. To be sure, McNamara's and Brzezinski's prescriptions as to how a turbulent world can be managed are different from Tucker's, but that alone does not establish the radicalism of their views. Tucker and other neoconservatives could make a case for an alternative interpretation, to the effect that the advocates of the new sensibility do not wish to radically alter the distribution of world wealth and power. They merely want to patch up the existing system to arrive at a different way of securing American hegemony. The Trilateral Commission—a group of distinguished North American, European, and Japanese industrialists, academics, and policy makers—which favors "accommodation" with the Third World, may advocate the new sensibility, but can one realistically argue that it is a radical group? Or, as is more likely, does "trilateralism" seek to preserve American power by "restructuring" the international system and enhancing America's leverage over both its Western allies and the Third World? Stanley Hoffmann penetratingly criticizes trilateralism as another way of preserving "America's pride of place"; the contemplated structure would leave the United States as the central part and Japan and Europe as the "wings."[23] Moreover, in the trilateral scheme, some Third-World countries—the nouveaux riches such as Iran, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia—would be invited to share in the benefits of the international system, which would remain largely unchanged. Stability is secured by inviting the participation of the most resourceful among Third-World countries—the ones that possess a certain capacity for disrupting the prevailing system.[24] Co-optation would serve the role that Kristol and Tucker assign to gunboats, but that role falls short of the radicalism attributed by Tucker to the

[23] Hoffmann, "Choices," *Foreign Policy*, No. 12 (Fall 1973), 16.

[24] See the Trilateral Commission's pamphlet, "A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations," *The Triangle Papers*, No. 3 (New York: The Trilateral Commission 1974).

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new sensibility. Upon closer scrutiny, the new sensibility turns out to propose only a different strategy for taming the challenge of the Third World to the Western-based international order.

Two fairly recent essays may be taken as illustrative of the politics of the new sensibility. They reflect the reigning outlook on North-South economic relations in American official thinking and practice. Both are mainstream pieces of work whose authors, Tom Farer and Tony Smith, come close to the thinking associated with the Trilateral Commission and other centrist groups that are concerned with what has come to be labeled as the "management of interdependence." The management of interdependence picked up where the Nixon-Kissinger policy faltered and left off. In part, the debate between the two schools of thought is a debate between what Hoffmann has described as the *classiques* and the *modernes*, with Nixon-Kissinger representing the former and those who stress management of interdependence representing the latter.[25] For the *classiques*, geostrategic concerns are the most important; for the *modernes*, the emphasis is upon such newer matters as economic interdependence, trade, and the "pacification of the world through industrialization." If Tucker's work reflects the concerns of the *classiques*, Farer's and Smith's reflects those of the *modernes*.

Of the two, Farer's essay comes closer to stating in the most blunt and cynical terms possible what the "management of interdependence" school of thought proposes to do about the challenge to global inequality.[26] Its author urges the advanced societies of the Western world to remember the way they resolved their own class conflict by the "creaming off and cooptation of the natural elite of the working class." That strategy "succeeded in creating two classes with sharply divergent interests. Members of the lower classes who worked in the key industrial and service sectors acquired a bourgeois outlook; they came to identify more closely with the upper classes than with those who were left behind." Farer recommends globalizing that strategy. He considers the prospects for its success in the global arena to be even more promising than those of its domestic predecessor. "Our conflict," he writes, "is not with huge anonymous masses whose demands have to be aggregated through fairly uncertain representational arrangements. For the most part, Third World elites are even less committed to human equality as a general condition than are we. They are talking about greater equality between states. And in their largely authori-

[25] Hoffmann (fn. 23), 6-12.

[26] Tom J. Farer, "The United States and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54 (October 1975), 79-97.

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tarian systems, the state is they."[27] Under these conditions, notes Farer, the leaders can control their followers: "There is, moreover, no reason to doubt whether the negotiators can deliver their constituents." Nor need the Western world worry about having to co-opt a large number of states to play "senior decision-making roles in the management structure of the international economy. In Africa, only Nigeria. In Latin America, Brazil and Venezuela, perhaps Mexico. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran. And in Asia, India and Indonesia."[28] Farer recommends this sort of strategy in an essay that praises "accommodationist" thinking as "the essense of statesmanship" and condemns the "confrontationist" politics associated with Irving Kristol and Daniel P. Moynihan.

Smith's essay[29] makes equally "progressive" claims; it too attacks Moynihan and Kristol as reactionaries. Smith proceeds to state what he calls the "liberal position." In language, emphasis on the postulates of interdependence, and priorities as to the primacy of economic equity questions, the essay epitomizes Tucker's new sensibility. But the new language conceals old politics and attitudes. After a fairly lengthy treatment of the issues that separate the North from the South, Smith spells out his case for reforming the world's economic system. Reform, he says, has nothing to do with moral claims; it should be pursued because of two principal reasons: it promises to increase Northern leverage over the South, and it promises to harmonize relations among the Northern states. The first reason is advanced after a discourse on the already considerable vulnerability to Western pressures on the part of Third-World societies, which would be rendered even weaker and placed at the mercy of outsiders. Such is the "liberal position"; the article pre-empts both the moral space and the *Realpolitik*. It speaks both the language of shared humanity and the language of power:

> But there are more substantial reasons, hitherto largely ignored, that the North should promote a package of reforms. The most obvious is the opportunity to change what would appear to be *concessions* to the South into *leverage* over it. For as debt financing, market access programs, and buffer stocks and earning stabilization schemes become more highly institutionalized, the Third World would become more systematically integrated into the international system. Given the relative balance of power between North and South . . . this could only enhance Northern power as it increased Southern vulnerability. Through increased lever-

[27] *Ibid.*, 92. [28] *Ibid.*, 93.

[29] Tony Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power Since 1945," *International Organization*, XXXI (Winter 1977), 1-27.

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age, the North could better control trade and investment relations with the South and exercise more direct political influence.[30]

Moreover, another service can be rendered by exercising "leverage" over the poor:

> There seems to be widespread agreement that in the wake of American involvement in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the bonds uniting the Atlantic Alliance have weakened. The obvious danger is that the current Southern demands could drive another wedge among the members of OECD, further fragmenting the North. By the same token, however, American leadership in responding creatively to Southern proposals could encourage a coordination of Northern interests and policies which would substantially reinforce OECD unity.[31]

Stanley Hoffmann's recent reminder that "pacification once became a synonym for devastation"[32] comes to mind in this context. Reform becomes a synonym for hegemony. The new sensibility does not give away as much as Tucker thinks it does. It lacks his and Kristol's bluntness, but it has yet to abandon hegemonic politics. It wishes to have it both ways: retain what is, yet entertain the illusion that it is on the morally justifiable side.[33]

VI

With considerable justification, a skeptic may add that the plight of the "bottom 40 percent" is not what the "new international economic order" is all about, and that none of the contending groups in the debate has a solution to that problem: neither the neoconservatives with their prescription for toughness, nor the "liberal accommodationists" with their emphasis on *embourgeoisement* and co-optation of the Third-World regimes that have been the main beneficiaries of the new international order.[34] The derivative argument that emerges in a num-

[30] *Ibid.*, 26; emphases in original.

[31] *Ibid.*, 26-27.

[32] Hoffmann (fn. 20), 99.

[33] For a thoughtful critique along these lines, see Richard A. Falk, "Beyond Internationalism," *Foreign Policy*, No. 24 (Fall 1976), 65-113.

[34] For one scenario that places its faith in the "deradicalization" and *embourgeoisement* of OPEC countries, see Roger Hansen, "The Political Economy of North-South Relations: How Much Change?," *International Organization*, XXIX (Autumn 1975), 911-47. As Hansen puts it (p. 939): "Why should the Shah of Iran pour funds into India and Bangladesh when he has his own empire to build, his own vision to create in his own country? Why should Venezuela and Brazil contribute funds indiscriminately to the Fourth World when they have their own (perhaps clashing) destinies to meet in a continent slowly liberated from U. S. hegemony? In other words, isn't the *embourgeoisement* of the Third World into the present international system a more likely outcome than a system transformation based upon a North-South relationship of major tension (at first normative and economic, then increasingly strategic-diplomatic)?"

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ber of Western analyses, including Tucker's, maintains that the new egalitarianism is not such a noble thing after all; it is motivated only by a crude struggle for world wealth and power. But until men and societies renounce both, there is no need to attack the motives of those who seek those goals. Nor should it come as a surprise that societies at the receiving end of Western domination should pursue those things that propelled the West to its ascendant position.

Critics of Third-World egalitarianism single out for particular censure a double standard discernible in the arguments of Third-World spokesmen: the assertion of Third-World autonomy and sovereignty, together with an assertion of global interdependence that justifies their demand for Western aid. The critics should abide by their own logic and avoid a double standard of their own: they cannot hold onto and value wealth and power, and at the same time demean those who wish to accumulate them. Until conditions around us take a complete radical turn, the case for the new international economic order, with all its attendant problems and risks, is formidable indeed. It challenges the hitherto unequal distribution of wealth and power, and one can easily make for it a second-best argument: although it has not brought about an equitable and just world, it has exposed the inadequacies of the old order and challenged its assumptions and justifications.

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THE EMERGING MORPHOLOGY OF THE WORLD'S LEGISLATURES

By SAMUEL C. PATTERSON

G. R. Boynton and Chong Lim Kim, eds., *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975, 286 pp., $11.75.
Abdo I. Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976, 316 pp., $11.50.
Allan Kornberg and William Mishler, *Influence in Parliament: Canada*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976, 403 pp., $14.75.
Peter Vanneman, *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Union*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977, 256 pp., $11.75.
Albert F. Eldridge, ed., *Legislatures in Plural Societies: The Search for Cohesion in National Development*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977, 284 pp., $12.75.
Giuseppe di Palma, *Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 299 pp., $12.50.

I

ELECTED representative assemblies—legislatures—have been given various holistic characterizations. They have been said to be venerable, paradoxical, ubiquitous, resilient, multipurpose organizations. Students of legislative politics have noted the complexity of the legislative institution, the ambiguities of legislative representation, and the perplexing variegation among political systems in the shaping of the legislature to the larger cultural-institutional matrix. The functional diversification of legislatures has prompted sundry efforts at classification, none of them particularly successful. For many commentators, the parent generalization has been that legislative bodies have declined in political importance from their presumedly more significant decision-making role in the 19th century, but this assertion is almost surely methodologically inadequate, historically inaccurate, and theoretically impoverished. Yet, these fascinating political institutions have, until recently, not been investigated systematically in any numbers. Perhaps the belief that legislatures had declined made them seem trivial to scholars, who therefore directed their attention elsewhere. Functionalist comparative political analysis seemed to suggest that legislatures, preemptively assigned to the rule-making function, were not in reality actively performing that function; the developmental complexity of

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the legislature in its institutional setting has made systematic comparative inquiry conceptually difficult.

It is only in the last few years that legislative research has begun to proliferate, generally from a comparative point of view.[1] After many years of fixation on American legislatures,[2] about which a great deal is now known, American scholars have begun systematic investigation of legislatures in other political systems. That research activity has been exemplified in the establishment of a legislative research consortium consisting of research teams at the University of Iowa, Duke University, the University of Hawaii, and the State University of New York at Albany. This Consortium for Comparative Legislative Studies, guided by Allan Kornberg of Duke University, has undertaken the publication of a series of legislative studies through Duke University Press under the editorship of Malcolm E. Jewell of the University of Kentucky. Gerhard Loewenberg brought about the creation of a Comparative Legislative Research Center at the University of Iowa, which has initiated collaborative research on the legislatures of South Korea, Kenya, Turkey, Switzerland, Belgium, and Italy, and the publication of a quarterly journal devoted to legislative research, the *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.

Of equal interest has been the growth of legislative research by scholars abroad. Only ten years ago, there were very few major studies at the national level of any parliamentary institution other than the United States Congress; one major exception was Loewenberg's seminal study of the German Bundestag.[3] Today, there is a rapidly growing body of research on non-American legislatures, including a substantial compendium of basic information on 56 parliaments, compiled under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union; a major compilation of dis-

[1] Comparative legislative research has been discussed in many places, but see especially Nelson W. Polsby, "Legislatures," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Governmental Institutions and Processes*, V, *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 257-319; Patterson, "Comparative Legislative Behavior: A Review Essay," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XII (November 1968), 599-616; Patterson, "The British House of Commons as a Focus for Political Research," *British Journal of Political Science*, III (July 1973), 363-81; and Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke, "Trends and Prospects in Legislative Behavior Research," in Patterson and Wahlke, eds., *Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research* (New York: Wiley-Interscience 1972), 289-303.

[2] The research literature on Congress is enormous, and there has been a great deal of research on state legislatures as well. For a synthesis, see Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States* (3rd ed.; New York: Random House 1977). Recent studies of Congress have been assessed in Malcolm E. Jewell, "New Perspectives on the U. S. Congress: A Review Article," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, II (February 1977), 77-91.

[3] Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1967).

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senting votes in the British House of Commons; and substantial monographs on legislative behavior in Finland, France, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, in addition to the contributions noted at the head of this review.[4] As a consequence, we now have in our literature some systematic research on legislative behavior in about 25 political systems other than the United States, with quite an impressive geographical distribution. This research has focused primarily upon (1) the internal structure of parliament and patterns of behavior of its members, often based upon data from personal interviews with legislators, and (2) the relationships between legislators and their constituents. Although the conceptual and methodological sophistication of these recent studies is marked, their impact is not highly cumulative in theoretical terms. These inquiries are exploratory mapping operations that are essential to comparative research on legislative behavior.

II

The volumes edited by Eldridge and by Boynton and Kim add to the growing number of anthologies of research materials about legislative politics.[5] These two collections focus upon representative assemblies in the "developing countries," and strongly reflect functionalist concerns. (Robert Packenham correctly observed a number of years ago that "everyone who has written about legislatures is, explicitly or implicitly, a functionalist.")[6] The major emphasis of the research reported here is on the contribution that legislatures make to political integration. The collection by Boynton and Kim includes studies of the legislatures of Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan, Thailand, Colombia, South Vietnam, Kenya, the Philippines, and South Korea; the

[4] See Valentine Herman and Françoise Mendel, *Parliaments of the World* (London: Macmillan 1976); Philip Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1945–74* (London: Macmillan 1975); Matti Oksanen, *Kansanedustajan Rooli* (Helsinki: Oy Gaudeamus Ab 1972); Pekka Nyholm, *Parliament, Government and Multi-Dimensional Party Relations in Finland* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica 1972); Roland Cayrol, Jean-Luc Parodi, and Colette Ysmal, *Le Député Français* (Paris: Armand Colin 1973); Frederic Debuyst, *La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes d'Acces et Images* (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques 1966); Soren Holmberg, *Riksdagen Representerar Svenska Folket* (Lund: Studentlitteratur 1974); Heinz Rausch, *Bundestag und Bundesregierung: Eine Institutionenkunde* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck 1976); Franco Cazzola, *Governo e Opposizione nel Parlamento Italiano* (Milan: Dott. A. Guiffre Editore 1974); Jan Kooiman, *Over de Kamer Gesproken* (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij 1976).

[5] Previous anthologies include Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf, eds., *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1970); Allan Kornberg, ed., *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective* (New York: David McKay 1973); and Patterson and Wahlke (fn. 1).

[6] Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development," in Kornberg and Musolf (fn. 5), 523.

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anthology by Eldridge includes India, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Canada, and Lebanon. One form that these analyses of the integrative contributions of legislatures takes is an assessment of the role of the legislator as intermediary between the citizens in his constituency and the central bureaucratic apparatus. The empirical studies have unmasked a remarkable amount of "linkage" activity on the part of Third-World legislators. Before the collapse of the regime, Allan E. Goodman found that South Vietnamese assemblymen engaged in constituency service activities to a substantial degree, in spite of citizens' distrust of and hostility toward the regime, and in spite of their own opposition to the government (Boynton and Kim, 186-90). Legislators are often highly salient to citizens in the Third World, notwithstanding the belief of some that Third-World citizens are politically innocent—that they are bovine and apathetic peasants. Indeed, constituents of these legislatures can be shown to be more aware and knowledgeable about their legislator and his activities than are citizens in the European and Anglo-American industrial countries. More than 80 percent of Kenyans interviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins in 1971 knew the names of their legislators, and a considerable proportion had sophisticated notions of their activities (Boynton and Kim, 222). Third-World legislators may be recruited in such a way as to maximize their linkage potential. Thus, of legislators in Rajasthan, Richard Sisson and Lawrence L. Shrader conclude that, "While members of the legislative assembly tend to be 'modern' men, they have close associations with the constituencies they represent. Most have close familial and ancestral ties; most spend considerable time in their constituency; most spend most of their time actively engaged in politics" (Eldridge, 89). Thus, "their ability to link a relatively traditional general society and the more modern political system effectively derives in part from their personal transitional experiences that incorporate both styles" (Eldridge, 270). And Third-World legislators are often highly constituency-oriented. Chong Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo classified about 78 percent of South Korean assemblymen interviewed in 1968–1969 as "delegates" (Boynton and Kim, 264); reports from other legislatures in the Third World (e.g., Afghanistan, India, Kenya, Lebanon) indicate approximately the same incidence of constituency orientation on the part of legislators.

Another form which the analysis of the integrative function of the legislature has taken has involved focusing upon mechanisms of representation in the assembly, and the access these mechanisms give to forces in the society. In Northern Ireland, Parliament was essentially

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an institutional embodiment of the Unionist Party; far from contributing to political integration, Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary show how the Ulster legislature exacerbated conflict and ultimately became defunct (Eldridge, 195-96). In Lebanon, according to Abdo I. Baaklini, delicate mechanisms for the representation of sectarian groups seemed to form the basis for the integration of that very pluralistic system (Eldridge, 244-62); but these representational devices proved, in the end, to be very brittle. In Yugoslavia, great efforts were made after 1968 to enhance the integrative capability of the Federal Assembly; these efforts did not prove to be very successful because the legislature lacked a consensual basis for compromise. Nevertheless, some cathartic release seems to have been beneficial to the Yugoslav system. But, according to Lenard J. Cohen,

> These benefits . . . were achieved at considerable cost to the effectiveness of the policy-making process and the overall development of the parliamentary system. In the absence of additional mechanisms or motivating forces for the aggregation of interests on a cross-regional basis, the Federal Assembly could not perform its tasks successfully. The tendency of federal deputies in the Chamber of Nationalities to act exclusively as conduits for their regional and ethnic constituencies only amplified the conflicts already present in society and failed to resolve them (Eldridge, 151).

Thus, party and electoral systems that regulate the selection of legislators and their performance may facilitate an integrating capability for the legislature, or they may not. The lessons of Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia serve to detail the ways in which mechanisms of access and the structure of legislative conflict may enervate the legislature's capacity to contribute to political integration.

III

Four of the studies under review deal with legislative politics in a single country—Lebanon, Canada, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Baaklini's study of the Lebanese Parliament deals with its history, the recruitment of its members, and structures and processes internal to the Chamber. He argues that the Parliament emerged gradually as a viable legislative body from beginnings in the 19th century, abetted by the modernizing influences of the Maronite Church and the Maronites' determination to create an independent Lebanon in which their religious beliefs would be protected. He also asserts that the predominant Lebanese political class reached the consensus that a pluralist society required a representative assembly in which sectarian differences would

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be carefully balanced; that evolutionary rather than abrupt change should be the course of Lebanese public policy; that the state should only minimally interfere in personal and communal affairs; that a free economic system would help preserve national independence; and that traditional cultural values should be kept strong.

In his analysis of the recruitment of members of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, Baaklini exemplifies the effort to subdue sectarian conflict in political practice. Legislative seats were distributed according to a formula of six Christian seats for every five Moslem seats, and the electoral system was designed so as to accommodate the representation of regions. The author shows voters to have been fairly active participants in legislative elections—elections that were highly competitive. And he points out the remarkably minimal participation of organized political parties in legislative elections: typically, only about one-third of the legislative seats were held by partisan members.

In portraying the internal organization of the Chamber, Baaklini shows that (1) parliamentary leadership in Lebanon was strong; (2) the Chamber had developed a robust committee system; (3) the Parliament had a significant decision-making function to perform; and (4) legislative-executive relations had evolved in such a way as to preserve legislative autonomy. He pronounces the Lebanese parliament a success as a legislative institution.

> . . . the legislature has succeeded in creating a symbiotic relationship with the executive where both stand to gain as a result of cooperation and both stand to perish in the case of serious conflict. The cabinet . . . became less an instrument of executive domination and more of a reconciliatory board between the various groups in the Chamber. The president of the Republic . . . became the arbitrator-at-large. . . . Similar interdependencies were established between the legislature and other institutions in the country. Thus the ecclesiastical institutions were brought into the mainstream of political life. . . . At an early stage the bureaucracy was politicized and remained under political direction and control. . . . The army remained a professional army and the press a free press (p. 236).

Baaklini's study of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies in no way foreshadows the disastrous events that were occurring by the time the book was published. He maintains that Lebanon's was not fundamentally a politics of sectarian conflict, and that, like Switzerland, Lebanon had found a representative formula for ameliorating intergroup conflicts. The immensely destructive sectarian conflict of 1975–1976, ignited by the presence of large numbers of Palestinians and extensive Israeli raids into southern Lebanon in 1975, gives evidence of the fragility of

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the Lebanese political formula for which we could not have been prepared by Baaklini's analysis of Lebanese legislative politics.

In contrast to Baaklini's synoptic effort to assess the contribution of the Parliament to the political development of Lebanon, Kornberg and Mishler analyze the Canadian House of Commons with a more limited perspective. Their central purpose is to find out why some M.P.'s are more influential than others. In the course of answering this question, they provide some rich detail about the institutional character of the Canadian House. But the main analysis is very straightforward and can be summarized quite parsimoniously by simply reproducing their conceptual framework.

KORNBERG AND MISHLER'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE IN THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS



Reproduced, by permission of the authors, from *Influence in Parliament: Canada*, p. 11.

The data for Kornberg and Mishler's research were generated by interviewing 189 of the 264 Canadian M.P.'s in 1971–1972. The focal points of these interviews were attributions solicited from the M.P.'s as to who were the "most influential" members of the House. The authors rated legislative influence by counting the number of nominations each M.P. received as being among the ten most influential members. The methodological tools employed were multiple regression and causal modeling.

It hardly does justice to the richness of the analysis presented by Kornberg and Mishler to say that their explanation for influence dif-

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ferentials among Canadian M.P.'s is unsurprising. The general outcome of the inquiry is that reputed influence is quite highly concentrated in all of the parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, the authors found a number of variations in the attributions of influence (for instance, 75 percent of the interviewed M.P.'s included Prime Minister Trudeau among the ten most influential members, but one is struck by the fact that the remaining 25 percent did not). A Canadian M.P. is thought to be influential mainly because he occupies a formal position of leadership and participates actively in the business of the House. Since about 10 percent of the frontbenchers were not nominated as being influential, and about 3 percent of the backbenchers were nominated frequently, other factors in the acquisition of personal influence are indicated. These other factors seem to involve mainly (1) a reputation for exercising good judgment and personal integrity; (2) being seen as a knowledgeable and skillful legislator; and (3) being able to reap the benefits of propinquity.

Kornberg and Mishler make an important contribution to the understanding of Canadian legislative politics in their demonstration of the differentials in attributed influence as between the Liberal and Conservative Parties. At various points in their inquiry they are able to show relationships that "point to the importance of achievement in the Liberal party and of ascription in the Conservative party" (p. 298). For instance, the authors found adult political socialization to be more substantially linked to parliamentary influence among Liberals, while characteristics of social background were more important predictors for Conservatives. Liberals were more active in committees and party caucuses than Conservatives, and more inclined to acquire the expert knowledge made possible by that participation. Thus, in general terms, Liberals come to have influence, and in turn become leaders, because they are the kinds of people who actively involve themselves in parliamentary work. Conservatives become leaders primarily because of their social status, their beliefs, their seniority, and their service to the extra-parliamentary party organization. In Nelson Polsby's terminology, the Canadian analysis strongly indicates that the Liberal M.P.'s (and members of the New Democratic Party, as well) in the House of Commons tend in the direction of a "transformative" concept of the function of Parliament, with its emphasis upon activities related to lawmaking—transforming public policy proposals into law.[7] In contrast, Conservative (and Social Credit) M.P.'s harbor the conception that the Parliament is an "arena" in which the role of the member is properly that

[7] Polsby (fn. 1), 277.

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of participating in highly visible plenary sessions, and that the tasks of the House are those of "agenda-setting and of establishing national priorities" (p. 307).

Italy suffers from what di Palma calls "the syndrome" of social, political, and economic crisis and the inability of the government to govern effectively. He inquires how the Italian system survives by analyzing the performance of the Italian Parliament. Performance, for di Palma, means successfully forming "at least sufficient, that is viable, agreement around decisions" (p. 9), so that rule-making can take place. The data for this analysis consist of 2,734 laws and legislative proposals made between 1948 and 1972, and of interviews with 160 members of the Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies conducted in 1970–1971. The analysis of these data rests largely on the comparison of proportions. But the data analysis and interpretation are handled masterfully.

Di Palma's analysis produces the following main conclusions about the Italian Parliament: (1) The Parliament is a highly autonomous, productive legislature. (2) There is considerable room for individual legislative initiative on the part of ordinary members. (3) In enactment of laws, committee processes, and the amending process, there is a substantial degree of concurrence between Christian Democratic deputies and Communists, illustrated by the finding that "more than 70 percent of the bills initiated by the government or by Christian Democratic members *alone* are approved with the vote of the Communist party" (p. 56; emphasis in original). (4) Italian legislation leans heavily to the trivial, fragmented, and largely uncontroversial because Parliament tends to avoid facing up to the crucial issues of the state: the Italian Parliament is "an institution [which is] unable to form agreement around decisions [but it] does not stop making them; it rather adapts its processes and products to the circumstances" (p. 93). (5) Both within and between the parliamentary parties, there is fundamental disagreement over the decisional rules *and* widespread dissatisfaction with them; this disagreement "triggers conflict over 'unnatural' legislative alliances, stalls major legislative initiatives, but at the same time leaves parliamentary alliances that include the opposition free to indulge in the transaction of marginal legislation" (p. 131). (6) Parliament is not a "negotial" body in the sense that compromise on crucial issues, widely accepted among deputies in principle, is not really seen to be possible in practice. (7) Members of Parliament are predominantly "party delegates" whose conception of "representation almost

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always involved the idea of translating and absorbing popular demands in a partisan ideology" (p. 165), as these popular demands are channeled through party organizations. (8) Although the parliamentary committees have formidable powers (they can enact legislation on their own, without the approval of plenary sessions of the House), committees in general exhibit conflict-avoiding rather than decision-making strategies. Of the committee-centered, decentralized legislative procedure, di Palma says:

> . . . the simple fact that the procedure is available and its use is in no way jointly programmed and constrained shields and therefore encourages government irresponsibility. The government can conveniently and safely count on the procedure's relative privacy and informality to practice . . . "majority obstructionism." It can rely on its senators and deputies in the committees and on committee chairmen to delay and possibly arrest approval of legislation included only pro forma in the coalition program. The opposition, on the other hand, finds in the procedure an opportunity to exploit the fragmentation of government action and to achieve a limited modus vivendi. Convenient as all of this may be for survival, it still leaves the matter of mutual decisional roles unsettled; indeed, it further confuses them (p. 217).

In short, the Italian Parliament exercises substantial law-making power—it is "transformative"—but it does so largely in relation to "small laws" (*leggine*). Because parliamentarians disagree fundamentally over the rules of legislative decision making, the Italian system is "surviving without governing."

The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union usually is written off in treatments of legislative bodies on grounds that it is merely a "rubber stamp," nothing more than an audience to provide applause for the oratory of Soviet Communist Party leaders. Vanneman does observe that the plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet are perfunctory and infrequent, but he focuses upon the very real increase in legislative activity by the Soviet parliament during the last twenty years. The first half of Vanneman's study is a careful legal and historical presentation. The second half deals with the contemporary role of the Supreme Soviet. Of particular interest is the analysis of the operation of committees of the Supreme Soviet insofar as they effect public policy and engage in monitoring administrative agencies of the Soviet Government.

Vanneman shows that participation in the work of Supreme Soviet committees has multiplied. While the author confirms that policy initiation and ultimate decision making remains very much in the hands

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of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, his analysis indicates that significant growth has taken place in the power of the parliamentary committees to amend and revise legislation. Moreover, the committees have come to play an important role in monitoring the work of government ministries through investigation, auditing, and publicity. The emergence of oversight activities on the part of the 26 Soviet parliamentary committees (which in Soviet parlance is called "kontrol") is, Vanneman believes, "a modest progressive institutional reform which provides the party apparatus with an additional line of supervision of the Council of Ministers and the ministries" (p. 166). His analysis demonstrates the ways in which the C.P.S.U. leadership dominates the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the parliamentary committees, although only about 72 percent of the members of the Supreme Soviet are C.P.S.U. members. He cautiously inclines to the view that party control of the Supreme Soviet, and especially the greater interlocking of members of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee with key positions in the Supreme Soviet, indicates greater support for the institutional interests of the Supreme Soviet in high echelons of the party, and accordingly an enhancement of the political power of the parliament.

IV

Legislatures come in different sizes and shapes, and seem to be doing diverse things. Polsby's differentiation between "transformative" and "arena" legislatures, while it has intuitive appeal, serves to segregate the world's legislatures into two very heterogeneous clusters. As the legislative studies briefly described here suggest, there are arenas and arenas, transformative parliaments and transformative parliaments. The Afghanistani representative assembly is quite a different arena from the Canadian Parliament; the Italian Parliament is quite a different kind of transformative assembly from the United States Congress.

Sooner or later, legislative studies are brought to reflect upon the consequences that the legislative institutions have on the political context in which they are enmeshed. Such reflection, though observational, involves many oversimplifications and ambiguities, and may require a temporary suspension of disbelief. Nevertheless, we abandon the search for helpful typologies at the peril of a repetition of purely descriptive accounts which merely consolidate the certainty that nothing about legislatures is generic, and that therefore no comparative study of legislative behavior is possible. The United States Congress may, for example, be thought of as a representative body whose principal function

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is that of *legislating*. Although it is influenced by the executive, Congress in our polity has the very significant role of initiating and innovating public policy. Surely, it has other important functions as well: it engages in authorizing and approving executive action; its electoral, constituency-service, and ombudsmanic activities have integrating consequences; and its imprimatur serves to legitimate actions. Congress is a highly institutionalized organization, given its autonomy, complexity, durability, and coherence. The scope of its legislative influence is general, and its power structure is committee-centered, denoting its substantive lawmaking function. While many roles are played by its members, the characteristic one is that of lawmaker. As a highly developed institution, well-anchored in its social milieu, its constituent function is "emergent" in the sense that it is highly responsive or, in a manner of speaking, representative from the "bottom up."

The Canadian Parliament is essentially an *authorizing* representative body. Its major function is to enable its leadership—the political executive—to govern. This is not to say that ordinary members do not influence policy, nor to suggest that the Parliament is not transformative in any sense. But it does appear that "Canadian party leaders have succeeded in turning their backbench colleagues into the functional equivalent of a staff that apprises them of public opinion and also handles much of the case work" (Kornberg and Mishler, 316). Parliament does, indeed, engage in integrating and legitimizing activities; recent reforms of its committee structure (among other things) suggest a more significant future for its legislating role. It is a party-centered legislature, though, in which the predominant role of the legislator is that of party man. The scope of its legislative influence is quite general, its constituency function is emergent, and it is moderately well institutionalized as an organization.

The Third World legislatures analyzed in the studies reported in this essay are largely significant to their polities for their *integrating* function. They tend to be executive-dominant bodies dealing mainly with intermediate and limited policy questions and with "directive" constituent functions; the characteristic legislative role is that of an intermediary, representing the constituents' needs and carrying government policies to the constituencies for endorsement and acquiescence. In the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviet is a *legitimizing* representative body, engaged in transformative activities primarily to the extent of raising problems and perfecting details; it is executive-controlled and highly directive in its nexus with its constituency.

These characterizations may be summarized in the following way:

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TYPES OF LEGISLATURES

Principal Function	*Institution-alization*	*Constituent Function*	*Characteristic Role of Legislator*	*Major Feature of the Power Structure*	*Scope of Policy Influence*
Legislating	High	Emergent	Lawmaker	Committee-centered	General
Authorizing	Moderately High	Emergent	Party functionary	Party-centered	General
Integrating	Moderately Low	Directive or service	Intermediary	Executive-dominant	Intermediate and limited
Legitimizing	Low	Directive	Ratifier	Executive-controlled	Details

Kornberg and Mishler's study of the Canadian Parliament reveals some of the tension that exists in a single representative body between legislating and authorizing functions, indicating a major difference between the Liberals and Conservatives in their conceptions of the principal function of Parliament. Di Palma's Italian study shows us how, when contextual circumstances are such that party polarization is unavoidable and there is fundamental disagreement over the decision rules, a legislating parliament can palliatively evade major societal conflicts and demands, and focus upon intermediate and clientelistic policy questions.

These categories are mainly suggestive, and are intended to preface a call for a morphology of the world's legislatures which moves increasingly away from investigations of single legislatures to more genuinely comparative inquiries. Such endeavors will require students of legislative politics to be more inventive in constructing macro-level indicators of legislative behavior, performance, structure, and function—including constructing such indices out of the rich individual-level interview data that political scientists have come to be so clever in amassing. At the same time, there is much to be said for intensive inquiries of the sort reflected in the studies considered here, insofar as they serve as the "giants" on the shoulders of which comparative generalizations may be built, rather than as ends in themselves.

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